


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8 JULY 1992



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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Col-Gen Gromov Appointed Deputy Defense Minister

92UM1199A Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
30 Jun 92 First edition p 1

[Report: "Col Gen Gromov, Boris Vsevolodovich"]

[Text] **By decree of the President of Russia Colonel-General Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov has been appointed Deputy Defense Minister of the Russian Federation.**

He was born on 7 November 1943 in the city of Saratov. He completed the Suvorov Military School in Kalinin in 1962 and the Leningrad Higher Combined-Arms Command School in 1965. He commanded a platoon and a company. After graduating with distinction from the Academy imeni M.V. Frunze in 1972, he successively occupied the posts of battalion commander, regimental chief of staff and then commander, chief of staff and then commander of a motorized-rifle division. He received early promotions to Major, Lieutenant-Colonel and Colonel.

He completed the General Staff Academy with distinction and a gold medal in 1984 and was appointed deputy commander of an army, first in Belarus and then the 40th Army in Afghanistan (1987-1979), the latter while simultaneously serving as agent of the government of the USSR for the temporary presence of Soviet troops in the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]. Prior to that he had served twice in Afghanistan: from February 1980 to August 1982 and from March 1985 to April 1986.

From 1989 to 1990 he commanded the Kiev Military District. He was appointed first deputy minister of internal affairs of the USSR in December 1990 while remaining a regular member of the armed forces. He recently served as first deputy commander of the Ground Troops.

He is a Hero of the Soviet Union and the holder of five orders and medals.

Findings of Commission on WWII Losses

92UM1183A Moscow *SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA*
in Russian 23 Jun 92 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Then We Began to Count Wounds: The Adjusted Statistics on Losses in World War II"]

[Text] The work of clarifying the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War has been carried out over a number of years at the General Staff and at the main staffs of the Armed Services. Careful scrutiny was made of not only the reports from the fronts and armies but also from the formations and units, in

addition to data on the registration of servicemen with the military commissariats, the military medical institutions and so forth.

In the aim of making a more careful study of the documents from various departments, for verifying the reliability of the data prepared at the General Staff and for comparing them with other information published in our country and abroad, in April 1988, by an Order of the USSR Minister of Defense, a commission was appointed under the chairmanship of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff Col Gen M.A. Gareyev. The members of the commission included representatives from all the directorates of the Ministry of Defense involved in the data on the losses of personnel during the war.

Great help in the work of the commission was provided by co-workers from the USSR Goskomstat [State Statistics Committee], the Academy of Sciences, Moscow State University and other scientific institutions, as well as prominent demographers and specialists such as: D.N. Valentey, V.V. Yelizarov, A.A. Isupov, A.Ya. Kvasha, V.I. Kozlov, T.V. Levina, A.A. Piontovskiy, L.Ye. Darskiy-Tolchinskiy, S.Ya. Shcherbov, Ye.M. Andreyev and others.

In the course of the Commission's work, in addition to studying the official documents for our side and the German, a close study was also made of the previous publications in the press and in the various historical works. Many of them err on the side of major inaccuracies, particularly in terms of the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces. In certain instances the number of losses included the servicemen who initially had been taken prisoner and later died in prison; no count was made of the persons who returned from being a prisoner and who reenlisted in the Soviet Army on liberated territory. In one instance they took only the irrecoverable losses and in another the losses included the wounded. The losses of servicemen included the civilians who perished in the Nazi camps, the Vlasovites, Banderov members and other persons who fought on the side of Nazi Germany.

The incorrect approach to determining the war losses and in a number of instances the simply evil-intentioned publications led to the appearance in the press of the most improbable conjectures on the losses of our Armed Forces of some 5-7 and even 14 fold more than the supposed losses of Nazi Germany. The conclusions of the commission refute these fabrications and establish that the ratio of losses was 1.3:1, not to say that at the end of the war the Nazi Army surrendered fully to the Soviet Army and its allied armies.

We would like to point out that the losses of our Armed Forces in the past war were truly great and the reasons for these require a more thorough and objective investigation, but we must not allow any blasphemous gloating or any fabrications about these sad facts.

V. Gurkin, Maj Gen (Ret) and co-worker at the Historical Archives and Military Memorial Center.

[Report of Commission]

As a result of a careful study and generalization of all available materials and documents, the commission has established the following:

1. The total losses of personnel in the Soviet Armed Forces including the Border and Interior Troops, during the years of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 were 11,444,100 persons. This included:

1. Killed and dying from wounds during the stages of evacuation to hospitals (according to the troop reports and the data of the TsVMU [Central Military Medical Directorate] of the MO [Ministry of Defense] with a total of 6,329,500 persons.

2. Perished from diseases, died as a result of accidents and incidents, condemned to execution (noncombat losses) with 555,500 persons.

3. Missing in action, taken prisoner (according to troop reports and the repatriation bodies) with 3,396,400 persons.

4. Uncounted losses from the first months of the war, when reports were not received from the fronts and armies (killed, missing in action, taken prisoner), and established by calculation using individual archival documents, including those of the Nazi Military Command, with 1,162,600 persons.

At the same time, on the basis of the research on documents from the military mobilizational and repatriation bodies, the Commission established that 939,700 servicemen who previously had been taken prisoner, who were surrounded and were on occupied territory of the USSR, had reenlisted, and 1,836,562 former servicemen returned from prison at the end of the war. These servicemen (2,775,700 persons) were excluded from the irrecoverable losses of the Armed Forces by the Commission.

Thus, the irrecoverable losses of personnel from the Soviet Armed Forces, considering the Far Eastern Campaign (killed, died from wounds, missing in action and not returning from prison as well as noncombat losses) were 3,668,400 persons, including 3,509,300 persons from the Army and Navy, 61,400 persons from the Border Troops and 97,700 persons of the Internal Troops. A significant portion of these losses occurred in 1941-1942 (3,048,800 persons) due to the circumstances which developed extremely badly for us in the first period of the war. In the main operations from the second half of the War (1943-1945), the losses of our troops were as a whole significantly less than in the first period of the war.

Simultaneously the Commission established the medical losses [wounded] in the Soviet Armed Forces and these were 18,334,200 persons, including:

—wounded and with concussion—15,205,600 persons;
—sick—3,047,700 persons;
—frost bite—90,900 persons.

It is essential to bear in mind that this number includes only those wounded which were evacuated to the hospitals. The wounded who were given medical aid in the units were not accounted for in this information. Also the servicemen who received two and more wounds were listed in the information respectively as two and more persons. As an average each serviceman during the period of the war, according to the data of the TsVMU, was included in the list of wounded 2.5 times while the actual number of wounded servicemen was significantly less than 15,205,600.

The irrecoverable and medical losses of personnel in the battles, in the main strategic and certain front operations during the years of the Great Patriotic War were ascertained and estimated on the basis of documentary materials stored at the Main Organizational-Mobilization Directorate, the History Archives Department of the General Staff and the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense.

From an analysis of the specific operations, it can be seen that the Soviet troops suffered their highest irrecoverable losses in the defensive operations of 1941-1942 (Smolensk with 486,200; Kiev with 616,300; Stalingrad with 323,900 men). During the offensive and defensive operations of 1943-1944, the losses in personnel of the troops were significantly less (the Kursk Offensive with 70,300; Orel Offensive with 112,500, the Belorussian Offensive with 178,500 and the Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive with 65,000). During the offensive operations of 1945, our losses were comparatively small (Vistula-Oder with 43,200; Vienna with 38,600; Berlin with 78,300; Prague with 11,200)...

The irrecoverable losses of the armed forces of Nazi Germany were 7,413,000 men. The losses of its satellite armies were 1,245,000 men. The total losses of the armies from the countries of the Nazi bloc numbered 8,658,000 men.

In the literature published in West Germany and in other Western countries, the losses of Nazi Germany have been clearly understated and they do not count the losses of Germany's allies such as Italy, Romania, Hungary, Finland and the foreign formations fighting on the German side. The Commission included 374,000 men from the losses of the Nazi bloc.

Recently certain new documentary data have been discovered on the number of enemy soldiers and officers captured by the Soviet Army in 1941-1945.

According to the documents of the Central State Archives (previously closed), it has been established that on the Soviet-German Front from 22 June 1941 through 9 May 1945, some 3,777,300 prisoners of war were captured, including 2,546,200 Germans and Austrians, 513,800 Hungarians, 201,800 Romanians, 48,900 Italians and 2,400 Finns. The remainder of 464,100 were prisoners of war of other nationalities (Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, French, Serbs, Croats, Spaniards, Dutch, Belgians

and others) from among the so-called "volunteers" serving in the Wehrmacht and the SS Troops.

An analysis of newly discovered archival materials on the questions of the casualties of the states participating in World War II indicates that the irrecoverable losses in the armed forces of Nazi Germany on the Soviet-German Front (killed, dead from wounds, missing in action and prisoners of war) were 6,923,700 persons, including some 1,725,800 persons from Austria, Alsace-Lorraine, the Sudeten Germans and "volunteers" from other countries and its allies (Hungary, Italy, Romania and Finland).

Considering that after the war's end the Soviet Union returned from captivity some 1,939,000 German prisoners of war, the total number of irrecoverable losses for the armed forces of Nazi German was 5,474,000 and together with the Nazi bloc armies, 6,719,000 men. The Commission established that in the German documents the losses were counted only for the combat troops and the combat support troops and in which served persons of German nationality. Many rear and service subunits and militarized formations such as construction, were manned with citizens of other countries (Czechs, French, Bulgarians, Romanians, Poles, Serbs, Croats and others) and these were not included in the losses of the Nazi Army. In considering the losses in these units and for which there are no documentary data, the losses in the Nazi bloc armies would be even greater (according to calculated data by some 500,000-600,000 men).

At the same time, in the course of the work, the Commission studied the documentary materials relating to hostilities in the Far East in August-September 1945. As a result it was established that the losses of the Kwantung Army of Imperialist Japan were: 83,737 killed, 593,995 men taken prisoner. Our troops lost 12,031 men during the campaign in the Far East.

Difficulties Recruiting Volunteers for Kamchatka

92UM1198A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Jun 92 First edition p 3

[Article by Captain-Lieutenant A. Ivanov in the "Call-Up 92" column: "Kamchatka: Plenty of Officers, Few Sailors"]

[Text] Captain 2nd Rank A. Galaburda, commander of the Kamchatka Naval Personnel Reception Unit, from where all recruits are sent to local units, provided some sad facts.

"We have already gone through two-thirds of the month, but the reception unit has received only a quarter of the number of inductees called for in the plan. No draftees have come from the Caucasus. It seems as if we will not receive any new manpower from there."

I learned that there were also a few problems associated with inductees from relatively productive areas. New

personnel complements are often formed there hurriedly, taking in whoever happens to be present at the time. A high percentage of the draftees must be sent to hospital immediately for extensive medical examination. It happens all too frequently that doctors' fears are confirmed, with the commander and other reception unit officers becoming involved in returning sick men to their homes.

"Quite a few inductees do not make it here to Kamchatka at all," continued Galaburda. "Of 274 youths allotted us by Volga and Ural area military commissariats, for example, only 66 flew into Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. Two hundred eight men were "pulled" by Vladivostok, which is experiencing an even more acute need for personnel. One can easily imagine the difficulties this will create this year for commanders, particularly those of combat departments. It will not be long before the combat readiness level will be adversely affected."

Is there a possibility that the shortage of young replacements will be compensated for by the youths' enthusiasm and high morale? Alas!—a brief survey made of Irkutsk and Vladimir inductees arriving at the reception unit provides no grounds for optimism. Half the respondents are willing to serve wherever they are assigned, as long as sea duty and shore duty are the same in length—two years. The other half is interested in shore duty only, which is a clear indication that they do not wish to take on too many burdens. Very few respondents indicated a desire to become submariners. The others are more afraid of the thought of the submarine than of the hardships inherent in life aboard this kind of craft. This has been true for several years and is a cause of serious concern to officers. They feel that such a patent fear of the boat could be a forerunner of highly unfortunate events.

The above depressing thoughts were on my mind as I took leave of the Naval Reception Unit. It is true, though, that the thoughts were dispelled to some extent during my ensuing visit to the oblast military commissariat. That is where Major A. Sakalov told me that, by the middle of June, 138 Kamchatka youths—mostly children of servicemen—expressed a desire to become officers. This figure has remained unchanged for the past two years, indicating a continuing interest in military professions on the part of some local youths.

So that is the story of Kamchatka: It supplies officers but not sailors.

CIS: POLICY

Alferov Discusses Potential of Cooperation with Pentagon

92UM1185A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 Jun 92 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with Zhores Alferov by Vladimir Nevelskiy of IZVESTIYA from St. Petersburg: "Foreign Military Agencies Can Become the Clients of Our Scientists"]

[Text] The Pentagon and the Physical Technical Institute of the RAN [Russian Academy of Sciences] are discussing the prospects of professional collaboration. The French Ministry of Defense has also evidenced its interest in contacts with Russian scientists. In mid June it will send to St. Petersburg a delegation which will become acquainted with the most recent developments.

In 1986, the Director of the Physical Technical Institute, Academician Zhores Ivanovich Alferov arrived in America as part of an official delegation from the USSR Academy of Sciences. It had been sent there in order to take up the struggle in the States against SDI and to win over American colleagues. And then, just 6 years later, Alferov is the desired guest of the Department for Scientific Technologies under the U.S. Defense Department.

[Nevelskiy] Does this mean, I asked him, that you have changed your views and have moved into the camp of the SDI supporters?

[Alferov] By no means, he replied. My position remains unchanged and that was that the SDI represented a great danger for our country under the conditions of the Cold War and the harsh opposition between the two superpowers. We had to think about countermeasures and be concerned with programs which would make it possible to neutralize the pending threat.

Now different times have come. As is known, during his visit to the U.S., the Russian President Yeltsin proposed that the Americans carry out the SDI Program jointly with our scientists. The point is that although the research related to the SDI at present to a certain degree has a military nature, its essence as a whole has become completely different. Neither we nor the Americans can conceal the work in this area from one another.

[Nevelskiy] And this is being said by the leader of an institute in which secret developments for the domestic military-industrial complex have been carried out.

[Alferov] For the record, secret research was carried out here from the end of the 1940's to the beginning of the 1960's. The general classifying is now something of the past. Only individual aspects of applied research remain classified.

[Nevelskiy] How did you find yourself at the Pentagon? Were you the initiator of your visit? Or were the Americans? Or did you yourself seek a meeting with them?

[Alferov] On one of the American delegations which visited our institute last year there were some prominent specialists from the U.S. Defense Department. We showed them a whole series of laboratories and acquainted them with certain developments. The guests showed unconcealed interest in these and upon saying farewell stated that they would be happy to continue the discussion at their own offices. So, if you ever are in America, stop by.

Such an opportunity came up in February. With my deputy, Professor Yury Sergeyevich Gordeyev, we spent a very productive half-day in the Pentagon. A second meeting was held in May.

The Pentagon specialists were very keen on what we proposed. It was a question of work in the area of the physics and technology of semiconductor materials in instruments and of solar energy converters. The institute has been engaged for a long time in this work, we have not made any secret of this, in openly publishing the obtained results. We compete successfully with the best American laboratories and universities, and we cannot only participate as equals in competitions, but also win them. The problem merely is that the financing of Russian research by the U.S. Defense Department is an unusual thing and for this reason the preliminary agreement of the American Congress was required.

[Nevelskiy] If the American side gives its approval and if you conclude an agreement with the Pentagon, what will this bring the institute?

[Alferov] The SDI and the Pentagon are one of the many areas of our international collaboration. I would put it this way: at present the Physical Technical Institute could earn millions of dollars a year in joint research, in grants and projects. Convert this total into rubles and you would have a major addition to the institute's budget.

[Nevelskiy] As far as I know, after the increase in prices for everything and the sharp increase in expenses, your current budget would scarcely allow you to make ends meet.

[Alferov] Yes, we must get through these next several years without replacing our equipment. There simply are no funds for this. But without fail the money must be found for maintaining the fleet of scientific equipment. Otherwise the equipment will begin to break down. Otherwise a unit costing a million dollars will stand idle literally at times due to the lack of some minor part.

However lamentable this may be, the scientific institutions during the period of the economic reforms have been outside the perusal of the state. The Commission on Science of the Russian Supreme Soviet has forgotten about them. When at the Congress of People's Deputies the President does not say a word about fundamental sciences, when over the two weeks of the work of the Congress no one mentioned this, the impression is created that Russian sciences does not exist at all.

In the world community, including in government circles, we encounter more understanding than in our own country. Naturally, in such a situation international scientific collaboration assumes enormous importance for us. Science is international and there is no Russian, German or Armenian physics, there merely is physics. But at present this collaboration is particularly important both on the moral and the material levels. Even

small support in the form of hard currency could be a life saver for domestic fundamental science.

At present, abroad they have a better understanding than do some of our leaders of what a treasure house for world science as a whole are our theoretical and experimental physics, biology, mathematics and the scientific collections of such institutes as the Botanical or the Zoological, our scientific schools and the system of their development and the recruitment of personnel.

The West has finally realized that if the brain drain continues from Russia, if the best scientists leave and the research schools collapse, then world science will lose a very great deal. For this reason, at present, upon the initiative of the President of France, a fund of the developed countries is being established for the support of Russian science, while the U.S. has proposed the idea of a Russo-American fund, the aim of which would be to maintain the scientific schools and finance joint research. The London Royal Society, the American Physics Institute and a number of other societies have offered a priceless gift to the Russian scientists, with our libraries being granted free (gratis) subscriptions to the main scientific journals.

Here it is essential to make a very serious stipulation and that is the funds allocated by the West will be beneficial only in the event that certain conditions are observed.

The first one is that the funds should go directly to the scientific institutions carrying out the research. And to no one else.

Secondly, neither the foreign exchange coming from abroad nor the funds provided in the state budget for fundamental science should be taxed. In the ukase of the Russian President signed in November 1991 on the founding of the Russian Academy of Sciences, there is the point of preferential taxation for the scientific institutions, including their foreign economic activities. But this provision has remained only on paper. At the same time, the institutes could be earning 30-50 million dollars a year from contracts with the West. This is a large amount for the RAN and this would also allow us to emerge from the crisis, although in comparison with the credits being spent by the nation as a whole, this is a paltry amount. And it is immoral to put a tax bite on this money.

Without these conditions, it makes no sense for the scientific collectives to earn foreign exchange or to have the financing of joint developments by Western partners.

Chemical Weapons Convention Prohibits Production, Storage

92UM1192A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
24 June 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by *IZVESTIYA* Correspondent Aleksey Portanskii: "A Convention on the Complete Banning of Chemical Weapons Is Ready"]

[Text] In Geneva, the Disarmament Conference has completed work on a draft Convention on the Complete Banning and Elimination of Chemical Weapons. Its elaboration was preceded by 24 years of negotiations. It is particularly important that the new document, in contrast to the 1925 Protocol, prohibits not only the use but also the production and storage of toxins.

According to the preliminary estimates, the Convention will be signed by all the European states, the United States, Canada and Japan. Their example will be followed by Latin America as well as many African and Asian states. The signing of the Convention should occur no later than the beginning of next year. The experts have voiced certain doubts over the Arab states and Israel which could defer signing until that time when concrete results have been achieved in the on-going talks being held between them. As a whole, the number of those which will sign the Convention, it is expected, should be fully sufficient for it to come into effective force.

A most important element in the Convention and one which is aimed at ensuring its unwavering fulfillment will be a system of international verification. It will be rather hard to carry this out, since the convention extends not only to military installations but also to industrial enterprises which are potentially capable of producing chemical weapons. The text of the document makes provision for inspections at any time and at any place. The state which is a participant to the Convention has merely to be warned five days prior to the arrival of the international inspectors.

For implementing the provisions of the Convention, it is planned that a special international organization will be set up similar in type to the IAEA with a headquarters in the Hague or Vienna. Here they will take into account all the negative experience of the IAEA which was unable to prevent the setting up of a large-scale program in Iraq to develop nuclear weapons.

As for the frequency of inspections, as the specialist assume, such a state as the U.S. could expect 10-12 planned inspections a year and several surprise ones.

The existence of the Convention should serve as a restraining factor also for those states which do not want to sign it. They will certainly come under international pressure and various sanctions, if they want to begin their own production of chemical weapons.

As is known, the Soviet Union was from the very outset an active participant in the Geneva talks on banning chemical weapons. At present the legal successor to the former Union, Russia, will encounter significant difficulties in resolving the problem of eliminating these weapons. According to the Soviet-American agreement signed in June 1990, the destruction of the chemical weapons stockpiles on the territory of the former USSR (with the exception of Russia, the other republics do not have their own stocks of the given weapons) should begin prior to 31 December 1992. However, up to now the

corresponding program has not been approved and most importantly there are no funds to implement such a program.

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

Profile of "Urals Version" T-72

92UM1201A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Jun 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Colonel V. Moroz: "The T-72: Urals Version of the Modern Tank"]

[Text] The T-72 combines several tanks with different combat potential: strictly speaking, the T-72 "Ural" and its T-72M export version (these tanks left the plant shops many years ago), the T-72A, the T-72B... Modernizing the base vehicle is the most economical way of improving equipment, also widely practiced by foreign tank building. A successful upgrade makes it possible to modernize a tank sharply. This is also indicative of the Ural tank. The T-72B surpasses its predecessor twice over in protection, fire capabilities, and combat characteristics as a whole.

The T-72 has much in common with the T-64 and T-80. Like our other main tanks, it has powerful armament. The cannons are of such a caliber not yet used in the West. All our latest-generation tanks are equipped with automatic loading devices (mechanisms), also not widely used abroad. Automatic loading of the cannon has made it possible to reduce the size of the crew to three people and nearly quadruple the rate of live fire.

As far as the differences are concerned, there are quite a few. The T-72 is equipped with a four-cycle, multifuel diesel engine. The engine is a V-12 with its cylinders arranged at an angle of 60 degrees. Our other tanks are driven by power plants that are not traditional for domestic tank building. The T-64, for example, has a two-cycle, multifuel, turbo-piston diesel engine with five horizontally arranged cylinders. An aircraft-type gas-turbine engine gives the T-80 special power.

In short, the long biography of the tank produced beyond the Urals is filled in all stages with competition with other types of tanks.

The T-72 has everything that is or may be required in modern combat. Its sighting system with a laser rangefinder makes it possible to employ the armament effectively. The tank is equipped with a device for protecting the crew from the effects of a nuclear blast wave, radioactive materials, and toxic agents. It is able to cross over the bottom of a river up to 5 meters deep. It has thermal smoke generating equipment that operates on the tank's fuel and a system for launching smoke grenades, which makes it possible to put up smoke screens in short periods of time. Engineer equipment is attached to the tank's hull which makes it possible to dig a tank caponier in 30 minutes even in adverse ground.

The T-72B variant of the Urals acquired, finally, a "long arm;" it is armed with guided munitions. When firing conventional rounds from the cannon, hitting the target beyond direct fire range (direct fire range at a target height of 2 meters is 2120 meters for an armor-piercing subcaliber round and 1000 meters for a shaped-charge round) becomes problematic. Guided munitions help the crew hit the target at a distance of several kilometers.

The T-72B is the one pictured below [not reproduced]. It is not hard to distinguish it from its predecessors: by the elements of dynamic protection—special containers with explosives, capable of withstanding shaped-charge rounds. They are positioned on the frontal armor of the turret. The smoke-grenade launching system, for which a different place has been found than on the T-72A, catches the eye. The design of the skirting plates is unique.

The tank remains a serious force, a support both in offensive and defensive combat, that is, of course, in close cooperation with other families of weapons, flexible tactics, and reliable air cover. The West is devoting much attention to renovation of the tank park. The tanks that entered service in NATO countries in recent years are distinguished by high qualities. Advances in the ideology of tank building itself are also noticeable. Whereas before more concern was given to tanks avoiding getting hit by a shell, now the emphasis has shifted to impenetrability of armor. In the United States, for example, they are very satisfied with the armor of the M1A-HA (Abrams) tank—multilayer, composite armor based on depleted uranium.

Specifications and Performance Characteristics of the T-72A

Tank weight, combat equipped, tons	41
Crew size	3
Average speed over dirt road, km/hr	up to 45
Top highway speed, km/hr	60
Range on one fueling, km	up to 700
Engine	Multifuel, V-12 diesel
Horsepower	780
Armament	125-mm smoothbore cannon paired with a 7.62-mm PKT machinegun; 12.7-mm Utes antiaircraft machinegun
Basic load of ammunition:	
rounds for cannon	44
rounds for PKT machinegun	2000
rounds for Utes antiaircraft machinegun	300
Weapon stabilizer	Horizontal and vertical, electro-hydraulic

The modern tank—a complex and expensive machine—contains many achievements of science and engineering thought and itself has given rise to new technologies. We have traditions of which we can be proud in this field. We should not lose them in difficult times.

Operation of Communications Center
92UM1071B Moscow VOYENNYY VESTNIK
in Russian No 8, Aug 91 pp 47-50

[Article by Guards Captain A. Butenko, Baltic Military District, under rubric "To Assist Signalmen": "A Radio Center at Work"]

[Text] The atmosphere in the high-power radio receiving section was businesslike. Each crew member of the combat post duty team was engaged in doing his job. In particular, its chief, Guards Senior Warrant Officer A. Lazarev, had turned the channel over to the special equipment van several minutes ago and now was unhurriedly filling out the operator's log. There seemed to be no reason for worry. The instrument check and channel adjustment had been made (a high signal-to-noise ratio had been achieved) and lines of the lead-in/junction cable had been tested and conformed to the prescribed attenuation norm. Terminal station specialists had not had any complaints about its quality and had accepted it without criticism.

The calm atmosphere suddenly was interrupted by the voice of the communications center duty officer: "Guards Senior Warrant Officer Lazarev, report the reason for the poor channel condition. Telephone operators cannot work over it." The station chief quickly cast a glance at the indicating instruments and saw that channel parameters were normal. "That means the channel is not the problem," flashed through his head. He called up the special equipment van chief over service communications. Talking between themselves, both specialists arrived at the conclusion that the reason should be sought in the cable.

The diagnosis was accurate. Serviceable not long ago, the PTRK 20X2 turned out to be completely unfit for operation: a strong crackling and background was heard on all pairs. The cable had to be exchanged for the reserve cable. Soon the channel had been turned over for operation.


The cause of the PTRK 20X2 malfunction was as follows. Soldiers set up the communications center at night in a pouring rain. The driver-electrician who laid the cable evidently hurried and made a slight mistake, connecting the cable to the adapter poorly. Therefore it "fell silent" after some time. As we see, negligence cost dearly—communications was not established on time.

I and my subordinates have had occasion to operate as part of a communications center, and practically each time both the tactical situation and communications situation turned out to be dissimilar from the previous

one. I will attempt to tell how best to act in the rapidly changing conditions of practice battle.

It is well known that line and non-line methods are used in setting up a radio center. Experience shows that it is best to use the latter (Fig. 1), for it most fully satisfies requirements of maskirovka [lit. "camouflage", however, includes "concealment" and "deception"—FBIS] and protection against the enemy's fire effect and mass destruction weapons. Although dispersing equipment vans and stations at a considerable distance from each other leads to inconveniences in controlling them and great expenditure of lead-in/junction, subscriber and other cable, hampers organization of security and defense of a communications center element, and so on, it is necessary to do this despite everything.

Fig. 1



LEGEND:

OPM—Separate receiving vehicle
PU/ChDS—Command and control
facility & frequency
allocation service
EPS—Power supply generator
R-136PM—Receiving vehicle of
high-power radio

The non-line method of setting up a radio center also had difficulty taking root with us. The main thing was that crews were understrength. Lately the flow of draftees into the Army has cut back in connection with the complication of the general political situation and aggravation of inter-ethnic relations, but for now we are finding a way out.

Of course, the first set-up performed by reduced crews did not succeed. We began looking for a solution. At the communications center and the radio center we succeeded in working out a special schedule for the sequence of jobs. Its essence is that the operations to be performed have been scheduled by minutes for each piece of communications equipment and each soldier. If a specialist of one radio performs them on time, he immediately shifts to help the crew of another equipment van.

Now (after several practices) radio center personnel keep within a specific time norm. The set-up process is as follows. During ground reconnaissance a specific site is selected for each equipment van and station, where they

are set up at a command from the combat post team chiefs. The soldiers ground communications equipment and power generators and connect the power cable to remote power panels.

Then the personnel begin setting up the antenna-mast groups. Unfortunately, we still have not succeeded in solving the problem of their maskirovka, but that is a subject of another conversation. I will note only that I would like to learn of similar experience in the pages of VOYENNYY VESTNIK.

As soon as antennas are set up, chiefs of the transmitting and receiving vehicles and the remote-control equipment vans begin a local check of equipment. Other crew members begin to lay cable lines in parallel with this. There is a rather serious difficulty here which must be dwelled on in more detail.

It is common knowledge that a radio center consists of a receiving radio center and transmitting radio center. The latter often has to be split into two groups, between which cable must be run to provide for redundancy of remote-control lines. At the receiving radio center similar work is done for this same purpose from one of the receiving vehicles to the high-power radio receiving section, and much time is spent on this, but without those operations it is practically impossible to perform a communications mission if just one remote-control line goes out for some reason.


Transmitter groups are ready to work by the time antenna-mast groups are set up at the receiving radio center. Therefore the process of establishing communications between receiving and transmitting radio centers begins immediately, followed also by adjustment of remote-control lines and channels. By the end of those operations, combat post duty team members are finishing the laying and checking of connecting lines to interworking equipment vans of other communications center elements. In conclusion, it remains for the soldiers to perform maskirovka of the equipment and prepare personnel shelters.

We begin duty on assigned radio nets after it is possible to control the transmitters. (Radio operators are on duty on warning radio nets without any interruption from time of departure from the permanent location until returning to the unit.)

At a command from the communications center duty officer, communications is established with subscribers on receive-only radio nets and a shift is made to radio links indicated in the diagram-order. This does not differ at all from rules set forth in the corresponding manual, and so it is inadvisable to dwell on it. The following question must be examined here.

It is no secret that sometimes there is an interruption of communications because along the radio channel route there is a rather large number of jumper connections in equipment vans through which the channel passes (Fig.

2), particularly in the distribution frame vans. To prevent this (when possible), receiving vehicles must be connected directly to terminal equipment vans. Moreover, it is desirable to use so-called hard-wire switching contained in the units. Switchboard jumper cords and jacks thereby will receive less wear.



Further, there are frequent instances where, having established communications with subscribers, radio operators turn the channel over to the distributing frame or the terminal equipment van after "eyeballing" it, as they say. But this is a gross error which often leads to interruption of command and control. Therefore an instrument check of channel quality must be made. This is done using authorized measurement instruments, either the ETI-69 or the P-321M, which of course not only must be serviceable but also must have standardized characteristics. I will cite one example to confirm what has been said.

Once during an exercise radiotelegrapher Guards Private V. Terentyev was performing prescribed operations in the high-power radio receiving section to adjust the

telegraph channel using the ETI-69. The instrument showed that the non-linear distortion factor did not exceed the norm. Then he began turning it over to the special equipment van, but its technician refused to accept the channel, stating that he "saw" a very large percentage of distortions. Then Terentyev tried once again to measure channel parameters, which showed up normal on the ETI-69 electronic display. Finally it was only the monitoring-testing laboratory specialists who determined that the instrument had been calibrated incorrectly. Evidently it makes no sense to comment on this instance.

Life convinces one that success in performing assigned missions depends to no small extent on how remote-control channels are adjusted between receiving and transmitting centers. In fact, without their good quality there can be neither clear intelligibility of telephone communications nor operation of telegraph communications without distortions. We have built up a certain amount of experience in this matter. Let us examine it in an example of actions by Guards Senior Warrant Officer A. Lazarev and Guards Warrant Officer A. Zatonskiy, chiefs of the high-power radio receiving and transmitting sections.

As a rule, communications initially is set up between the receiving radio center and transmitting radio center using radio-relay stations, and only then does adjustment of remote-control channels begin. This is done as follows. A generator signal over the first voice channel is requested from the transmitter. It is supplied from the receiving radio-relay station by depressing the "Measuring Generator" button. The needle on the built-in indicating instrument at the transmitting station is set to the "0" mark with the "1st Telephone Level Adjustment" potentiometer. These operations also are done in the receiving vehicle in a similar manner. The second voice channel is adjusted in the very same sequence.

Then the specialists begin "working out" the telegraph channels. The work algorithm is as follows. After "dots" are requested from the receiving radio-relay station (the "1st Telegraph Dot" button is depressed), the "Control" button is depressed on the transmitter front panel. The "Bias Adjust 1st Telegraph" potentiometer is used to get the "Bias Norm" indicator to light up. Then the channel is checked toward the receiving radio center and they begin adjusting the second telegraph channel.

The next operation is where a type switching of control channels is made to appropriate jacks using jumper plugs. Then the possibility of supporting voice traffic is checked from the service communications panel.

After this a test control of the radio transmitter is made from the receiving vehicle's Morse code transmitter. If there is control, then both necessary switching and adjustments have been done correctly, otherwise some operations will have to be repeated.

Now I deem it advisable to dwell on problems which definitely must be taken into account in the process of

practices and performance of communications missions and which subordinates must be taught to skillfully resolve.

First of all, it is the protection of center personnel and equipment against mass destruction weapons. In all field exercises one radiation and chemical reconnaissance post each is set up at the receiving radio center and transmitting radio center. Non-TOE CW scouts perform duty there.

Thus driver-electrician Guards Private A. Babayan lately has been coping successfully with the duties of CW scout in the transmitting center. At his post there is a foxhole, the DP-5B instrument and VPKhR troop chemical reconnaissance instrument, as well as means of individual protection.

In addition, as they receive various narrative problems, soldiers rehearse the norms for protection against mass destruction weapons.

Secondly, as stated earlier, we position the equipment vans and stations at considerable distances from each other in order to keep the effect of precision weapons to a minimum. We try to remote all emitting radio equipment as far as possible from the command and control facility. We also use corner reflectors. Moreover, we definitely remote power supply units away from the KUNG's [heated vehicle bodies with shelving] and set them up in dug shelters covered on top, for example, with sod and other available material.

It also would appear to be of no small importance that as soon as the remote-control cable is run between the receiving and transmitting centers a shift is made to controlling the transmitters over wire channels and radio-relay stations are placed in a listening watch mode for the purpose of radio maskirovka.

Thirdly, the following problem also troubles us: there are no authorized means for combatting jammers. In exercises a narrative problem often is given that the enemy has used them, and in such situations we are helpless. The soldiers cannot react in any other way except to shift to an alternate or reserve frequency. As Lieutenant Colonel S. Kirbenev suggests in the article "Arctic Communications Center," why not use microtransmitters? We heard their production has been organized by industry. To locate jammers, use the receivers used by athletes ("fox hunters") in radio sport. Then our subordinates would be able to gain necessary skills in combatting this enemy weapon.

Fourthly, the center duty officer workstation is in one of the receiving vehicles. In my opinion, this is not the best variant. Not only is the officer crowded by the radio operators, but he himself also is limited in matters of coordination with other communications center elements. Our suggestion is that to ensure his normal work the receiving radio center duty officer should have a specially outfitted bay in some station, perhaps even in the high-power radio receiving section.

Finally, security and defense of the radio center is a matter of no small importance. In connection with the shortage of personnel today, not everything is going

smoothly, as they say. The fact is, we are forced to use even driver-electricians for alert duty on radio nets and links. Therefore it is now extremely complicated to resolve this problem at the proper level. It is well that we succeeded in providing rather good rest, warmth and meals for soldiers under all conditions of field life. It is common knowledge that this greatly helps them successfully perform communications missions.

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Remote Mine Laying

92UM1071A Moscow VOYENNYY VESTNIK
in Russian No 8, Aug 91 pp 55-57


[Article by Colonel Yu. Fesenko and Colonel B. Orlov under rubric "For Artillerymen": "Remote Minelaying (Features of Employing missile Artillery)"]

[Text] The contradiction which arose back in World War II between the defending troops' need for minefields and capabilities for laying them can be successfully resolved today. Remote minelaying equipment, which also includes missile artillery, will help.

It is used to rapidly create or reinforce minefields on probable axes of enemy actions, at launch or firing positions, in disposition areas (forming-up places, assembly areas, concentration areas) and on movement routes. Minefields are divided into covering and containing minefields depending on the method of laying and into antitank, antipersonnel and mixed minefields depending on the type of mines laid.

A covering minefield is laid on routes of attacking or counterattacking enemy subunits or on axes of their possible actions (Fig. 1). The mission assigned is to delay forward movement, disrupt deployment into approach march or combat formations and disrupt the enemy's organized commitment. One other possible goal of laying them is to cover flanks or boundaries and close breaches in friendly combat formations as well as passages in minefields.


Fig. 1



The entire area of a stationary or moving target is covered with mines to establish a containing minefield (Fig. 2). It is laid for repelling enemy attacks or counter-attacks, disrupting the normal operation of his command

and control facilities, constraining the maneuver of subunits in their disposition areas and at positions, and delaying or prohibiting column movements.

Fig. 2



If the angle between the line of platoon or battery fire and the direction of the line along which a minefield is laid is less than 45° measured clockwise, the minefield is considered to be flanking, and if the angle is 45° or more it is considered frontal.

The effectiveness of a minefield laid by missile artillery depends on the kind and caliber of projectiles (type of mines) used, their expenditure, and the method and procedure for creating the minefield. Nature of terrain, time of day, visibility conditions, enemy capabilities for breaching minefields and nature of his actions on a minefield also have a certain influence, and of course the degree to which a minefield is covered by the fire of other weapons is of importance.

The result of remote minelaying can be considered successful only if firing is executed suddenly and the enemy is deprived of an opportunity to promptly employ all available means for reconnoitering and negotiating the minefields. To this end, for example, it is better to lay covering minefields at the moment an attacking or advancing enemy arrives within 500-1000 m from the line on which they are to be laid. Taking into account dispersal of the missile-propelled projectiles as well as a rate of forward movement of 10-15 km/hr, his subunits already will approach the far boundary of the minefield in 2-4 minutes. This means they will be forced to conduct reconnaissance and make passages in the minefield under the defenders's fire.

Even if the enemy decides to cross the minefield without reconnaissance (which means taking a risk) and bypassing detected mines, the attackers' losses can be 15-30 percent. Calculations show that in repelling assaults by tanks and infantry, it is necessary to expend 70 projectiles with antitank mines (or 20 projectiles with antipersonnel mines in repelling assaults by dismounted motorized infantry) for every 1000 m of frontage of the covering minefield.

The above projectile expenditure must be approximately doubled in laying a containing minefield on a line of deployment into platoon columns and a final coordination line.

A containing minefield is established at enemy launch or firing positions with the primary mission of delaying the firing subunits for a certain time. Of course this cannot keep the enemy from launching missiles or firing, but it considerably facilitates destruction of launchers and self-propelled armored gun and mortar batteries and MLRS by other weapons.

The projectile expenditure per hectare of target area usually is taken as equal to five with antitank mines or two with antipersonnel mines.

The following must be noted with respect to laying containing minefields against columns. Considering that the probable enemy's armies are well outfitted with means for reconnoitering and negotiating minefields, it can be expected that columns will be held up on a minefield only for 10-30 minutes, but in case a minefield is negotiated "at risk," combat equipment losses will be approximately 10 percent. To hamper the reconnaissance and negotiation of minefields on column movement routes, it is better to lay them at night and under other conditions of limited visibility when it is difficult to detect mines on the roadbed and nearby terrain.

Now a word about fire capabilities of missile artillery subunits for remote minelaying. As a rule, they are determined by the number of combat vehicles, type of minefield, kind of projectiles (type of mines) used and their expenditure. These capabilities can change accordingly within wide limits. But the limit for a subunit will be a sector on which it is capable of distributing mines evenly. Fire capabilities of a medium-range and long-range medium-caliber missile artillery platoon for laying a minefield are shown in the table.

	Width of Platoon Minelaying Sector (m)	
	Type of Mines Employed	
Type of Minefield	Antitank	Antipersonnel
Covering	1500	1200
Containing	800	1200

To ensure even distribution of mines in laying a frontal minefield, the missile artillery platoon used for firing fires at the center of the sector at the computed range setting with a sheaf based on the width of the minelaying sector; and in laying a flanking minefield it is done by combat vehicles by the scale with a converged sheaf.

In both cases necessary minefield depth is established through dispersion of projectiles and mines by range and line respectively.

A battery fires with minefield sectors distributed among platoons. In this case the mines lay more evenly along the entire minelaying line.

In creating a containing minefield at launch or firing positions, in disposition areas and on movement routes of enemy subunits, the projectile expenditure and

method of firing on a target usually are designated according to general rules for engaging stationary targets and columns.

Settings for firing against platoon minelaying sectors are determined by the full or abbreviated preparation method on the computer or using instruments. The rules for calculating them remain the very same as in firing other kinds of cluster projectiles.

As a rule, remote minelaying equipment is used according to the combined-arms commander's plan. Therefore the battalion or battery commander receives fire missions for remote minelaying from the superior artillery or combined-arms commander. Here he is usually given the mission of laying a minefield, its type, kind of projectiles, and the area or line and time of remote minelaying.

Let us examine the work procedure of assigned battalion personnel in a specific example.


A missile battalion commander has received the instructions: "Contain actions of tanks and motorized infantry by laying an antitank minefield on the lone house, Kruglaya Grove line." Laying is to be executed when the enemy moves to that line (Fig. 3)

After detailing the mission he received, the commander ordered the rangefinder operator to determine polar coordinates of the minefield flanks, plotted that line on the map, and determined its frontage (3300 m) and mean elevation (90 m). Dividing the line's frontage by the width of a platoon minelaying sector when laying a containing minefield (3300:800), he concluded that four platoons had to be used to execute the mission. He decided to use 1st Battery (callsign Oka) and 3rd Battery (callsign Volga). He commanded: "Oka, Volga. As you were. Target 101, tanks and motorized infantry. Contain. Second point (prearranged number of the battalion command-observation post). Right: 47-95, range 6660; left: 41-59, range 4980; elevation 90. Expenditure standard. Load."

At this command, the battalion chief of staff ordered the operator to load the target number, coordinates and elevation, projectile code, and prearranged numbers of subunits to be employed into the computer. After his report: "Target 101. Antitank. With large ring. Sheaf 0-33. Expenditure 38 rounds each. Oka. Topographic: 8050, left 0-38; computed: range 287, fuze 17, left 0-48. Volga. Topographic 8200, left 0-90; computed: range 296, fuze 18, left 1-00," the chief of staff checked and confirmed the correctness of calculation of the computed settings.

When the enemy columns moved to the minelaying line the battalion commander (after receiving battery commanders' readiness reports) gave the command to open fire on the target. Immediately after firing, the battalion chief of staff (having listened to battery commanders' reports on execution of the fire mission and on projectile

Fig. 3



expenditure) compiled the minefield log, which indicated the area where the minefield was laid; scale, sheet designation, and year of publication of the map being used; coordinates of the center of the minefield and its size; grid bearing of the line of fire; appointed position of the person who ordered the minefield laid; time and date it was laid; type and number of mines; means of recording the minefield (if coordinates of the center of impact of mines were determined using technical reconnaissance equipment); subunits which laid the minefield, and the rank, last name and initials of their commanders.

If technical reconnaissance equipment was not used, the battalion chief of staff determines the minefield position based on points of aim designated for batteries or platoons, and he determines its size with consideration of dispersion of projectiles and mines. He submits the minefield log to higher headquarters in four copies.

Thus, the use of missile artillery for remote minelaying permits considerably reducing the time for laying minefields. It is the task of every artillery commander to master to perfection in the shortest time the rules for laying minefields.

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CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Divided Loyalties in Aviation Units

92UM1172D Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
10 Jun 92 p 2

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Novikov, under the rubric:

"Topic of the Day": "We Would Stand Idle During the Day and Hold Out at Night"]

[Text] Military pilots of the regiment that is part of the CIS Unified Armed Forces and that is deployed in Nezhin of Chernigov Oblast are serving with that sentiment. And they have reasons to do that. This article is about one of them.

About the Regiment

The Long-Range Aviation Regiment (TU-22) subordinate to the 46th Air Army (Smolensk) has stood on the outskirts of the small beautiful city since time immemorial. And here they have become accustomed to the servicemen with flying patches on their uniforms and they know them right up to the most minute details. Including the military secret—about the direct purpose of the aircraft—to conduct aerial reconnaissance.

The aviation regiment, a guards regiment, has its own Heroes of the Soviet Union and made its contribution (since 1943) to the victory over the common enemy—German Fascism. But everything is flowing and everything is changing. People more rarely recall the former glory. Conversations are increasingly being heard about the uncertainty of tomorrow. And this uncertainty and lack of confidence in the social protection of each servicemen individually has also resulted in the confrontation of those who remain on guard of the CIS and those who want to be subordinate to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense...

On "Traitors"...

The 199th ODRAP [Long-Range Air Force Reconnaissance Regiment] was aroused on 15 January 1992. It had to be! They had to decide: whom do we serve? Orders

from Marshal Ye. Shaposhnikov followed one after the other: swear to Russia, to the CIS...

Seventy four servicemen violated the Moscow order—they “surreptitiously” swore allegiance to the people of Ukraine. But this patriotic burst was not supported by the unit commander or by his deputy for educational work with personnel.

SOU [Union of Ukrainian Officers] Nezhin Organization Chairman Major Perets said: “Regimental Commander Colonel Kozhin said to a regimental formation on 15 January: ‘Whoever wishes to serve in the Ukrainian Armed Forces—fall out!’” Seventy four of us from the technical staff fell out of ranks. ‘You are traitors... You should all be shot’, the regimental commander told us.”

“A minute later,” added Captain Povoroznyuk, “the commander ordered Major Perets ‘to arrest these men and command them.’ He also demanded lists of these people. ‘I’, he stressed, ‘will send them to Morozov and ‘et him find positions for you.’”

“Then,” added a third officer who was present during this conversation, “silent resistance began. And if I am more precise—quiet, inconspicuous oppression.”

While talking with the “traitors”, among whom were female servicemen, I involuntarily became alert. And there was reason for that. According to their words, Former Regimental Propagandist Major Boldyrev, who is currently undergoing retraining in Russia, made this statement: “I have talked with the pilots. They are in a decisive mood, two sorties over Kreshatik... and that will put everyone in their places.”

I thought: really how can anyone suddenly have such a desire? Although I know that the pilots always had sufficient common sense. But... six aircraft have flown to Russia.

...On the Commander

No matter how much I attempted to bring our conversation to the issue of oppression to taking the military oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine, Colonel Yuri Pavlovich Kozhin avoided it. He adroitly and professionally “lectured” me on “toilet” oaths and their “instigators”.

Externally, everything seemed to be in the best light. Actually: there has not been any direct interference with the patriotic feelings of those who wished to swear allegiance to Ukraine. But then why were Officers Perets and Povoroznyuk, the “initiators” of this, immediately forced to go on leave without their appropriate request or desire?

Why was Major Perets’ first request on his desire to swear allegiance to Ukraine not sent forward? On the contrary, he was removed from his unauthorized position of garrison commander and they prohibited his comrade from issuing him his personal weapon.

Frankly speaking, the situation has developed in a complicated manner.

...On the Subordinates

You will not find a single Ukrainian among the squadron commanders or the regimental commander’s immediate deputies.

For example, the chief of staff frankly admitted that he will return only to Russia. Nothing ties him to Ukraine.

Others also serve with these thoughts and sentiments. The commander and his deputy (the former chief of the political department) themselves will never take the new oath. And although two car garages “tie” the latter to Ukraine, he is flatly refusing to be subordinate to the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the future.

Lieutenant Colonel Kolmogortsev frankly stated that there is only one solution for them: to hold out until 1994. At that time, in his opinion, the need for their regiment will finally cease to exist. Vitaliy Borisovich sees those who have taken the oath as “saboteurs” and as those who “run ahead of the horse”.

Yes, neither the commander nor his deputy have the skill to take the time to maneuver or sit tight. They know precisely how long they have to hold out and when to pack their suitcases.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Kasatonov Locks Out Ukrainian Sailors

92UM1173B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
13 Jun 92 p 1

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA Special Correspondents Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Shvyrev and Major Sergey Nagoryanskiy (by telephone): “Why Are the Black Sea Fleet’s Replacement Troops Coming from Russia?”]

[Text] Ukraine’s sovereignty is being torpedoed. The latest confirmation of that is the situation with young Black Sea Fleet replacement troops.

As of today, 4,641 men-citizens of Ukraine have been accepted to serve in the fleet. The Black Sea Fleet command authorities are using all possible steps to impede sending young men to fleet crews. So, on 10 June, based on Admiral Kasatonov’s order, the doors were closed to the next group of conscripts. As a result, nearly 900 men had to be assigned to Sevastopol Garrison ground forces units.

At the same time, the oceanographic research ship Belingauzen arrived by sea (by the way, it is not designed to transport personnel) with 103 conscripts from Russia. This has laid the foundation for the realization of a plan code named “Malaya zemlya” [Little Land] which provides for manning the Black Sea Fleet with 10,000 citizens of Russia.

Another seven men who were accompanied by Captain Lazarev arrived by civil aircraft besides those 103 men from Amur Oblast who were delivered by sea. Based on the information available, the next arrival of young replacement troops from Novorossiysk is planned in the near future.

These steps that have been conducted by the CIS Unified Armed Forces command authorities and the Russian Ministry of Defense will inflame the situation associated not only with the draft but also with the fleet as a whole.

Details of 'Varshavyanka' Diesel-Electric Submarine

92UM1195A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Jun 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Captain 1st Rank V. Kazurmanov: "The 'Varshavyanka' is Much Like a Nuclear-Powered Submarine"]

[Text] Until the mid'70s diesel-powered submarines were designed and built for the navy from designs developed and tested in World War II and during the first postwar years.

The inception and development of nuclear-powered submarine construction was reflected also in the design of diesel-powered submarines. A design team headed by Yu.N. Kormilitsyn was the creator of the new boat.

On 12 September 1980 the first ship of a new series, physically resembling a nuclear-powered submarine but somewhat smaller, came off the slip at the Plant imeni Lenkom in the city of Komsomolsk-on-Amur. When it was designed the boat was conditionally named the "Varshavyanka" because it was planned to provide the navies of the Warsaw Pact nations with it.

The drop-like design of the new diesel-electric submarine gives it better underwater running capability, whereas all previous designs of diesel-powered submarines were based on a "stem-type" bow to give them maximum surface speed. The new approach to the designing of diesel-powered boats and the adoption of automated ship control systems and mechanisms, which are already widely used in nuclear-powered submarines, made it possible to build a submarine meeting all the modern specifications.

The new generation of diesel-electric submarines, with their improved acoustical features and new radioelectronic equipment, are not inferior to a number of new diesel submarines of the NATO nations. The quietest of our submarines, with good armament and habitability and reliable systems and mechanisms, the Varshavyanka has admirers not just in our country. The export model has been acquired by India, Algeria, Poland, Romania and certain other countries. Production of the series of Varshavyanka-class submarines for our navy and for export continues.

Technical Specifications of Large Diesel-Electric Submarine Varshavyanka

1. Dimensions (in meters):

length	73
width of hull at widest point	9.9
draft	around 7

2. Normal displacement

up to 2,500 tonnes

3. Full speed

submerged	around 18 knots (around 33 km/h)
surfaced	around 10 knots (around 18 km/h)

4. Submersion depth

300 m

5. Crew

52

including 16 officers

6. Autonomy

45 days

7. Radioelectronic equipment:

—Combat information and control system
—Sonar system
—Radar system
—Navigation system
—Communication facilities

8. Armament:

—six 53-cm torpedo tubes

—18 general-purpose torpedoes (torpedoes can be replaced with same number of mines)

—self-defense system with eight antiaircraft missiles

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Problems of Ship Repair System

92UM1182A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
25 Jun 92 p 2

[Article by Stanislav Pastukhov, special PRAVDA correspondent from Kronstadt: "A Cutting Torch for the 'Timoshenko'"]

[Text] Some seven years ago a steelcaster from Azovstal [Azov Steel Plant] Grigoriy Yakovlevich Gorban (two gold stars of Hero of Labor plus two higher education degrees obtained on the job) explained to me:

"Any grade of steel requires its own approach, its own additives, that is, extras. But no grade of steel can be made without a bucket of sweat."

"Why a bucket?"

"Well, a steelcaster drinks that much in water or kvass over a shift. And then sweats it off. Sweat is like blood—like the sun."

I recalled this conversation with such a remarkable man recently at Kronstadt, on board the large ASW ship "Marshal Timoshenko." A glorious ship.

Capt 3d Rank Igor Lukyanov, upon completing school, came to serve on this ship 11 years ago. As he described it:

"I considered my assignment then a great success. 'Marshal Timoshenko' had the title of 'Best Ship in the Navy.' It had served in the waters of the Arctic Ocean, the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean..."

"But now to us it is simply 'Timokha,'" continued Capt 2d Rank and First Officer Andrey Azarov, and with the toe of his boot poked at the partition: "But the rust has already eaten a hole."

With Azarov I went up to the wheel house, the brain of the ship, and there it was empty and in disorder. We went down into the engine room, the heart of the ship, and there too it was empty except for a sailor by himself scrubbing the galley's pots and pans.

A pile of rusty metal afloat is not a ship. And certainly so for a comparatively young ship.

"This is the usual picture," explained Azarov, "the more a ship undergoes repairs the sooner it ages, as there is not the proper tending of it."

The Timoshenko was put in repair (medium) at the Kronstadt Navy Yard just five years ago. The limit on repairs was 10 million rubles in former prices. The date for completing the work was to be 1990. But by this summer, the ship is only half repaired. I asked the leaders of the Navy Yard, the director V. Kucheryavko and the Chief Engineer V. Shorokhov, why things were going so slowly. Certainly in the same 5 years it would be possible to build two new ships or even more.

The yard leaders replied that in the first place, ship repairs are much more complicated than shipbuilding and ship repairs are in fact double shipbuilding but broken down into parts and then assembled. Moreover, the Kronstadt repair workers produce the end product in delivering to the Navy a ship that is ready to serve, and this means that they are largely dependent upon Kiev, upon Yerevan, upon Tallinn and other places in the former Union and now the CIS where they also manufacture or rebuild various parts of the ship. Secondly, the repair workers are for better or worse the executors and you can order from them a navy coat with one sleeve, really, one sleeve. Or, if you wish, one with its closure in the back. That is possible too. For the orderer is the Navy and they themselves at times do not know what they want.

The Navy, I was told by the repair workers, does not use its equipment efficiently but rather in the most unconscionable manner. The ships are run into the ground, to the point of being completely unserviceable, and then they go "to the pier," to repairs. The ships are virtually unprepared for repairs, in particular the repair plans, as a rule, are technically unintelligible and far from complete in terms of the amount of required rebuilding work. It also happens that a ship arrives at the yard piers without any repair documents, even for sewing one sleeve or an opening in the back. The same Marshal Timoshenko plied the oceans for 10 years without a single planned—preventive or routine—overhaul and had been reduced to an emergency state...

"Such a circumstance," continued the director and chief engineer, "we find harder and harder to explain to our workers and specialists. They ask us why we should get callouses on our hands, if no one needs our work, if it is for nothing?"

I heard this same question from the yard workers. In fact the complicated, great work of Russia's senior and most experienced collective at the Kronstadt Navy Yard at times goes literally right to the "dump." A ship is overhauled here for a year or two or five, and it is delivered to the sailors "spick and span," and they set to sea for a bit and then "that is it."

For example, I was told at the yard and outside it, here for six years they overhauled the destroyer Blagorodnyy. They filled the ship with new radioelectronics, and installed new machinery in it. They spent many millions and the commission accepted the ship for commission, having thanked the yard workers. As they say, not more than a month had passed when the Blagorodnyy was again moored at the pier, but now at the Kronstadt Arsenal located on the other side of the fence of the Navy Yard. Here the equipment from the Blagorodnyy was partially removed and partially cut up by an autogenous welder. The destroyer was being scrapped. Large amounts of money had been spent on the patrol boat Rosomakha. It also had come under the cutting knife. One of the flagships of the Northern Fleet Admiral Zozulya was undergoing repair for seven years. There is a special story about it.

Last summer the Admiral Zozulya was to set to sea after overhaul for sea trials but there were no propellers for the ship as these had broken. It was decided to remove the propellers from the nearby Marshal Timoshenko. They brought Timoshenko into the drydock, they drained the dock, removed the props, put them on the pier, filled the dock with water, removed the Timoshenko, moved in the Zozulya, and again emptied the dock... But the props of the Marshal did not fit the Admiral. They headed up North, they removed the props there from a combat ship and brought them back to Kronstadt...

It is a story of tears and laughter.

Finally the Admiral Zozulya set to sea, but it was unable either to fire a gun or travel under its own steam. Where is it now, at what pier is it moored? They could not tell me this.

"You have come to the wrong place," said the director of the Navy Yard, "you should ask the orderer himself. He is just across the road..."

The orderer refused to see me. The questions which I wanted clarified remain so far unanswered. But let me add to those already asked above: why do the overhauled, fit ships soon thereafter go to be scrapped. Are they poorly overhauled? No. The Kronstadt Navy Yard gives a guarantee of 14-18 months even for very venerable ships which have undergone repairs there. Possibly the ships are technically obsolete and are unable to carry out modern combat missions? There are some grounds for that. But why then are such ships overhauled at all? Why waste money on unnecessary repairs?

"In order to be in the books," I was told by the first mate of Marshal Timoshenko A. Azarov.

I don't know to what degree Andrey Feliksovich [Azarov] is right, but his assumption is not devoid of validity. While a ship is undergoing repairs, it is considered part of the fleet, of one or another navy subunit. The ship is considered a healthy fighting unit and for it the senior commanders are promoted in rank and receive their pay. First Mate Azarov himself is involved as well, as he is on military service. But in fact we are being

guarded by a large ASW ship which is clearly doomed to be scrapped. They have overhauled it, they overhauled it for 5 years, they worked and lived under God knows what conditions, they finish half the work, and then (I found out the last "bit of news") the orderer... refuses now to finance the repairs on Timoshenko. There are not enough funds.

Of course, at present there are no funds not only for the Navy, but there are few allocations around generally, and money is in short supply. At the same time it has been rumored on the Timoshenko that a decision has been taken to simply sell it abroad. But it will not be sold as a new ship, as who would need an old wreck. Rather they will sell it as scrap. And it will be sold, as they do with the other decommissioned ships in the Navy, at any, even rock bottom price as long as they receive their freely convertible currency.

The cutting torch is coming for the Timoshenko and it is felt that they are rendering a good deed for Russia, for all of us and its population. Certainly we are receiving for the old scrap metal, for the iron the best gold there is, a hard, freely convertible currency. It makes no difference to them that the best ship steel is being sold for a pittance, that in the steel, aside from all else, there is the sweat of many, many of our compatriots. And the sweat, let me recall the words of the Azov steelcaster, is like blood...

So, fin: gentlemen, you are trading not in just "iron," but you are trading in blood and sweat, but not your own rather that of others.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Overview of Dniester-Moldovan Conflict

924C1782A Moscow NOVOYE VREM'YA in Russian
No 16, Apr 92 pp 20-23

[Article by Kseniya Myalo: "The Dniester Region: A Khaki-Colored Spring"]

[Text] Moldova, Ukraine, Romania and Russia are trying to come to terms on the fate of the Dniester Region. Among the participants in the talks there is no one from the Dniester Moldavian Republic and this has caused many to doubt the success of the talks. What is happening in this unrecognized republic?

Spring has arrived in the Dniester Region as a time of burials. There are burials almost every day with the father of families and the almost beardless priests, they are burying the guardsmen and militia personnel as well as persons who are far removed from military operations and who fell victim to a stray bullet or intentional terror such as the nighttime firing on an ambulance on the Grigoriopol Highway.

It has become a common sight to see armed men on the streets of the Dniester cities as well as the sight of empty fields and abandoned villages in the combat zone. It is the time to sow, but life here has become dangerous, the roads are fired on, and the armored personnel carriers and mine layers are replacing the tractors as a subject of the spring landscape.

Spring has arrived here dressed in khaki.

"The Knightly Republic"

The word "Cossack" is one of those which is heard more often at present on both banks of the Dniester. Of course, in different intonations. In Chisinau, they have put up posters: "Cossack, plunder your own houses!" and "Russians, the Cossacks have come for you!" and others in this vein. In Bendery an announcement on a street stand announces and urges:

"In the lobby of the gorispolkom from 1000 to 1700 hours there will be an enlistment in the Cossack detachments of Bendery District for the Black Sea Cossack Troops. Patriots of the city! Join the ataman squadron!"

In the Dniester Region they love the Cossacks, both "their own" Black Sea ones as well as those from the Don and Kuban which have come to help ("for us they are a link with Russia") and about whom here legends are related of their military valor.

In Chisinau, on the contrary, they sketch in an image which is well familiar from the agitation of the revolutionary times and the Soviet history textbooks as "punishers," "servants of the Tsarist Regime" with daggers in hand. With indignation the question is asked "What are these strangers doing here?"

At the same time on the banks of the Dniester and on the pages of Moldavian history, the Cossacks are not making their first appearance, and this again confirms the banal truth about the new as the rather well-forgotten old.

If it has become a sign of the times to leaf back through the pages of history, if in Moldova they would turn in the search for their own national identity to the age of the glorious lords such as Stefan the Great and Ion the Fierce, it would not be a bad thing to recall what happened here in those remote times on the other bank of the Dniester.

In the words of the Moldavian writer and scholar of the 19th Century Bogdan Khashdeu, this is what happened: "On the other bank of the Dniester, on the border of Poland with the Tatar Khanate, a small republic was set up of fugitives, the motto of whom was to become the destruction of the enemies of Christianity... Soon thereafter they became famous for their fearlessness and began to be known as Cossacks..."

It was precisely to the fighters of this, as Khashdeu called it, "knightly republic" in the mid-16th century that the warrior Ion the Fierce turned for allies in the struggle against the mighty Porte.

Foreign Intervention?

The memory of the Cossack past is now kept in certain toponyms from the Left Bank Area, while the Cossacks themselves (in their fundamental triple national composition of Ukrainians, Moldavians and Russians) joined as an organic, natural part, that very complicated symbiosis of ethnic and religious sects and which is the population of the Dniester Region. More accurately, they became its very base, a deep subsurface layer which now, during the time of political storms, has been exposed and has emerged on the surface.

While now in Chisinau they are inclined to see the Cossacks as just "foreigners" and "outsiders," and consider them as almost the sole guilty parties of the tragic events in the spring of 1992, such an aberration in the perception of the realities of the process can be explained either by an ignorance of the region's history or by a conscious shifting of accents in the aim of depicting the entire conflict as chiefly the result of some "foreign intervention."

At the same time, the number of Don and Kuban Cossacks arriving in the Dniester Region, according to various estimates, scarcely exceeds 700-800 men and it is simply not serious to say that they have "stirred up" the 700,000 persons in the population of the small rebel republic.

The Black Sea Cossackry has been legalized here and its status is governed by special decrees of the leadership of the Dniester Moldavian Republic (PMR), and since the Russian Cossackry historically has viewed itself as a single whole, the republic frontiers which have become

the state ones can scarcely impede the contacts and movements of the Cossacks.

More and more clearly the conflict is showing itself to be political and even geopolitical and in no way an interethnic one. Its sources lie in the profound difference, and at present it would be more proper to say, the incompatibility, of the paths of development in the "postcommunist" age.

A Sanctuary of Technocrats

Directed from Chisinau to Tiraspol is a daily flow of accusations that has now become all too pat: "a military communist regime," "a bulwark of the partocracy," or "a communist sanctuary." These views, unfortunately, for too long have held sway over the conscience of the Russian community, which prefers as it were not to notice the growing threat and has grown used to speaking about the "plotting of the nomenklatura" and "the intrigues of the Center." They have had a marked impact also on the views of the representatives of the international organization which have visited Moldova.

Certainly this violates the principles of the defense of human rights regardless of ethnic or religious affiliation, as well as **political convictions**. In other words, even if the Dniester supporters were complete hard-line Leninists, we should show more attention to the alarms coming regularly from them about the violating of human rights in Moldova and all the more the first bloodshed.

Reality, however, is much more complex than the over-worked "innovator—conservative" scheme, and being confined to which the phenomenon of the Dniester Region would be given an extremely vulgarized and ideologically oversimplified interpretation.

First of all, there is nothing further from the truth than the popular assertions of the "partocratic" nature of power in the Dniester Republic. Not to say that in all the leadership there is not a single person whose party past could be compared "in caliber" with the corresponding past of President Snegur, while the party functionaries have been virtually expelled from all levels of power even at its very sources; this goes back to the political strike of 1989. It was precisely this expulsion which has brought about the dynamic nature of the process which has developed in the Dniester Region, and is largely unique of building structures of "post-CPSU" power, and which largely differ from those which have begun to be formed on the territory of Moldova itself.

While in Moldova there has been an abrupt shift toward strengthening the administrative structures and executive powers designed along Romanian lines, in the Dniester Region, on the contrary, a process has gotten under way of building up the structure of self-government both with the development of the existing soviet forms as well as with the creating of new ones.

In its genesis the republic actually had a number of chances to become a "republic of directors," and in this

instance one could have spoken about the power of the "technocrats," but certainly not the "partocrats." However, the realities of the process of building a state which the Dniester population encountered, the fierceness of the ethnocratic pressure from Chisinau, and the necessity of defending their rights and which is now universally felt as the necessity of military self-defense, have led to the consolidation of the small community, to the rapid merging of the fundamental interests of the "haves" and "have-nots," and ultimately to the forming of their own particular political style.

The particular feature of this style is the noncontradictory combination of three elements and which can be found in virtually none of the former Soviet republics: the institution of the President, the institution of the soviets, and what in Western political terminology is called elements of "direct democracy." This is the name which has come to be given to various associations and societies of citizens and which have the right not only to settle their own private problems but also—in certain circumstances—to take a direct part in the passing of state decisions.

Against the general background, the Worker Committee in Bender stands out particularly, and at present it has actually become the organizer of the city's defenses. Incidentally, its significance, if one were to employ the concept accepted in political science of a powerful **pressure group** which actively influences the forming of local power, was already apparent in "peacetime," and here you could feel a definite similarity to the role which the shop organizations played at one time in Europe.

Finally, there has been a sharp rise in the importance of citizen meetings in taking decisions on particularly important questions. For example, the question of accepting or rejecting the ultimatum received in March from Moldova was resolved precisely at meetings of the labor collectives.

Reverse Conversion

The broad involvement of the masses in the decision-taking process entails a real danger of anarchy, and considering the drama of the situation, the danger of swamping authority in a storm of emotion. But in the Dniester Region that danger has been counterbalanced by the sum of presidential powers as well as (and certainly not last) by the expressed pragmatism of the entire political style of the PMR.

This is a government of professionals (engineers are the predominant part, along with agronomists and physicians) which in no way are tied in "passed life" with the "apparat" let alone the ideological structures of the CPSU. Clearly for this reason there is the lack of political and particularly ideological overexcitability which is so characteristic, for example, of Moscow. There are also the noticeable successes which even the most rabid opponents of the rebel republic are finding ever harder to deny. These successes have been felt particularly in two

most painful spheres of our general life: in the economy and in interethnic relations.

Here easily and without pressure there arose what the Dniester residents had been seeking unsuccessfully from Moldova: official status for the three main languages (Moldavian, Ukrainian and Russian) and a bicameral parliament where the three main peoples of the republic would be represented by equal-sized groups (7 deputies each) with the right of a veto.

The absence of ministries and the flexibility of regulating economic activity through the few administrations and mainly through the tax system have made it possible to produce a positive balance in the budget and limit the drop in the production level to 4 percent while in Moldova this has been 25 percent.

It is true, feels the PMR President Igor Smirnov, that a further decline will also occur here as a consequence of the crisis in the entire economic system and into which the economy of the Dniester Region has been thoroughly integrated. But the experience gained makes it possible to hope that this decline will be softened.

Certainly corrections are being made by the commenced conversion of a part of production to military needs; here there is a certain reverse conversion. This is considered to be inevitable as the acuteness of the conflict, the sputtering hopes of a peaceful resolution to it and the marked disproportion in weapons in comparison with Chisinau force them down this path.

From the Worker Committee in Bendery: "We are already making mortars, flamethrowers and mines. What else can we do? The other side is receiving weapons, and in particular from the Ugeny Artillery Regiment where they are howitzers. The Floreshti Artillery Battalion has gone over to them and they have tanks..."

Undoubtedly, the decision of the leaders of the CIS countries and the Command of the CIS Armed Forces to turn over weapons to Moldova—and this under the conditions of a bloody conflict!—cannot be given any sensible explanation.

Federation or Rupture

This is precisely how the question is being posed now in the Dniester Region. In following the logic of the process, its population has reached a point which previously they would not have imagined. At present, when they have created their own, rather efficiently operating state structures, when they have already had to defend these at the price of their own blood, they will scarcely be satisfied by any palliatives in the form of a free economic zone or a separate district with a capital in Dubossary (instead of the shabby Tiraspol).

Preserving the territorial integrity of Moldova, they feel here, at present is possible only under one condition: accepting the idea of a federal system and turning it into

an union of three sovereign republics—Moldova itself or Bessarabia, Gagauzia and the Dniester Region. Otherwise the PMR will seek the recognition of its own independence.

Here they assume that the abrupt refusal of Chisinau to even discuss the idea of federation merely confirms the worst fears, namely that the end goal of the Moldavian leadership is reunification with Romania. For Romania the acquiring of the Dniester Region, a territory to which it has no historical rights and which it possessed only in 1941-1944, undoubtedly is colored by a desire of revanchism. The Dniester residents are drawing their own conclusions from the resolutions like the one which was approved at one of the demonstrations of the Moldovan National Christian Party, where "Marshal Antonescu and his men" were also included in the pantheon of glorious rulers while their own land was put within the boundaries of "Greater Romania." Curiously, in this resolution, in denouncing the "Stalin-Hitler treachery," they have managed to say nothing about the question of just **whose** ally Antonescu was.

The prominent differences between the People's Front and President Snegur and whom the members of the Front constantly stigmatize for his "renegadism," in the Dniester Region are not given much credence, considering them an expression of tactical differences within the general strategy, if not completely a trick.

Moreover, who says that Mircea Snegur, a prominent, in any event, supporter of the notion of "two Romanian states," will remain in power long? Many are inclined to interpret the new ultimatum presented on 28 March to the Dniester Region and which so alarmed Carpathian-Balkan Europe as an attempt to avoid the fate of the Azerbaijan President Mutalibov, as the introduction of a state of emergency which thwarted the demonstration planned for 29 March by the People's Front, the consequences of which could have been very serious.

To cap it all off, it is possible to end up in Romania but not be annexed by it simply as a consequence of the rapid and profound romanianization of all aspects of life characteristic for today's Moldova. A federation, or more precisely, a confederation, hence seems a method of maintaining one's home and cultural identity. The number of supporters of this relatively painless way out of the stalemate at present is rather large; however, with the deepening of the conflict, with the increase in the number of victims, the same fate may await this idea as the idea of a free economic zone which also at one time was proposed by the Dniester Region. Moldova "sat on it" until the Dniester Region had given up on it.

Are the Bridges Burned

At present the number of supporters of the "zone" is minute, although there is an increasing number of "radicals" who criticize the moderate line of Tiraspol and who are ready to examine the question of even blowing up all—with the exception of the Bendery—bridges, that is, the actual destruction of any, including economic, ties

with Moldova. These bridges—as has been particularly stressed by President Smirnov—have not been touched by the conflict. There is no need to explain how profoundly the entire situation would change with such a turn of events on the southwestern geopolitical expanse which until recently was called the USSR.

Incidentally, the federalization of Moldova will have a profound impact on the course of the political processes here. The process is being closely followed in Ukraine. For the response of Ukraine goes beyond the actions of President Kravchuk, who has hurriedly put up quarantines on the frontiers with the "dangerous" territory in the hope of avoiding the "contagion." The shakiness of such hopes can also be seen from the joint appeal to the deputies of the Ukrainian Supreme Council and adopted on 21 March by the Movement for the Rebirth of the Donbass, by the Kiev, Kharkov and Nikolayev organizations of the Ukrainian DDR [expansion unknown], the Youth Union of the Kharkov Area and the Kharkov Public Committee Elections-89:

"The attempt to destroy the Dniester Republic is an attempt not to allow the precedent of establishing federative states in Moldova and Ukraine. This has determined the actions aimed at isolating the Dniester Region and depriving it of support and aid..."

"The Kiev mass information media have kept silent about the main thing: the Dniester favors not a redrawing of frontiers and does not seek the collapse of Moldova but rather favors a democratic state system. It is precisely this that frightens the opponents of the federal-land system of Ukraine..."

One scarcely needs to be a prophet to predict the further and ever deeper echo of the Dniester events both in Ukraine and in Russia. This will be all the more destructive the more stubbornly—contrary to any obviousness—they ignore the definitely not local nature of the conflict. And the longer they put off the essential step of inviting the Dniester Region as an equal participant in the talks which will decide its fate.

Chemical Test Warning for Alma-Ata

92UM1186A Alma-Ata KARAVAN in Russian
No 21 (43), 22 May 92 p 1

[Article by O. Babiy from Alma-Ata: "Another Testing Range, But Now Close to Alma-Ata?"]

[Text] The newspaper announcement stated that in the surroundings of Alma-Ata, from 6 through 20 May, there would be ground and aerial spraying of the forests against pests using chemical and bacterial agents. For this reason, for a period of 50 days, they do not recommend the cutting of grass, the pasturing of livestock or the picking of mushrooms.

This announcement from the Interoblast Forest Protection Station appeared six days after the start of spraying the forests. Equally curious is why the banned period has

been extended to six weeks. It might be wondered if one can eat the vegetables, including early cabbage which in this period is ripening in the environs of Alma-Ata, if one should not eat the mushrooms and cut grass? We were interested in whether the leaders of the agricultural enterprises and organizations in the oblast were familiar with the announcement. Some avoided answering, while others honestly admitted that they still had not seen the announcement, but all of them strongly rejected the warning on the pasturing of livestock. And of course, their main argument was the lack of feed. Hence, the milk will go to the tables of the city dwellers with bacteriological additives.

In the opinion of Doctor of Biological Sciences and Head of the Laboratory at the Zoology Institute of the Republic Academy of Sciences, I. Mityayev, Alma-Ata and its environs could become a test range for testing the action of foreign biological agents. Who knows what would be worse, a nuclear test range or a bacteriological one?

"The use of chemical and bacteriological agents should be under rigid control," said I. Mityayev. "Mankind already knows the fact of the polluting of the environment during the period of the so-called 'chemical revolution' in the 1960's. The high level of oncological ailments in the U.S. at present, with the years-long safe ecological situation, can only be explained by previous 'sins,' that is, by uncontrolled use of chemistry and biological agents which were not tested out under laboratory conditions.

"It is essential to learn from the mistakes of others and not to repeat them. For precisely this reason our institute has set up a zooresource commission. Its specialists are very knowledgeable in the area of the scientific achievements of foreign colleagues and can provide qualified conclusions on the prospects of employing various agents to combat pests. This will help avoid an outbreak of allergic illnesses and possible negative phenomena of a mutagenic nature in our republic. However, neither our own institute nor colleagues from the Plant Protection Institute and the Ministry of Ecology and Bioresources, as it has turned out, have run expert tests on the agents which were used on the forests around Alma-Ata. We have written a letter to the Ministry about this. I am afraid that this will not be enough for the people of Alma-Ata to understand our concern."

If we do not set up a dependable system for testing the chemical and bacteriological innovations inundating us from overseas, then Kazakhstan is threatened with a tragedy comparable certainly with the death of the Aral Sea.

Political Mercenaries Involved in Local Conflicts

92UM1188A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 24, 14-21 Jun 92 p 9

[Article by Vladimir Kiselyov, MN news analyst: "Mercenaries on the War Path"; first paragraph is MOSCOW NEWS introduction]

[Text] When former major of the British army Michael Hoare, nicknamed "Mad Mike", answered a call from Congo dictator Tshombe and assembled a team of commandos in 1960, that perhaps started the history of modern-day mercenaries. Now such operations are continuing in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The Afghan Syndrome

Inside the headquarters of the National Guards in Tskhinval, South Ossetia, a bareheaded woman was inexpertly bandaging the leg of a hefty lad whose skin was glaringly white compared to that of his swarthy comrades-in-arms.

"Arseny D., captain of the Russian National Legion." He saluted smartly. "You can call me Senya. But please don't identify me by my surname."

Senya proved to be a loquacious fellow fond of showing off. An orphan, he graduated from the airforce training college in Ryazan. He served two stints in Afghanistan, was wounded and shell-shocked. When in Afghanistan he and his mates called at a small shop. The owner grabbed the phone and called the Soviet military police, saying he was being robbed by Soviet soldiers. That landed Senya in jail. Once out of jail he went back in the army. In a recent incident he beat up an army colonel he met in the street and didn't like for some reason. Consequently he was discharged from the army and faced a prison sentence, so he went on the run. He has no wife nor kids and the only trade he has learned in his 34 years is to make war. That decided him. He went to Tskhinval to join the Russian National Legion.

As he drank glass after glass of water (obviously due to the thirst after a drinking bout the previous night), the former paratroops captain cursed as he went on:

"We're just sitting here on our asses without weapons. Not even all the Ossets have them. I tell them: let's break into the engineers' battalion or the helicopter regiment and grab some guns, but they won't hear of it. Meantime weapons are being ferried back into Russia in helicopters loaded so that they almost scratch their underbellies on the bloody mountains."

That brings back memories of the nine years' Afghan war. War generates a special type of psychology. The Afghan war syndrome isn't just a medical term. Nearly 700,000 former Soviets are still affected by this feeling of needlessly losing the war. They haven't fought their battle to the end.

Heroes or Scoundrels

Colonel Vyacheslav Barsukov, head of the local army operations group, curled his lip in disgust:

"They're scum, those mercenaries. My regiment had the first brush with these individuals in Karabakh three years ago. They are generously paid. The guys run no risks and don't take part in operations. They pretend they are instructors. Here in Tskhinval they go by the

flashy name of the Russian Legion. They are bloated from doing nothing but drinking. Having guys like that for friends only compromises the Ossets. I think they gave them shelter out of desperation."

Talking later with commander of the local security troops Vadim Gazzayev, I heard this explanation: "We asked that South Ossetia be reunited with Russia. But your government betrayed us. Ordinary Russian lads came over here to join us in the war. How can we spurn them? They are straining at the leash but we don't let them join the fray—we'd hate to see them die."

Answering Their Party's Call

The legionnaires had a swinging night out. Having begged for weapons which were given them, they headed for a Georgian village. They blazed a grenade at a bunker, blew a machine-gun emplacement to smithereens, had their fill of gunplay and retreated under a shower of retaliatory fire. They called it reconnaissance. I knew that the guys wanted some action after their enforced idleness.

They've been living for several months in a cramped room with peeling walls, cots standing back to back and covered with crumpled blankets. No TV, no papers, no fun.

There are eight legionnaires. There were more of them. Three were sent back soon after their arrival: they were drinking with locals, got into a scrape and threw a hand grenade. One was evacuated with a wound in his leg, yet another disappeared in March, no one knows where.

The group leader is a Moscow student by the name of Ivan. As a conscript he was a paratrooper; he served in the Ferghana Valley during the ethnic riots and was among the troops pulled out of Afghanistan. A member of the security service of the Russian National-Patriotic Centre during the Congress of Civil and Patriotic Forces in Moscow in February. There he heard the call by the National Republican Party of Russia to send volunteers to defend Tskhinval. He secured leave from his college and signed a six-month contract with the party. The Ossetian side was to pay his fares, bed and board, and to provide a uniform and weapons.

The rest of the legionnaires also volunteered to go to South Ossetia, signing similar contracts with the party. They are students and workers from various places. One already had combat experience in Trans-Dniestria. He is Viktor, I think he comes from the Urals. A tall, wiry guy with a wrinkled face. He only smiled enigmatically at my questions and reeked of drink. Then he dozed off in the filthy chair. ("We want to sell Vik to the Georgians. He'd drink and snuff up all their wine and they'd send him back," the legionnaires joke.)

The men don't agree they are mercenaries. They prefer to be called volunteers, or members of an international brigade. Like in Spain back in the 1930s.

"Aren't you paid for being here? Your contract says it's 5,000 roubles a month, I think."

"Listen, the Ossets have no cash to pay people their wages," Ivan objected as he stirred macaroni and canned meat in the frying pan. "We were paid five thousand, all of us. We eat what we could buy with the money in the market place."

Ideological Guidance

I went to see Sergei Maltsev, an official of the party in charge of military matters, at a hotel in St. Petersburg. He turned up with a bodyguard. The latter was a hulking guy in military uniform complete with a black beret sporting a double-headed eagle and a shoulder stripe with the letters RNL (Russian National Legion). He sat behind me all the 90 minutes we talked.

From MN File: The National-Republican Party of Russia (until recently called the Republican People's Party of Russia) was founded in Leningrad on April 8, 1990, on the basis of the Russian National Patriotic Centre. Its leader is Nikolai Lysenko, former member of the council of the Leningrad branch of Pamyat. He insisted that all mention of Zionists be removed from the party programme and that a policy of "legal and constructive authoritarianism" and "cooperation with the army and KGB" be proclaimed. During the Gulf War the party supported Hussein. According to its leaders, membership stands at 5,000.

"The Ossets are Alani, a nation very close to us. With regard to Arian origin they are on a par with Germans or Slavs," Maltsev began. "By defending them we also uphold Russia's interests and protect its southern border. To us South Ossetia is as much part of Russia as Trans-Dniestria, where we're also sending legionnaires. There's a group in Vladikavkaz ready to go to Tskhinval at short notice. But the Ossets don't provide our people with weapons as agreed. There's little point in sending them there, isn't there? We'll probably stop sending them. Which is a pity, because some legionnaires are real pros who can each do the job of ten in battle. The Russian National Legion is an organization controlled by the party and devoted to martial sports. It has units in Rostov-on-Don, Krasnodar, Magadan, Yekaterinburg and Chelyabinsk. There are two companies in Moscow and five in St. Petersburg. Their commanders are officers. Legionnaires receive physical training and shooting practice and learn hand-to-hand fighting, using methods specially designed to train reconnaissance personnel. Even today, in repulsing the Georgian aggressors, they are substitutes for the much maligned Russian army. The time will come when these forces play a stabilizing role in the country and, jointly with the other patriotic forces, they'll stop the chaos."

Other Patriots

The Ataman of the Cossack Union of the Don Cossack Army was trying to prove that his men fighting in Trans-Dniestria were only volunteers and can't be

regarded as mercenaries. They weren't recruited or paid any money. Conclusion: dozens of men up and down Russia all at once decided to hop over to Dubasari and Tiraspol to do some shooting.

That's right, they signed no contracts, but it is already proven that they were well paid there.

Men from the Ukrainian National Self-Defence Forces (UNSDF) appeared in Trans-Dniestria in the same way as the legionnaires in Tskhinval and the Cossacks in Trans-Dniestria. Before he set off for Trans-Dniestria the commander of one unit (some thirty uniformed men), former Soviet Army Major Vladimir Solovei, said:

"I fought in Afghanistan and I'm well aware that when there's a civil war it is conducted by terrorist methods. Terror like that in Yugoslavia or Nagorny Karabakh can crush the enemy. A free Ukraine can only be a Great Ukraine, and for that one has to fight."

From MN File: The UNSDF were created last fall by the extreme right Ukrainian National Assembly. The Assembly spoke against the participation of Romanian and Russia in the coming multilateral talks on a peaceful settlement of the Trans-Dniestria conflict. It suggested that participation be limited to Ukraine, Moldova and the Trans-Dniester Moldavian Republic. According to UNSDF leaders, the organization has at least 8,000 members. They are being trained by members of Ukraine's Union of Officers under a special programme.

According to MN correspondent in Ukraine Vladimir Ruban, there are permanent UNSDF headquarters in Tiraspol, operating under one of the leaders of the National Assembly—Dmitry Korchinsky.

Communists don't remain indifferent to developments in Trans-Dniestria. During a rally in Manezh Square in Moscow I saw a man who was calling on the crowd to volunteer to go to Tiraspol on behalf of the Working Moscow movement.

Leader of the Russian Communist Workers Party Viktor Anpilov demanded that his interview be taped and published word for word, otherwise he threatened to take me to court. Let me summarize what he said, nevertheless.

Anpilov admitted that seven volunteers were sent to Tiraspol. They are members of the party and men of five different nationalities. They weren't engaged in the fighting, they helped patrol the streets. Anpilov didn't hear that they were paid. He generally believes that money is ruled out when human blood is being shed. The contingent sponsored by the party has nothing to do with volunteers.

No Investigation

Early in March, when Cossacks first appeared in Trans-Dniestria, Moscow found itself in a delicate situation. The issue could not be passed over insolence and the

Russian prosecutor general was asked to carry out investigation into the alleged participation of Russia's citizens in armed formations in Moldova.

"Any progress?" I asked in his office.

"None," I was told. They explained that since the whole thing is taking place on the territory of another state, it's up to Moldova to investigate. Russia has no right to do so.

I would like to see how Moldavian investigators can come to Trans-Dniestria. Or Azeri investigators to Nagorny Karabakh. Or Georgian investigators to South Ossetia.

Does this mean that "gentlemen of fortune" can do exactly what they please and fear no punishment? It appears so.

Africa and CIS

When mercenaries rampaged through Africa in the 60s amidst the ruins of the colonial system, Mad Mike said it was a golden age for mercenaries.

Once again the smell of blood tempts venturesome individuals—an empire that used to take up one-sixth of the globe is crumbling. I wish I were mistaken, but another golden age of mercenaries appears to be descending on new independent republics which were until recently fraternal.

P.S. After I left Tskhinval three legionnaires were captured by Georgian armed militants. According to eyewitness accounts they were in fact betrayed by Arseny, a captain stripped of his rank and fond of bragging about his adventures in Afghanistan. The rest of the legionnaires left for Russia in a hurry, despite the critical situation in South Ossetia.

UKRAINE

Ukrinform said to have Misrepresented Morozov

92UM1172C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
10 Jun 92 p 1

[Article by Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Press Center Chief Major Aleksandr Kluban: "Once Again on a Biased Approach"]

[Text] In the 5 June 1992 issue of the newspaper "24" that is published in Russia, an article, "Chitayu istoriyu Ukrayny" [I Read the History of Ukraine] (authors TASS-Ukrinform Correspondents Nikolay Zaika and Aleksey Trotsenko), was published on Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov. In the initial version, it was planned as a political portrait of the first Ukrainian Minister of Defense. But this "portrait" was cut down to a small sketch (only 120 lines remained of four pages of text) in the end result on the newspaper page. But this is still not so terrible—you can't do anything, it has become crowded on newspaper

pages due to a shortage of paper or obviously due to other intentions. This is a matter for the newspaper's editorial staff colleagues. But the trouble is that the gentlemen from international newspaper "24" still found place for their commentary in the form of a small insert to the article, having forgotten about the elementary norms of journalistic ethics.

They certainly have a complete right to express their own point of view on events and to provide assessments of activities of some state leader or other but to ascribe to him that which he never said and, all the more so—never did and yet in an article to the authorship of which these schemers have no relation at all—this is already too much. Obviously it was advantageous to someone to present Konstantin Morozov to the entire world (the newspaper is international) as some sort of person who hates Russia and Russians. It is sufficient to just read the original: "I justify the trust," stated Konstantin Morozov after his appointment as Ukrainian Minister of Defense. Having been promoted from Major-General to Colonel-General in a matter of months, he has been transformed into a proponent of a strict policy in relations with Russia. And today in the Ukrainian Army they determine loyalty to their own people through the question: "Are you ready to fight against Russia?"

Well, right now will the Minister of Defense think about meeting journalists halfway who so often request an interview with him or will he refuse the request? But it turns out that this is another time when they irresponsibly deal with written materials, distorting what has been said, interpreting to their own way (however it is advantageous) any sentence. Or they totally unscrupulously lie about something and later you prove that it was not that way.

The Ukrinform correspondents had a good idea to interview the minister of defense, it's too bad that they didn't think about how their Moscow colleagues could reduce it and they could render Colonel-General Morozov a well-meaning gesture that backfired.

Ukrainian Military Appointments

91UM1171A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
6 Jun 92 p 1

[Ukrainian Presidential Decrees appointing military officers to key posts and unattributed biographies, 27 May and 4 June 1992, Kiev: "Appointments in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense"]

[Text]

Ukrainian Presidential Decree On the Appointment of a Ukrainian First Deputy Minister of Defense

Appoint Lieutenant-General Ivan Vasilyevich Buzhan Ukrainian First Deputy Minister of Defense.

[Signed] L. Kravchuk
President of Ukraine
Kiev, 27 May 1992

Lieutenant-General Ivan Vasilyevich Bizhan

Lieutenant-General Ivan Vasilyevich Bizhan was born on 25 November 1941 in the village of Yalanets of Tamoshpolskiy Rayon of Vinnitsa Oblast. He graduated with distinction from Kharkov Guards Tank School. He began his service in the troops as a tank platoon commander. Later he was a tank company commander.

In 1971, after graduating with a gold medal from the Tank Troops Military Academy imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovskiy, he was a tank battalion commander, tank regiment chief of staff, tank regimental commander, and tank division chief of staff.

In 1982, he graduated from the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy and was appointed commander of a motorized rifle division in the Central Asian Military District. From 1984, he was an army corps commander and was on a special assignment abroad from 1987. From 1989, he was an army commander. From April 1991, he was deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Main Directorate.

He has been awarded the Order of the Red Star, the Order For Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces, 3rd Class, and medals.

He is married and has a son.

Ukrainian Presidential Decree On the Appointment of a Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense

Appoint Major-General Aleksandr Stepanovich Ignatenko Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense for Personnel—Ukrainian Armed Forces Personnel Directorate Chief.

[Signed] L. Kravchuk
President of Ukraine
Kiev, 27 May 1992

Major-General Aleksandr Stepanovich Ignatenko

Major-General Aleksandr Stepanovich Ignatenko was born on 2 September 1945 in the village of Usak of Yampolskiy Rayon in Sumy Oblast. He is Ukrainian.

After graduating from a middle evening school in 1963, he entered Kharkov Guards Tank School. He began his officer service as a self-propelled gun platoon commander in the air assault troops on the territory of Turkestan Military District.

From 1967, he commanded a self-propelled gun battery and was awarded a distinguished service medal.

From 1973, after graduation from the Tank Troops Military Academy imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovskiy, he was appointed army headquarters operational department officer in the Belorussian Military District, and, in 1974, chief of staff and tank regiment deputy commander.

From December 1975 through March 1980, he served on the territory of the GDR [German Democratic Republic]. Deputy regimental commander, regimental commander, and deputy division commander.

After the redeployment of the division, from April 1980 until June 1984, he served in the Belorussian Military District. In 1982, he was elected a Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies deputy in Grodno. In August 1982, he was awarded a "Brotherhood in Arms" Medal by order of the Polish People's Republic Minister of Defense based on the results of the Klen-82 firing training exercises that were conducted on Polish territory.

In 1986, he graduated from the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy and was appointed commander of a tank division in the Transbaykal Military District on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic.

From July 1988 through August 1990, he served as military expert under a GDR NNA [National People's Army] tank army commander.

From 1990, he was deputy army commander for combat training in Transbaykal.

He occupied the post of personnel directorate deputy chief and personnel directorate chief in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

He is married and has three children.

Ukrainian Presidential Decree On the Appointment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Chief of the General Staff—Ukrainian First Deputy Minister of Defense

Appoint Lieutenant-General Vasiliy Timofeyevich Sobkov Ukrainian Armed Forces Chief of the General Staff—Ukrainian First Deputy Minister of Defense.

[Signed] L. Kravchuk
President of Ukraine
Kiev, 4 June 1992

Lieutenant-General Vasiliy Timofeyevich Sobkov

Lieutenant-General Vasiliy Timofeyevich Sobkov was born on 20 October 1944 in the village of Lisanovtsy of Starosinyavskiy Rayon in Khmelnitskiy Oblast to the family of a collective farmer. He is Ukrainian.

After completing middle school in 1961, he entered a technical school where he obtained the specialty of metalworker-sanitary engineer.

He graduated from Kazan Tank School in 1966. He began his officer service as a tank platoon commander in the Carpathian Military District. Later he was appointed commander of a tank training platoon and commander of a tank training company.

In 1974, he entered the command department of Tank Troops Military Academy imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovskiy. Upon graduation from the

academy in 1977, he received an appointment to the post of tank regiment chief of staff, later tank regimental commander, and tank division commander in the GSFG (Group of Soviet Forces Germany).

From 1982 through 1984, he studied at the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy.

From 1984 through 1987, he was a motorized rifle division commander in the Transcaucasus.

From 1987 through 1989, he was an army corps commander in Turkestan Military District. Later, he spent two years serving as an army commander in Kiev Military District and from 1991, tank army commander in the Western Group of Forces.

He has been awarded the Order of the Red Star, the Distinguished Service Medal, and others.

He is married and has two children.

Ukrainian Presidential Decree On the Appointment of a Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense

Appoint Lieutenant-General Ivan Ivanovich Oleynik Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense for Weaponry—Ukrainian Armed Forces Weaponry Directorate Chief.

[Signed] L. Kravchuk
President of Ukraine
Kiev, 4 June 1992

Lieutenant-General Ivan Ivanovich Oleynik

Lieutenant-General Ivan Ivanovich Oleynik was born on 14 February 1937 in the village of Skranglevka of Berdichevskiy Rayon in Zhitomir Oblast to the family of a worker. He is Ukrainian.

In 1955, after graduating from middle school in Berdichev, he entered the Higher Naval School for Weapons Engineers which he completed in 1960. After graduation from the school, he was sent to the Strategic Rocket Forces on the territory of Moscow Military District where he served in the posts of engineer, senior engineer, division section chief, regimental chief of staff, and missile regiment commander.

In 1973, he entered the command department of the Military Academy imeni Dzerzhinskiy which he completed in 1975. Later he spent one and a half years serving in the post of missile division chief of staff. From 1976, missile division commander.

From 1983 through 1985, he was chief of the Perm Rocket Forces Higher Military Command School. In 1984, he defended his dissertation as a candidate of military sciences.

During the next six years, he served as chief of Plesetsk Cosmodrome. In 1987, he received the scientific rank of "senior scientific associate", and "RSFSR Meritorious Figure of Science and Technology" in 1991.

In August 1991, he was appointed first deputy chief of the Main Missile Weapons Operations Directorate. This year he defended his doctor of technical sciences dissertation.

He has been decorated with the orders of the Red Banner, "For Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces" 2nd and 3rd classes, and with many medals, including from the Republic of Cuba and the Mongolian People's Republic.

He is married and has three children.

Ukrainian Presidential Decree On the Appointment of a Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense

Appoint Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Vasilyevich Lopata Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense.

[Signed] L. Kravchuk
President of Ukraine
Kiev, 4 June 1992

Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Vasilyevich Lopata

Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Vasilyevich Lopata was born on 23 March 1940 in the village of Rozhev of Makarovskiy Rayon in Kiev Oblast. His father died at the front in 1944.

After graduation from Makarov Middle School in 1958, he worked as a carpenter-parquet floor layer at a Kiev specialized construction administration.

In 1959, he was drafted into the USSR Armed Forces. He graduated from an artillery masters school. He served his compulsory service as a senior gun-mortar master.

In 1964, he completed Baku Combined Arms Command School. He commanded a motorized rifle platoon and company in the GSFG.

In 1971, he graduated from the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze and continued his service in Odessa Military District. Motorized rifle battalion commander, chief of staff, motorized rifle regimental commander, and deputy division commander.

From 1980 through 1982, he served as commander of an independent motorized rifle brigade in Cuba.

After graduation from the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy in 1984, he commanded a motorized rifle division and an army corps in the Far East.

From 1990, he was first deputy commander of the Northern Group of Forces.

He has been decorated with the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Certificate, the orders of the Red Star, "For Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces" 2nd and 3rd class, a medal "For Distinction in the

Defense of the USSR State Border" and others. He has awards from the Republic of Cuba and the Polish People's Republic.

He is married and has two children.

Ukrainian Presidential Decree On the Appointment of the Ukrainian Air Defense Forces Commander

Appoint Lieutenant-General Mikhail Alekseyevich Lopatin Ukrainian Air Defense Forces Commander.

[Signed] L. Kravchuk
President of Ukraine
Kiev, 27 May 1992

Lieutenant-General Mikhail Alekseyevich Lopatin

Lieutenant-General Mikhail Alekseyevich Lopatin was born on 1 July 1940 in the village of Svoboda (currently Kalinovka) of Klichevskiy Rayon in Mogilev Oblast. He is Byelorussian.

In 1957, he graduated from Perekop Middle School. Until July 1958, he worked at a kolkhoz.

In August 1958, he entered Daugavpils Military School which he completed in 1961.

From June 1962 through June 1965, he was on a government assignment in the Republic of Cuba.

From 1965 through 1970, he studied at Minsk PVO Troops Higher Missile Air Defense Engineering School, upon completion of which he continued his service already in the post of air defense missile battalion section chief.

From April 1971 through October 1973, he was a battalion commander. Later, he served as unit chief of staff in Chisinau and, from October 1978 through July 1982, as an air defense missile troops directorate section chief.

In 1980, he entered the correspondence department at the Air Defense Troops Military Academy imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevskiy from which he graduated with a gold medal in 1984. He combined service and studies in the post of PVO [Air Defense] deputy corps commander.

From 1984 through 1986, he was a PVO division commander in Ukraine. Later he was a corps commander for two years. From June 1988 through August 1989, he was a PVO independent army chief of staff—first deputy commander. His next assignment was PVO independent army commander—Kiev Military District deputy commander.

He has been decorated with the orders "For Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces" 2nd and 3rd class.

He is married and has two children.

Baku Ukrainian Officers Seek Placement in Homeland

91UM117IC Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
5 Jun 92 p 1

[Interview with Baku Regional Union of Ukrainian Officers Chairman Colonel Aleksandr Igorevich Slyusarev by Senior Lieutenant Dmitry Zolotko, Baku-Kiev, under the rubric: "To Put the Question Point-blank"; "Will We Become Persons Made Homeless by Fire?"]

[Text] The breakup of the USSR and the acquisition of state independence by the republics has placed before many servicemen the question of where to continue serving. And it is not surprising that many officers who are natives of Ukraine want to serve in the Armed Forces of their own state. However, right now not everything depends on the desires of the officers themselves and quite a few barriers frequently remain in their path. But they are fighting for their right to live and serve in their own Homeland.

The Baku Regional Union of Ukrainian Officers was formed on 10 November 1991 in Baku and has tasked itself with the goal to render assistance to its members in the transfer to the Homeland and their social protection both in Azerbaijan and also later in Ukraine. Several dozen officers have already been transferred to Ukraine and many are still waiting to do so, thanks to the will and persistence of Union Chairman Colonel Aleksandr Slyusarev. Right now there are 253 members in the union. Colonel Slyusarev stated that all of them will be transferred to Ukraine and will continue serving in its Armed Forces. This was decided at a meeting of a union delegation with Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General K. Morozov.

Despite the union chairman's optimism, many officers nevertheless doubt that they will succeed in finding a place in the Ukrainian Army or Navy. I also expressed that doubt in an interview with Colonel Slyusarev.

[Slyusarev] We all will occupy those positions which are due to us by right. And not on the second team, we will transfer to the second team those who are now on the first team. The Ukrainian people will support us. We are not requesting positions for ourselves in Ukraine, we are not even demanding, we will simply arrive and we will occupy them based on the rights of the owners.

[Zolotko] But the officer whose place you intend to occupy and who has also cast his fate in Ukraine, what is he guilty of?

[Slyusarev] We are proposing the creation of a main certification board which, as its work, will place all officers and employees in Ukraine and those who wish to be transferred there under equal conditions. All of them write requests about their desire to participate in the competition for the right to serve their state. Knowing the number of those desiring to do so and the need for

personnel, one can conduct a competition. Let there be 100 people per position, but we can select one and release 99 on an objective basis and with the participation of society. When we proposed this to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the response was silence. But this competition could be conducted during a period of months, a maximum of a year. But if they do not want to conduct it under equal conditions, we will have to take what is our due.

[Zolotko] Let's say that they do not accept your proposal on a competition. In that case, whom do you intend to drive out?

[Slyusarev] I do not intend to drive out anyone. I am saying this figuratively. Let's assume that they place some of us on the second team but they intend to release us in three months (you can be in an unauthorized position for three months)—we will picket and we will not permit them to release us. If they release us at another location, we will assemble there.

Further. If a position is vacated—someone has been released into the reserve. We will not permit them to place someone other than us in that position. But once again using legal methods. Already right now, as far as I know, the Ukrainian Minister of Defense has ordered a halt to movements for assignment of those who are arriving from "hot" spots.

As Colonel Slyusarev is planning, the activities of the Baku Regional Union of Ukrainian Officers with the transfer of its members to the Homeland will not cease. He thinks that with time the union can become a Baku Regional Organization. Officers, who will be transferred to Ukraine, will find themselves in an unequal position with those who are already serving here. Therefore, we need to unite and defend our rights.

In conclusion, I would like to say one more thing. The Baku Regional Union of Ukrainian Officers has helped or in the near future will help its members to transfer to Ukraine but this is not all 253 members. A total of nearly 5,000 officers and army and naval warrant officers who are natives of Ukraine are serving in Azerbaijan. As we all know, they plan to return all of them to the Homeland prior to the end of 1993. However, this may be too late, considering Azerbaijan's position on military issues. Talks are already occurring about dividing the Caspian Flotilla and a portion of the administrative structures is being disbanded. The fate of the 4th Army is open to question. Thus, it could turn out that officers will face a dilemma: remain to serve in the Azerbaijani army and navy or go to Russia with the withdrawing units and ships. And as a result, they will have to move twice within a year: first to Russia and later to Ukraine. We all know that two transfers are equivalent to one fire, and I think that we need to immediately resolve the fates of these officers so that we don't place them in the position of persons who have been made homeless by fire.

From the Editorial Staff

You will agree that this is the first letter in our mail in such a threatening tone. Although similar notes have rung out in recent days as a result of preparations for the congress of officers—Ukrainian citizens who are serving in the Diaspora. We are publishing it so that our servicemen-readers know that this slice of opinions also exists. At the same time, we would like to formulate our point of view on the tone of this letter.

There is no disputing that today independent Ukraine, which is building its own armed forces, is going through an unusual situation. Instability is being felt practically in all spheres of economic and socio-political life, there is not enough money or resources, there is not enough experience or material-technical support in many sectors with which we are having to become independently involved with for the first time.

This also affects the military sphere. We were the first to set out down the path of building our own Armed Forces. And we did not go through a general friendly blessing but while overcoming numerous attempts to trip us up, and while encountering continuous streams of slander and disinformation at every corner. They at times distracted Ukraine from major matters, including from manifesting concern for those sons who are still serving outside its borders and who desire to return to their native land, and this has not yet ceased right now. Some are disseminating the falsehood that "you, they say, there in Ukraine are not waiting and therefore do not know how to reduce the group of forces deployed there." Those who have not yet been transferred want to make social orders based on such fabrications.

And we do not want to believe that some of our fellow citizens in the Diaspora has been hooked by this "canard". Their attempt to return to the Homeland a bit more quickly is understandable. Who of those currently serving in Ukraine has not experienced that state of mind?! Who yesterday, who today, and who will be happy to return only tomorrow. There are few enough hopes here. For each such return—there are a mass of problems which are not so easy to resolve. Here there is both housing and job placement...

But the transfer process is being resolved slowly but surely. There are the appropriate decisions of the President of Ukraine and the Minister of Defense. And in order to become convinced that matters are not at a standstill, you need to visit the Ministry of Defense personnel directorate staff offices which today sooner remind you of an emergency actions headquarters. The fates of dozens and hundreds of servicemen are resolved positively every day. And believe me, the tempo of this work will increase.

And, finally, with regard to the threatening tone of the letter. We once again would not like to believe that everyone thinks the way Colonel Slyusarev does. We will not talk much about the lack of ethics and even danger of dividing servicemen into first and second class people as

this slips by in Aleksandr Igorevich's thoughts. Knowing the specific situation and conditions of service of officers in Ukraine, we will authoritatively point out that it is also not heaven here. And under conditions here, a man in uniform experiences no less physical and moral loads. And the majority bear them with honor and serve conscientiously. So why must they, also citizens of Ukraine, feel uncertain that soon someone will arrive and expel them from the service positions they occupy based on "the rights of the owner"?

The process of building the Armed Forces, including the return to the Homeland of its citizen-servicemen, is proceeding with difficulty. And the duty of each one of us is to relate to what is occurring with understanding, to help with deeds and advice, and to strengthen the unity of our ranks.

Ukrainians Seeking Transfers Encounter Delays

*91UM1171B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
5 Jun 92 p 1*

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA Correspondent Major Aleksey Trubitsyn, under the rubric: "The Cadre Issue: A View on the Problem": "The Messengers Are Rushing to All Corners"]

[Text] While returning from a temporary duty assignment recently, I met two officers on the train who had arrived in Ukraine in search of jobs.

"The personnel folks, particularly in Moscow, are not rushing to transfer us," said a tank battalion chief of staff from Transbaykal Military District. "Right now there are few people who are keen to go to remote military districts so it is better to take an official letter and look into the matter yourself."

Alas, the messengers with official letters are not decreasing, although the issue on the exchange of servicemen who are citizens of some republic or other of the former Union has recently been resolved, a mechanism for officer and warrant officer transfers has been worked out by the ministries of defense, and the right has been granted to release those who have served the prescribed period or who have decided to part ways with the army early, regardless of what country the serviceman is a citizen. In a word, the problem is being resolved, however Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate cadres and unit heads of personnel departments and sections have concerns and troubles.

"It is turning out in such a way," Engineer Brigade Personnel Section Chief Major Nikolay Vazhenin admitted in an interview, "that general personnel issues would be transformed into personal issues. The influx of servicemen into Ukraine is such that personnel agencies have neither enough time or manpower to find the requesters jobs or complete transfer documents as efficiently as they would like. But it is still simpler to find yourself serving in Ukraine than to get an assignment from here. What they are offering Russian [rossiyane]

servicemen, as a rule remote military districts or "hot" spots, does not suit the majority of them. Obviously, there are no vacant positions in Russia's prestigious military districts.

"Today only three of the six in the brigade who have not taken the oath have left. Documents for the transfer of Colonel Tarantsov and Senior Lieutenants Yanin and Zhiryakov have been submitted to Moscow but there is the impression that no one is involved with them there."

As for myself, I will note that Oleg Yanin left for the capital of the former Union on the day of my interview with Major Vazhenin. He will resolve official and personal issues.

Colonel A. Tarantsov, whose personal file is also in Moscow, was there recently. Indeed, this is a special case: having 27 calendar years of service, and 30 years with preferential calculation of service, Anatoliy Ilyich is full with desire to go on serving his homeland.

Major V. Fetisov, who is being released into the reserve, is also looking for his personal file at the CIS Armed Forces personnel organs. At one time, nearly six months ago, the documents for his release were sent to Moscow and they vanished into thin air.

"Today we could release him much more rapidly," said Major Vazhenin, "by an order of our Ministry of Defense. But the fact is that Major Fetisov was ordered to a brigade and we don't have the documents on the calculation of years of service or on passing a medical commission. Yes and today he himself is in Leningrad, he is resolving the apartment issue."

In my opinion, the CIS Unified Armed Forces personnel organs are primarily to blame for this leapfrog with transfers and releases of servicemen. They waited for a long time: would national armies arise in the republics or not? And so many problems have accumulated. Although even today issues are being resolved more slowly in Moscow than the situation demands. And therefore the people themselves are rushing to resolve where and in what post they can continue to serve.

The messengers have repeatedly appealed to the engineer brigade's personnel department. As of today the unit command authority has issued five official letters to officers to hand carry who are attempting to be transferred to Ukraine.

"There are somewhat more people who wish to return," noted Major Vazhenin. "But two problems arise here. First of all, not all aspirants for platoon and company commander positions (the remaining positions in the brigade have been filled) are acceptable to us based on their recorded military specialty. There are few "pure" engineers so many tank officers are applying. Secondly, so far the brigade's authorized staff that was developed recently has not been approved and it is very risky to accept people right now, we may have to suddenly reduce some positions or other."

Actually, the situation in the Ukrainian Armed Forces is not simple. The issue of forming an army has turned out to be extremely difficult in all regards. And here the lion's share of the load has lain on the personnel organs who deal directly with people and with their fates and where any mistakes are expensive.

Rumors about the fact that, they say, in the Ukrainian Armed Forces the selection of candidates is being conducted primarily according to national origin and that aspirants for some position or other are not passing certification boards due to weak native roots in Ukraine and ignorance of the language are also inciting passions.

I also posed that question to Major Vazhenin who is, incidentally, a Russian:

"I can precisely state for the brigade that we have no such thing," said Nikolay Nikolayevich, "we are attempting to help each serviceman, if there is some sort of possibility of doing so. Here is the latest example. Captain Vladimir Kuvshinov recently passed a certification board in the Ministry of Defense Engineer Directorate. He is a tank officer and he is being nominated for a position as chief of a radio control group. If they had wanted to, they could have found a snag to reject his candidacy without any particular difficulty."

"But the members of the certification board were not concerned about that but with when the officer will be able to thoroughly learn what is in general a new subject for him. Vladimir stated a specific time period. I am certain that the officer will keep his word."

Yes, Ministry of Defense personnel organs are working in a difficult situation today. However, there is no doubt that all citizens of Ukraine who are serving outside their Homeland will ultimately find their own place in the ranks. But time and patience are required to do that. Unfortunately, not all servicemen who are attempting to return to Ukraine have enough of the latter.

Status of 13th Army Officers not Taking Oath Viewed

91UM1171D Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
10 Jun 92 p 1

[Article by Major Oleg Vachayev, Carpathian Military District, under the rubric: "About Those Who Have Not Taken the Oath to Ukraine": "A Special Category of Officers"]

[Text] "There is a special category of officers in the division who have not taken the oath for various reasons," 13th Army Commander Major-General Petr Shulyak said in conclusion at a hearing of the command authorities of a Carpathian Military District division. "Among them are quite a few experienced, conscientious people. We do not need to alienate them from the service."

The general's opinion sort of summed up the short but difficult conversation that occurred during the days of the performance evaluation exercises. The question consisted of how to use these officers during the evaluation. But even after the hearing, honestly speaking, there was no unambiguous opinion among the officers.

In the division where Colonel Stanislav Ivanchenko is the acting commander, they are more than one fifth of all the officers, beginning with the previous division commander (he has already left for a new duty location) and ending with company and platoon commanders. The most perceptible losses, if we can call them that, are at the regimental and battalion level. For example, in the regiment which Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Chata (he himself is a deputy commander for rear services according to his position) is temporarily commanding, all three motorized rifle battalions have been left without battalion commanders. Senior Lieutenant V. Tkachuk commands one of those subunits. By the way, "commands" was spoken too loudly...

It has been said more than once and at various levels that it is not worthwhile to create a tragedy out of all of this. Actually, right now the time is such that the officer corps is unstable: some are arriving, others are leaving, and still others are staying. That is on the one hand. But, on the other hand—service remains as before. No one has released an officer from carrying out his assigned duties. But now it turns out that the number of assigned duties for some officers has increased by at least a factor of two.

And what about those who until recently occupied authorized positions? Are they really, anticipating their fate, not now seen at the subunits? Some, although withdrawn from authorized positions, continue to serve as before, others (the majority of company and platoon commanders) will appear at units only on payday. Since my temporary duty assignment occurred on other days, you understand that I did not manage to meet the latter. But then I saw Major Dmitriy Sapronov, a battalion commander until recently, at headquarters.

"I am awaiting a transfer to the Belorussian Military District," Dmitriy Vasilyevich told me. "But for now I am working at headquarters. My interrelations with the officers are normal. I attempt to impart maximum benefit to the unit."

While speaking with the officer, I had to catch a note of regret and even resentment in his story. He had served very little time in his position based on the interim agreement and, according to the testimony of headquarters officers, he had conscientiously carried out his duties. However, a telegram soon arrived at the regiment: as a result of the fact that commanders, who have not taken the oath and who have direct contact with personnel, are evading service, remove them from authorized positions. Obviously, there were grounds for this order, albeit in that division where Sapronov serves. We don't understand one thing: why treat everyone alike?

Besides the tribulations of a purely moral context, there is also a service aspect to this story. The fact is that there are practically no trained officers left in the battalion. Moreover, the principled battalion commander suggested that all three of his company commanders be removed from their posts for a cool attitude toward their duties at last year's efficiency report board. Two of the company commanders, who did not take the oath, rarely appear at the subunits (didn't the order on the removal from authorized positions appear for the good of officers like them?) and the third, in Sapronov's words, is "toiling away". But the commander, now already former, has neither a moral nor an official right to affect the situation.

The question may arise: what, are those commanders who "were offended" by those officers who did not take the oath not guilty of destroying the system of subordination and of the deterioration of discipline and order? Those people who answer in the affirmative will be only partially correct. The reverse process is also being observed.

In that same regiment, I met Major Viktor Timoshchuk. Viktor Anatolyevich arrived in the position of assistant battalion commander for personnel, but he is not in an authorized position for now but his "colleague", who did not take the oath, has not been removed from his authorized position, although he does not particularly trouble himself with duty.

The reason is that only commanders are being removed from authorized positions and no commands whatsoever have arrived with regard to assistant commanders. So Timoshchuk suffers although he has already involved himself in the work...

This is an understandable matter: the issues of the transfer of some officers or other—is a very complicated matter that requires a mass of shakeups and agreements, besides pure paperwork. However, if this problem is resolved slowly, the local command authorities, as they say, can use their authority. Albeit in the sense not to reduce good and poor officers to a common denominator.

The latter due to the fact that the personnel situation in the regiment (and also in other units) serves as a fertile ground for all sorts of rumors and gossip.

Much has been said and written about the reasons and consequences for the dual attitude of officers toward service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. But I would like to direct attention to just one factor. This is not a purely personnel problem as the bureaucrats who yearn for a simple life sometimes present it. Besides everything else, we need to understand the state of an officer whose thoughts are already at the new duty location.

Besides, this is not a purely officer problem. You can't hide the truth from a soldier. According to the testimony of many, soldiers welcome the renewal of the officer corps. But you have to note that the situation with

officers is projected to a certain extent into the soldiers' environment. One of the regimental commanders of that same division told me which words his fellow servicemen use to award the three soldiers—natives of Crimea who are demanding that they be sent to serve in their homeland. And all because they can plainly see the example of the officers, who have considered their military duty to Ukraine to be ended although there have still not been any orders on transfers. It is good that for now the confrontation is occurring at the level of discordant epithets.

The best solution to the situation that has developed is the rapid resolution of all issues on the reassignment of officers, which, incidentally, both the departing and remaining officers are demanding.

National Guard Commander Kukharets on Call-Up

92UM1172E Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
10 Jun 92 p 2

[Interview with Ukrainian National Guard Commander Guard Major-General Vladimir Alekseyevich Kukharets by Ukrainian National Guard Press Service Correspondent Vera Valerko: "No Cause for Alarm..."]

[Text] Conscription of young men for service in the Ukrainian National Guard [NGU] is continuing. Our correspondent met with NGU Commander Guard Major-General Vladimir Kukharets and asked him to answer a number of questions associated with the course of the conscription campaign and the manning of guard subunits.

[Valerko] Vladimir Alekseyevich, many people are interested, which legal acts support the conduct of the draft?

[Kukharets] The current conscription campaign is being carried out based on the Laws of Ukraine "On Universal Military Obligation and Military Service", "On the Ukrainian National Guard", and "On the Procedures for Manning Military, Material- Technical and Financial Support of the Ukrainian National Guard" and also the 23 March 1992 Ukrainian Presidential Decree "On the Release into the Reserve of Servicemen Who Have Performed Compulsory Military Service From the Ranks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Ukrainian National Guard, Border Troops, and Civil Defense and on the Next Conscription of Citizens of Ukraine for Compulsory Active Military Service in May-June 1992".

[Valerko] The work to select young recruits requires maximum concentration and detailed calculation of all possible situations. It was certainly preceded by a serious preparatory stage?

[Kukharets] You are correct. All of the work for the impending draft was planned beforehand. Incidentally, the Statute on the Ukrainian National Guard Manning Procedures provides for the possibility to begin studying

and selecting candidates for service in the guard beforehand, still prior to the initiation of the draft. Our representatives drove out to all military commissariats and oblasts in Ukraine, including to the Crimea, to conduct familiarization work locally, jointly with military commissarial workers. They attempted to not simply review the lists of conscripts but to personally talk with each young man and, when possible, also with his parents, because few people have more than a modest knowledge about the guard.

A poster "In the National Guard—Best of the Best" was prepared and distributed at the request of oblast military commissariats. The strongest and hardest young men, who are well-developed physically and who have a middle education will actually be drafted into the guard. The primary requirements demanded of them are contained in the Statute on Ukrainian National Guard Manning Procedures.

[Valerko] Vladimir Alekseyevich, how were guard representatives greeted in the various regions of Ukraine? What problems arose in the process of their work?

[Kukharets] A great deal of assistance and support was rendered to us in Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Odessa, Lvov, Kiev, Poltava, and Ternopol oblasts. Here we met complete understanding and coverage with regard to our problems. Questions were resolved without any impediments whatsoever. Therefore, I am not exaggerating if I say that we selected the required number of conscripts thanks precisely to these oblasts. Things went more poorly in Sumy, Cherkasskiy, Zhitomir, and Kirovograd oblasts and in the Crimea.

Are you interested in the problems? Unfortunately, there were quite a few of them. First of all, we sensed a significant weakening of the military-patriotic education of young people. I am certain that the unwillingness of some young people to serve in the army results from that. A review of the draft contract system which could stabilize the situation and attract young men into the guard is being delayed by the legislative organs for unknown reasons. Secondly, many young men of draft age will not be able to serve in the guard due to their state of health.

[Valerko] Can we say in this regard that today not so many young men want to serve in the NGU?

[Kukharets] Not at all. There are enough who wish to do so. Evidence of that are the letters which arrive at the NGU Main Directorate. The majority of them contain requests to be drafted for service in the guard or to provide needed clarification on this issue. We recently received letters of this nature from 11th grade students who are dreaming about service in the NGU. A letter addressed to the President of Ukraine from 17-year old teenagers Yevgeniy Morenko and Aleksandr Moiseyenko from Feodosiya requested that they be enlisted into the ranks of the National Guard ahead of time. They vow to serve the people of Ukraine. I can also cite this

example: a group of young people from Dneprodzerzhinsk came to visit us several days ago. They were interested in the conditions for being accepted for service in the guard. As you can see, worthy replacements are growing up and there is no cause for alarm.

[Valerko] Is everything ready to receive the young replacements?

[Kukharets] Unfortunately, no. Assignment of the lads who have been conscripted for service and the creation of normal living and training conditions for them have been delayed. The fact is that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has not yet decided to transfer to the Ukrainian National Guard the required military garrisons and training ranges. Issuance of new uniforms to personnel has been delayed due to the lack of the required amount of raw materials and cloth. This has resulted in the fact that today guard officers are dressed in quite varied ways: in internal troops, navy, army, air force, and militia uniforms. This mixed uniform situation shocks those who have not been informed about the true state of affairs. Some conscripts cannot at all understand in which forces they are going to have to serve. The Ukrainian Ministry of the Economy must display the maximum understanding in this issue and render the required assistance to the guard.

In conclusion, I want to express kind words to those who rendered assistance and cooperation to us during the conscription campaign. They are Armed Forces Main Staff Manpower Mobilization Directorate Associate Colonel Pavel Anikeyevich Bragar, Major-General Vladimir Dmitreyevich Kolesnik (Dnepropetrovsk), Col Valeriy Valentinovich Nesterov (Nikolayev) Major-General Ivan Ivanovich Altashin and Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Mikhaylovich Ivanov (Lvov), Col Vladimir Vasiliyevich Shelest and Lt Col Stanislav Ivanovich Shvets (Ternopol). This list could be continued.

I think that the young conscripts will justify the confidence we have in them and will not let down either their parents, commanders, or the people of independent Ukraine.

Ukrainian Conscripts Excluded from Black Sea Fleet Units

92UM1172B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
10 Jun 92 p 1

[Article by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Press Service: "There Are no Positions for Ukrainians in the Naval Infantry"]

[Text] As it became known at the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, many young men who have been drafted from the territory of Ukraine to perform compulsory service in units and on ships of the Black Sea Fleet and who dreamt of becoming naval infantrymen will not be able

to realize their desires only for that simple reason that they are Ukrainians and are ready to pledge allegiance to their own people.

This year, the naval infantry brigade that is deployed in Sevastopol is manned by citizens of Ukraine but only those of the Russian nationality. And just recently Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Igor Kasatonov, both from the television screen and in the press, accused the leadership of Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense that they are allegedly conducting a split in multiethnic naval units, although the Ukrainian side has repeatedly proven in deed that we are not selecting servicemen in our Armed Forces based on national origin—for us, they are all citizens of Ukraine.

Just whose orders (written or oral) is the naval infantry brigade commander carrying out with such manning of its new recruits?

Moreover, let's note that the conscripts themselves are outraged by this selection when Brigade Assistant Chief of Staff Captain V. Lazarev poses the question to them: "Which oath will you take?" And for some reason places are not being found in the ranks of the naval infantry for citizens of Ukraine, even if they are of the Russian nationality but if they are prepared to swear allegiance to the Ukrainian people. They immediately find themselves in other commands.

As a result of these cases of the human rights violations on the territory of our independent state, we consider it necessary to mention that the activities of Black Sea Fleet officials are discriminatory and run counter to the laws of Ukraine and are in violation of the Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities.

Ministry of Defense Plays Down Ukrainianization

92UM1172A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
10 Jun 92 p 1

[Interview with Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate First Deputy Chief Colonel Ivan Grigoryevich Khomyak by NARODNAYA ARMIYA Correspondent Major Gennadiy Klyuchikov, under the rubric: "The Cadre Issue: A View on the Problem": "Timely Interview: Oh, That Fifth Column"]

[Text] It is no secret that many CIS states that are forming their own armies, including Russia, are studying and utilizing Ukraine's experience in building its own armed forces. However, this circumstance hardly intersects with the mass media's harsh criticism and at times distortion of the activities of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and specifically of the personnel policy being conducted by it.

Our correspondent requested that Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate First Deputy Chief Colonel Ivan Grigoryevich Khomyak comment on the most often encountered rebukes in the press that are directed at the Ministry of Defense.

[Klyuchikov] Recently the mass media has been increasingly accusing the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense of aggressive "Ukrainianization" of Armed Forces officers. To what extent are these accusations well-founded?

[Khomyak] No "Ukrainianization" whatsoever of the officer cadres is being conducted in our army. All of that is fantasy. We are being accused of the sins that the former USSR Ministry of Defense often committed. It is thanks to the personnel policy that it conducted that an overwhelming majority of Russians were assigned to the positions of regimental, division, and army commanders.

At the same time, Ukrainian officers were sent where hard-working, competent specialists were needed. To the Northern Fleet, the Far East, to Central Asia, and to the Transcaucasus—in these places our fellow countrymen composed a significant portion of the officer corps. And now when they have found themselves in a very difficult position as a result of the breakup of the USSR and the emergence of a number of interethnic conflicts, is the Homeland really not justified to be concerned about its sons? But in this case it is a question not only of Ukrainians but also about citizens of Ukraine who have expressed a desire to serve its people.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces Personnel Directorate is purposefully and intensively conducting work for the return of servicemen—citizens of Ukraine to the Homeland. In the process, needed and, in my view, adequate steps are being taken so that this process will be both dynamic and civilized.

By way of illustration, during our two days off, we all managed to accept and prepare the required documents for assigning the 120 officers who have arrived from Azerbaijan. And a week later, we had processed a group of 100 people who had also arrived from there. Those people who are familiar with the tasks of personnel organs will be able to assess the volume of work that we performed.

And still so far we hear charges of slowness. No, that is not the matter. The work of the personnel organs will not endure bustle and haste. The initial ardor of the officers who desire to immediately, having dropped everything, return to Ukraine, will pass in time. They will need their personnel folders and a great deal of information about the performance of service in favorable areas to process their pensions. But it will be somewhat more difficult to process them at that time.

[Klyuchikov] Will the influx of officers who are serving outside the borders of Ukraine not cause an increase of contradictions in the army? Where will you assign the 200,000 servicemen who have arrived?

[Khomyak] I will note that this figure is quite approximate. Politicians and journalists most frequently use it. In our calculations, we proceed from the number of requests for transfer to the Ukrainian Armed Forces that have arrived at the Ministry of Defense. We have more

than 20,000 of them. But a decision cannot be made on a significant number of these requests since they either do not contain the required information or they have not been signed by the individual concerned but by relatives of servicemen.

Moreover, we have transferred nearly 5,000 officers to other CIS armies and we have received only 1,500. A significant number of vacant positions will be created due to the planned release of servicemen who have served the prescribed period of service. So there is not yet any reason to incite the situation surrounding the return of servicemen to the Homeland. And all the more so since this is not a question of any conflicts whatsoever. We are assigning to a position that person who has shown that it is he who has the best knowledge and a great deal of experience.

So, two officers were competing for the post of Kiev Oblast Military Commissar—Brovarskiy OGVK [City Military Commissariat] Military Commissar Colonel V. Polishchuk and Colonel V. Fedyrko from the Northwestern Group of Forces. Having evaluated the professional qualities of both competitors, the Ministry of Defense certification board indicated a preference for Colonel Fedyrko.

[Klyuchikov] What is the goal of the command personnel certification that is being conducted by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense? Is a pledge of allegiance to the people of Ukraine insufficient to serve in its Armed Forces?

[Khomyak] While taking the oath, a serviceman just assumes certain obligations with regard to the state. But is he capable of carrying them out and in what sector of work is it better to use him—the one-man commander already decides that. The certification board is tasked to help him make the correct decision.

By asking various questions, board members are attempting to find out as much as possible about the person and to determine not only the level of his professionalism but also the motives that prompted his decision to serve in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. And what is strange in this when we are interested in knowing why a citizen of another CIS state wants to serve precisely in our army?

Alas, cases are occurring when officers, whose candidacies were rejected due to low professionalism or moral qualities, suddenly begin talking about persecution based on political or ethnic motives once they are outside the door.

[Klyuchikov] Is it true that a secret Ministry of Defense order exists to not assign officers of non-Ukrainian nationalities to the highest positions? KRASNAYA ZVEZDA recently wrote about that.

[Khomyak] That is a gross lie. And this is easy to prove. Let's turn to specific facts.

During the course of certification, the absolute majority of officers who are not Ukrainian and who occupy leading posts have been recertified and at times assigned to higher positions.

PVO [Air Defense] 8th Army Commander Lieutenant-General Mikhail Lopatin has been appointed commander of the Ukrainian Air Defense Forces.

Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Klimov has been certified from commander of a radio technical regiment to the post of commander of a radio technical brigade.

Aviation Regiment Deputy Commander Lieutenant Colonel N. Sukhitashvili has been certified to the post of regimental commander.

Let's look at the results of the work of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense certification board to the position of regimental commander for the period from 25 March through 14 April 1992 as an example. During that short segment of time, four Russians and five Ukrainians were submitted for review for the position of deputy army commander and three and four were recommended for appointment, respectively. Three Russians of eight reviewed candidates and five Ukrainians of six were recommended for work on the Ministry of Defense staff.

We could endlessly continue citing examples. And they all prove that there is no notorious fifth column that determines the certification board's conclusion, but exclusively the servicemen's ability to conscientiously and skillfully carry out his service obligations and his desire and ability to stand guard over the security of the Ukrainian people.

[Klyuchikov] How actively is the Union of Ukrainian Officers [SOU] influencing Ministry of Defense personnel policy?

[Khomyak] Here there is no question of imposed settlements whatsoever. But we consider the participation of representatives of social organizations, including SOU members, in the work of the certification board to be very useful. Knowing well the moral climate in military collectives and having information at their disposal about some serviceman or other, they render substantial assistance in the work of certification boards. Obviously, SOU Chairman Militia Colonel G. Omelchenko will be placed on a certification board in the near future.

Ukrainian Officer Union Free of 'Party' Influence 92UM1175A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Ukrainian 9 Jun 92 p 3

[Article by Ivan Shkvarko, Colonel (res), delegate to the Third SOU Congress, and member of the Ukrainian Writers Union: "Just When Will There Be a Ukrainian Army? Thoughts by a Delegate to the Congress of the Ukrainian Officers Union"]

[Text] I did not have a chance to mount the rostrum at our Officers Congress and share my reflections with my

brothers-in-arms, but—on the whole—I am satisfied with its work and with its summation documents. At the time, however, there were fears that the euphoric nature of the meeting in that auditorium would not allow us to be identified as a civic-minded organization—one whose fundamental efforts are directed at one and only one goal—building a truly effective Ukrainian Army and protecting patriotic Ukrainian military-service personnel. Thank God that—as our new chief stated—the SOU [Ukrainian Officers Union] is independent of any parties or movements whatsoever. But the last "i" has not yet been dotted, nor the last period placed...

To my way of thinking, the SOU did, nevertheless, "help" Mr. V. Martirosyan to become "people's general of Ukraine," although there were also other patriots in the running for this post (but they lacked any political reputation!). This newly confirmed general is now manifesting his "patriotism" as a state official in the Cabinet of Ministers—and I will be speaking about this work of his later in the present article....

But first let me present my view of our union. It should exist not as a kind of military trade union, but rather should function as a civic-minded, professional organization, uninfluenced by political factors—something we have been waiting a long time for. In no case can we allow it to be transformed into a party for the narrowly ambitious interests of its leadership, seemingly "approved" by the rank-and-file members. I reject the newly appeared "Ukrainian stars," who put on airs in front of the television cameras and "defend" our interests as officers by traveling to Canada and Britain (although some of our lads are also there). And certainly may God grant that nobody takes shelter under the SOU roof for political or monetary reasons!

[Words illegible] No matter what happens, they will not have power in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which swear allegiance not to Ukraine, but rather to their own guns and ranks—the most distinguished of which [words illegible] are certain officers, warrant officers, sergeants, and privates, which go to make up—on the whole—(and for the first time!) our Ukrainian Army!

The puzzling question which my colleagues used to ask me somewhat ironically is the following: Just when will there be a Ukrainian Army? At that time I would reply as follows: Not soon, not until we apply all our efforts from all sides! Because at present this army is not really Ukrainian, nor is it combat-ready. It is simply utter nonsense to say that this state is independent, but its army is part of the empire!

I am not happy at all about those high-ranking officers in the military service who have sworn their oaths of allegiance to the people of Ukraine, but who make mental reservations to the effect that the Ukrainian Armed Forces "will fight" and—some of them—resist to the very last the very idea of a national army. These are persons to whom Moscow has given seats on a "train which has already left the station..." and they also

include followers of the "Committee for the State of Emergency," who—even now—hold the rank of general.

Nothing has changed in the so-called Ukrainian Armed Forces—the same old use of force and violence; everything is the same as it used to be in the "unconquerable and legendary" army. The military units stationed on Ukrainian soil live according to the rules of Yazov and Grechko, as well as those of their predecessors—Zhukov and Voroshilov. And here we should pause for a while and reflect on this. What did I see when I visited several units and stations in the Kharkov garrison? The same old passwords, the same old orders and procedures, the same old spirit of using force and violence to compel people to do things, the same old lack of cultural standards and low intellectual level, the same old petty protectionism and stupid willfulness, such that you felt on your own skin that you were serving in the imperial army. To be sure, some "innovations" have appeared such as the following: light blue nameboards on the doors and signs written in yellow letters. You get the same feeling about the zealous use of "bright yellow" in certain units of the National Guard. They have made a great point of painting the entrances and exits of the barracks with a bright yellow color. But you do not sense the Ukrainian spirit nor hear the Ukrainian language being spoken in these units....

Frequently among the personnel staff (read: "officers") of the UZS [Ukrainian Armed Forces] you encounter some young fellows who are "awe-struck by the East" (O. Gavrylyuk), and they tune in to Moscow radio and television. Perhaps they themselves sense the "news blackout" for troops in Ukraine. Because they take no notice of Kiev, nor do they listen to it; they prefer to get their news from the "Center." They are expecting something, waiting and hoping for something. Could it be that they are anticipating a signal for a military coup?

It is more commonly the case that they are waiting for and impatiently anticipating a reduction in the Ukrainian Armed Forces so that they can be released into the reserves of the "no-good and unsuitable," that is to say, in other words, Ukrainian patriots (the experience of "perestoyka" is great in them!). And the following is what I advocate: Having pledged and undertaken to build up the Ukrainian Army, the SOU (and all of us!) have to protect the military-service personnel in the ranks, as well as in the reserves, from the "true sons of the Ukrainian people." We must pay attention to and intelligently lead to the "clear path of truth" all those who do not perceive or accept our movement and spirit. Let's not act foolishly; let's not beat anybody up, and let no one accuse us of any kind of "isms." All that we are endeavoring to do is to enlist those "sons of Ukraine" in the "army of friendship and brotherhood," and we will return to the sacred experience.

For the task that is required of us is to build up our own, Ukrainian Army!

Let me say frankly and sincerely that we had a fruitful discussion and did a great deal at our congress on the following issue. We were concerned and disturbed about those persons who are serving in Ukraine as well as beyond its borders. But there was one painful and urgent problem that the delegates avoided paying attention to. It concerns those Ukrainian officer-patriots who—prior to the well-known events of August 1991—were released ahead of schedule into the reserves “for advocating a reduction in the USSR Armed Forces,” and who now must prove that there was a political basis for this. Such a fate also befell me, and I would like to permit myself a digression at this juncture in order to illustrate my remarks by my own example.

At the end of 1990 I—as an army colonel in active service (who saw combat in Afghanistan) and a writer—became a “pensioner” at age 47. My post was lost in a “reduction.”! But prior to this, a conference of the Ukrainian People’s Movement (Rukh) had been held, and I spoke there. There were also democratic endeavors in which I took part: There was a contest for the seat of a Ukrainian people’s delegate. My own stance with regard to perestroika and the army did not coincide with the views of my commanding officer, and so the “logical” ending to my case could be expected, and I—frankly speaking—was ready for it. Although the top brass made it look as if they were troubled by my fate, I was certain that the system would work faultlessly and genuinely. I had “clean” documents and even a discharge certificate stating—in the well-known formula—that everything was in accordance with the law! “That’s the way members of Rukh must be handled!,” i.e., not up front but rather behind the scenes.

I did my best to fight for myself, but nothing came of it; such persons as myself do not fit into the scheme of “One, two, and no backtalk!” And so, having found out about the course of events and the situation, even prior to the order concerning my dismissal, I addressed a petition to the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council (Rada) that I be “commissioned as a colonel in the Ukrainian Army.” It may seem unusual, but that was an unusual time. But my wish (albeit extraordinary!) to join the ranks and build up the Ukrainian Army was not granted to me, and has not been granted even today, when the situation has changed fundamentally.

Just who has delayed the resolution of this petition? Those persons who dismissed me “in connection with the reduction,” for it is they who occupy the high posts in the structures of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, and it is they who will not “yield in their principles!” And this does not pertain to me alone. I am sure that there are many such cases as mine—and who will take the responsibility for resolving such problems as ours?!

As to my own case, I have definite proof that certain persons are blocking my wish to join the Ukrainian Army and to take part in building it up. In 1990 I wrote a private letter to L. Kravchuk and wrote him twice last year (after the attempted coup by the GKChP [State

Committee for a State of Emergency] and once to another person, but there were no replies. Nor is this particularly surprising, because my letters do not have much respect (I suppose) for such “prominent” persons as General Sharikov, a “GKChP supporter” and presidential adviser to whom I was subordinate at one time in the chain of command.

I wrote reports to General K.N. Morozov, the minister of defense, and Ukrainian People’s Deputy G. Altunyan intervened with him on my behalf, but I have received no encouraging reply. And then I unexpectedly received the following “assurance” (after my letter to Moscow): “The matter of your dismissal in 1990 was not submitted to the district political administration—this was Colonel V. Odegov, chief of the personnel division of the former KVO [Kiev Military District] Political Administration, and another high-ranking bureaucrat in the Personnel Administration of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

And my dossier was then sent to the chairman of the Committee To Protect Military-Service Personnel under the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers—Colonel (now General) V. Martirosyan. The reply over his signature dumbfounded me because it was in the form of the well-known “help to a drowning man—advising him to save himself.” What he wrote was: “The positive solution of your problem will depend—to a large extent—on you.” Just what do you expect me to do, Mr. Martirosyan? I did not document my whole case suddenly or all at once; I have forgotten all the replies received from various government officials as to how the Committee advises persons like me to proceed. If I were to be “guided,” in such a way as the Committee advises, then I would be waiting for protection for a long, long time. For the chairman does not possess the requisite government document; it has been sent to the SOU Board in accordance with which I have submitted my petition in quadruplicate: the SOU oblast center, the kray-level Rukh organization (URP) [Ukrainian Republican Party], the Ukrainian people’s deputy, the SOU Secretariat. Such complicated procedures were not required even for those persons who wanted to join the CPSU! Such requirements, such demands on me, should be a matter of former times; I should not have to certify such matters for Mr. Martirosyan or anybody else. For such a viewpoint is subjective, erroneous, and discriminatory: One “tabu” is more than enough, and what difference does it make if I am “black” (or “red”?). Although here one could discuss matters a bit further (each individual case being somewhat different), I draw attention to the fact that one submitted copy should be sufficient—the SOU Center could provide copies for all other entities involved. And, in fact, I introduced just such an amendment to a resolution of the congress, along with a paragraph dealing with the return to the service of those officers who were dismissed ahead of schedule “in connection with the reductions in the USSR Armed Forces,” and who now wish to continue their service in the name of protecting and defending an independent Ukraine.

And the Supreme Council (Rada) and the Cabinet of Ministers must urgently work on preparing such a document as would serve as a basis for presenting a petition concerning our return to military service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. My like-minded fellow-officers and I want to serve the present-day Ukraine for a lengthy period of time. We want to build up a truly effective Ukrainian Army, for the time is coming—and is not far off—when the new "herds of Muravyov" will rush down upon Krutiv.

Officer Union Plenum Issues Statement

92UM1176A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA
in Ukrainian 13 Jun 92 p 1

[Statement by Ukrainian Officers Union Executive Committee Plenum, Dated 6 June 1992, Addressed to Chairman, Ukrainian Supreme Council (Rada), Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ukrainian Minister of Defense, and Ukrainian People's Movement (Rukh)]

[Text] Proceeding from an assessment of the military and geopolitical situation around us as well as in Ukraine itself, the Ukrainian Officers Union draws attention to the fact that the independence of our state is threatened by a genuine danger caused by certain isolated reactionary forces within Ukraine itself. The following factors serve as symptoms or indicators of this:

- an attempt to isolate Ukraine at the level of Russia's official circles;
- the decisions taken by the Russian parliament with regard to the Crimea, the speech made by Vice-President Rutskoy, the statement by Baburin, Ukraine's ambassador to Russia, the trips taken by several leaders of political parties through Ukraine making anti-Ukrainian and anti-state speeches, the unpunished split or dissension in the activities of chauvinistically minded groups in Transcarpathia and Bukovina, as well as in the RDK [Crimean Republican Movement] in the Crimea.

Nor should we be amazed at the urgent and pressing demands of the Ukrainian president and minister of defense; the Russian government and its Ministry of Defense are demonstrably leaning away from a just resolution of the issue involving the assignment or allocation of the Black Sea Fleet. They are decidedly endeavoring to make a special case of the Black Sea Fleet by way of recalling it from Russia and returning it completely to the jurisdiction of its Ukrainian Fatherland. It is also their desire that officers who are Ukrainian citizens and members of the Ukrainian community be stationed on our territory as military units separate from foreign citizens of the CIS; new dislocations are likewise being created in Ukraine's border areas because of military units returning from countries to the west of us.

Proceeding on the basis of the above-listed facts, the Ukrainian Officers Union states the following points:

1. The Officers Union supports the Ukrainian president and parliament in their activities with regard to building an independent Ukrainian state. We also support the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense in its work of creating a Ukrainian Armed Forces and strengthening their combat-readiness. Our Officers Union will bend all efforts to provide a reliable and certain defense of our state's independence.
2. Guided by the interests of our state and its integrated, unified characteristics, we draw attention to the unsatisfactory work being done by the SBU [Ukrainian Security Service], MVS [Ministry of Internal Affairs], and the procuracy in the struggle against anti-state and anti-Ukrainian organizations, parties, groups, and factions. We demand that urgent and speedy countermeasures be taken against their activities in accordance with the laws in effect. And in the event that these demands are not carried out, or that such activities are regarded differently, the persons involved should be made strictly accountable, including criminal liability.
3. The Ukrainian Officers Union insists on the most rapid possible resolution of problems connected with reforming the Ukrainian Armed Forces, particularly with regard to the commanders and the chiefs at all levels. And it demands that personal responsibility be assigned for ensuring the combat-readiness of the units and subdivisions involved. We draw attention to the fact that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Defense Collegium must decisively demand that these matters be resolved by the commanders and the chiefs at all levels. And, in cases of disobedience, such officers should be dismissed from their posts.
4. We must proceed as rapidly as possible to create civilized borders for the purpose of ensuring that the interests of our independent state are protected.
5. The recruitment and deployment of the military units under the Ukrainian Armed Forces should correspond to the requirements relating to providing absolute security for Ukraine.
6. The Ukrainian Officers Union draws attention to the impermissibility of allowing any military units of foreign states or their groups to appear on our territory.
7. The Ukrainian Officers Union appeals to all civic and community organizations, members of Rukh, and other political parties to wage a decisive struggle against anti-state and anti-Ukrainian actions in all spheres of economic, political, defense, cultural, and information activities, to implement the Ukrainian national idea as an official ideology, and to unify their own efforts for the purpose of building an independent Ukraine based on the principle of working together.

Glory to Ukraine!

[Signed] Ukrainian Officers Union Executive Committee Secretariat

32nd Corps Commander Kuznetsov Accused of Abuse of Power

92UM1173A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
13 Jun 92 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Valeriy Fedotov: "Dacha in the Sun, or what Former General Kuznetsov Is Hiding!"]

[Text] Former 32nd Army Corps Commander Valeriy Yevgenyevich Kuznetsov loves to give an interview. Running for Crimean Supreme Soviet deputy, he, not sparing any energy, describes his activities and views, while attempting to gain the voters' trust. He, they say, is a frank and open man for whom honor and honesty is above everything. You get the impression that it is Kuznetsov who can defend the rights of the simple people with dignity if they vote for him.

But can you believe all of Valeriy Yevgenyevich's words? So, while speaking on Crimean television, Kuznetsov responded evasively to the question on whether or not he has a dacha. It seems that he said he has one but he actually doesn't. The people in Rodnichok Garden Club, of which Valeriy Yevgenyevich is a member, certainly smiled at this cunning. It is not for nothing that they say that the truth will out.

Valeriy Yevgenyevich does have a dacha and, indeed it is not completely built. Despite its unfinished state, it looks picturesque and has long since become an orientation point for long-time residents. This is what they say here: Drive down the road until the general's dacha and turn left there. The unfinished "facility" costs very little at the present time. Offer a million rubles for it—they will tell all and they will also say thank you. The structure eloquently attests to the broad nature of the owner: three stories, a veranda, and an underground garage. The roof is particularly expensive. They say that the cost of this iron is equal to the sum of ten-ruble banknotes that are stacked right up to the roof. Just how was this especially secret facility built? Here is the description of a direct participant.

Unit Physical Training Chief Major Vladimir Vasilevich Feofanov:

"In September 1991, Major-General Kuznetsov summoned me to his office. Without a long preface, he proposed working on the construction of his dacha. Why was it me that they selected? Unit physical training chiefs are people, as a rule, who are familiar with construction. They frequently have to build sports facilities and other types of facilities. It was senseless to refuse Kuznetsov's proposal: he was still the senior commander. And later the corps commander transparently hinted that, henceforth, he would not offend. What he had in mind, I don't know. It has not been excluded that he could, let's say, help me to get a promotion. Anyway, I'm still a major. And the time has come to obtain a new rank.

My task consisted of controlling the soldiers who worked on the structure. There were usually three of them plus a crane operator if that type of technician was required at the moment. A civilian specialist from UNR [Office of the Work Supervisor] by the name of Misha did the engineering work. I do not know how Valeriy Yevgenyevich came to an agreement with him. The work usually progressed without delays. At a state facility, first they would not provide bricks then they would not deliver the mortar. Here "they only took a smoke break" once a week—when the local ZhBl [reinforced concrete products] plant shut down. During the remaining time, they worked from morning until evening.

Besides the crane, they used dump trucks and so-called "dumpsters" [shalandy] at the "facility". But then again, as a corps commander, Major-General Kuznetsov could use any equipment from the unit for this work. As they say, the boss is an aristocrat.

They also used a water tank truck to erect the facility. Driver Private Aleksey Ushinskiy from the commander's company, in his words, sometimes dropped in at Kuznetsov's dacha three times per week. He considered this to be planned work. He received a "pass" and he drove out. This is what Ushinskiy says with regard to his assistance to the senior commander:

"A soldier is a subordinate person. He does what they order him to do. But I personally would not have undertaken that structure. Why? A private who is accustomed to relying only on himself is incapable of caring for it."

Aleksey himself lives in the village. His family has its own home but they do not live extravagantly. Here they have become accustomed to counting every kopek. And before undertaking the erection all together, they weigh 100 times if they enough resources.

But then again, a definite incentive system even existed so that the do-it-yourself builders worked better and did not stuff their heads with such "nonsense". So, Private Ushinskiy was sent home on Saturdays and Sundays since he lives nearby. Aleksey himself links the incentive only with work at the facility. If he distinguished himself, then it was here.

As for the other masters with shoulder boards, they were obtained from various units and relieved each other. According to eyewitness accounts, here masters from an independent communications battalion worked at one time. Obviously, they were also encouraged in an appropriate manner.

It is difficult to say without further investigation where they obtained the materials of which there was a shortage at that time. I am convinced that a headquarters combat training section officer who is well-known here could shed light on this "secret". Many participants in the construction named him as some sort of supplier. But as luck would have it, that officer turned out to be on leave when I arrived at the garrison. As I managed to learn, he

left to go relax almost simultaneously with the initiation of the well-known activities of the former corps commander which ended for him with a release into the reserve. Was it not because he decided to wait until this anxious time is over and to avoid tricky questions.

Although the construction of a personal dacha using the labor of subordinates is an improper affair, hardly anyone would dare to cast a stone at these officers. Anyone who has had the opportunity to serve under the command of these high-ranking "builders" knows well that a refusal to carry out a commander's whim could have serious consequences: to cause a high-ranking person's dissatisfaction or even revenge from him. And service, and sometimes also the fate of an officer, warrant officer, or soldier largely depended on the commander and his mood. I am already not talking about receiving some sort of benefits or, say, an apartment. If you have objected to the commander—you will cry over split milk a hundred times.

I am sincerely sorry, for example, for General Kuznetsov's former Adjutant Captain Vladimir Kolosov. An effective, capable officer and Afghan veteran, he played far from the last role in the construction of the dacha: he was the manager and drove people to the site. To today's question, doesn't he see anything reprehensible in this, the officer responded: "But what can you do if this 'dacha system' exists? We did not invent it and we certainly won't put an end to it. Yes and what is the matter here if a man has his own vegetable garden? It is hard to find food right now."

A vegetable garden like any other vegetable garden. But not everyone erects mansions. Other officers, besides ex-General Kuznetsov, have plots of land on that same neglected plot of land. But there is only one dacha, even if it is an unfinished one. And it towers like a monument that personifies unjust power.

Yes, one can have a small garden hut. But how do you regard the following fact? In a year or so, this piece of land will become part of a city and Valeriy Kuznetsov will turn out to be the owner of this small apartment with an area of 100 square meters. And this is at a time when more than 1,000 people need housing at Simferopol Garrison alone. Just where then is social justice? Where is the border that separates honor from unscrupulousness and legality from lawlessness? Or have we in the trifles of everyday life forgotten about these concepts?

If you want to be a fighter for justice, then you need to be completely honest. Isn't that so, Valeriy Yevgenyevich? Or do you have your own opinion on that score?

NARODNAYA ARMIYA Roundtable: 'Future of Ukrainian Armed Forces'

92UM1173C Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
13 Jun 92 p 2

[Roundtable discussion consisting of Ukrainian Presidential Representative to Lvov Oblast S. Davymuka, Air

Army Commander Major-General of Aviation V. Antonets, Carpathian Military District Union of Ukrainian Officers Coordinating Council Chairman Reserve Lieutenant Colonel O. Zelinskiy, Lvov Oblispolkom Deputy Chairman for Military Issues V. Lyaskovskaya conducted by Captain Yevgeniy Partin, under the rubric: "NARODNAYA ARMIYA Roundtable": "The Future Ukrainian Armed Forces: Will We Follow That Path?"]

[Text] The questions of the formation of statehood in Ukraine currently worry many people. Less than its rightful share of attention has been devoted to the problem of creating our own Armed Forces. The NARODNAYA ARMIYA Roundtable participants have their views on the processes that are occurring and are involved to some degree or other with the formation of the Ukrainian Army. They are Ukrainian Presidential Representative to Lvov Oblast S. Davymuka, Air Army Commander Major-General of Aviation V. Antonets, Carpathian Military District Union of Ukrainian Officers Coordinating Council Chairman Reserve Lieutenant Colonel O. Zelinskiy, Lvov Oblispolkom Deputy Chairman for Military Issues V. Lyaskovskaya.

"WE NEED TO REDUCE THE ARMY RATIONALLY AND BUILD IT—WITH CLEAN HANDS"

Major-General of Aviation V. Antonets:

The process of reducing and reforming the Armed Forces is occurring in Ukraine. In my opinion, this is practically the process of their destruction. This trend does not respond to either the economic or the political situation which is developing around Ukraine. We are surrounded by states that have strong armies and I do not see pacifist sentiments such as they are emerging in our country in any of them.

Experts know that the reduction of the army is costing the country no less than its maintenance and, in addition, it is groundless to reduce or disband units and to later adjust what remains to military plans—is senseless from the professional point of view.

Therefore, we must begin the reduction of the Ukrainian Armed Forces only when a scientifically-based military doctrine has been prepared and operational plans for the use of the army have been approved.

Today it is still not too late to review our state's strategy for military organizational development. I see this process as consisting of several stages.

First—1992-1995. During these years, do not reduce the Armed Forces but transform existing military formations with regard to the political and economic conditions in Ukraine. At the same time, withdraw our army from dependence on the CIS. To do this, we need to create an infrastructure that consists of defense industry

enterprises that produce weapons and military equipment, military VUZs [higher educational institutions], ranges for all branches of the armed forces, including missileers, aviators, etc.

This structure would ensure the autonomy of Armed Forces activities. During this stage, reductions of the strength of the officer corps and compulsory service military personnel are possible. But during the first period, many farfetched leading structures and military units that are equipped with obsolete equipment must primarily be reduced.

Laying the foundation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces—creation of a national officer corps must become the most important task in this period. Today this is how I see the mission of the Union of Ukrainian Officers [SOU]. It needs to unite its efforts with a democratic society and aggressively work in this direction.

Only after that can we shift to the second stage which is calculated for the period from 1996 until 2000. During this period, based on the scientific concepts that have been developed, the army must begin to shift to a professional basis.

This question also worries me. Already today some cunning persons (you can't call them anything else), in order to hold on to their leading position, are attempting through any means to become SOU members. But still several months ago, it was they who organized the persecution of the officers who were struggling to create a Ukrainian army.

I think that SOU members must give a fundamental assessment to these "chameleons" and not allow them into their ranks. The time has come to more intently look at those people who are members of this organization but who, according to their official and moral qualities, do not meet its high purpose. This will give us the opportunity to build the Ukrainian Armed Forces with clean hands.

"OVERCOME CORRUPTION AND EXCLUSIVENESS"

S. Davymuka:

I worked in the sphere of technical creativity and I know when and at what stage an integral concept is born. Today, under pressure from society, we are at times rushing the processes of reform of the state which is resulting in its destruction. Of course, we need to build all of the state mechanisms as rapidly as possible but we need to do this carefully and soundly. This especially applies to reform of the army.

I am already accustomed to the peculiar game that they are playing, including in personnel issues. We agree to everything in words but in deed much is resolved behind my back. As a result, I want to point out that if such a negative practice is not changed, I will decisively place

before the President the issue of Lieutenant-General Stepanov's stay in the post of military district commander.

They tell me that the military district is located in ten oblasts and, they say, they can't resolve anything for everyone. If required, I will seek the transfer of certain functions from the President's representatives to the other nine oblasts.

I think that servicemen must be materially provided for. And we are gradually resolving this issue. One of the first orders of the President's representative concerned providing housing to officers and warrant officers in Lvov and in the oblast.

"THE STINGY PAY TWICE"

Reserve Lieutenant Colonel O. Zelinskiy:

The personnel issue is one of the primary issues that affects the future of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Today officers and generals who previously served in the headquarters of Kiev Military District occupy the majority of leading posts in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. Why? There is one motivation—they will be worse off if they take people from other cities. There are already several thousand servicemen without apartments in Kiev. There would be nothing terrible in this approach except for one detail. Until recently, 85 percent of the officers and generals who were in leading positions in Kiev Military District did not call Ukraine their homeland. We cannot consider that situation normal.

Matters are no better in the Carpathian Military District. Despite the fact that Lieutenant-General Stepanov stated, in a conversation with me, that serious changes are occurring at the present time at Carpathian Military District Headquarters, I can state with complete confidence that these changes are sooner cosmetic in nature.

It is impossible to reconcile ourselves to the fact that to this day officers in many key positions previously persecuted those who advocated the revival of national Armed Forces. I can cite quite a few of these examples. They attest to the fact that the personnel policy being conducted in the army today requires serious adjustments. The certification boards that have been created in units continue to work based on the statute that was developed in Moscow. So and representatives of local organs of power, social organizations, people's deputies, and SOU members have not been named to them. Although there was a minister of defense directive on this score. And all of this could promote the selection and placement in the army of trained officers and generals whose hearts ache for the fate of Ukraine and the Armed Forces.

So far inadequately serious attention is being devoted to educational work among personnel in the troops. In many units, humanitarian training is being conducted formally. Former political workers who have been

assigned to positions as assistant commanders for personnel do not know the history of Ukraine or of the Ukrainian host. And many don't want to know. There is not enough teaching literature.

Nothing has changed in the external appearance of soldiers and officers after they have taken the oath of loyalty to Ukraine. The uniform, rank, and insignia have remained as before. But if a certain amount of time and a great deal of resources are actually required to obtain new uniforms, insignia and the attributes that would reflect the national symbol certainly would not be that expensive.

While saving on minor details, we are losing prestige. Today neither the people nor the military themselves see any difference between the former and present army. The stinginess that has been displayed in this case may cost us a great deal in the future. We must not forget that the stingy pay twice!

"THEY TRIED FOR THE 'SA'. BUT FOR UKRAINE?"

V. Lyaskovskaya:

As a result of the fact that Carpathian Military District Headquarters is located in Lvov, the Oblispolkom [Oblast executive committee] has established close ties with its commander. And we are finding joint solutions on many issues.

However, there are factors that we cannot bypass, as they say, without paying attention. The personnel policy being conducted is causing serious censures. Here is just one example. At the present time, one of the division commanders has been reviewed for the position of military district personnel directorate chief without coordination with the local organs of power. This is a direct violation of the minister of defense directive. We think that an officer who is known in the oblispolkom and oblissoviet as a nationally trained person must be assigned to this key post. In all fairness, I need to say that both we and activists from the Union of Ukrainian Officers share the blame for what is occurring. We frequently and justly criticize a lot an officer who has been appointed to a post. But we make very few corrective proposals on by whom he should be replaced. During the past three months, we can count these proposals on one hand.

The conduct of the conscription campaign is becoming a serious problem in the spring period. However, at the present time, a paradoxical situation has developed in this matter.

Already six months ago, Carpathian Military District officials and military commissariat associates had conducted, long before the draft, assemblies with representatives of the local authorities and provided us with the required literature. But the responsible moment has arrived—the first conscription campaign for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. And what are we observing? An

absolute lack of interest from the military themselves. Isn't it indeed strange that those same people from those same offices on manning the former Soviet Army were worried but they are not worried about with whom and how the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be manned. Not waiting for instructions from Carpathian Military District Headquarters, oblispolkom workers began to prepare for the formation of draft boards. They are meeting with conscripts and with their parents. I want to believe that our young men will not disgrace Galichina.

And, finally, the local authorities, civilian and military, law enforcement organs, and commanders of all levels must today join efforts in the struggle for compliance with the law by servicemen and conscripts. Once the republic parliament adopted the Law on Military Service, it must be unfailingly carried out. And those who attempt to evade it must mandatorily be subject to punishment.

Social organizations, political parties, and the mass media are called upon to play an important role in the resolution of this problem. Our duty is to change public opinion, to create an atmosphere in which both a deserter and a lackadaisical commander feel, putting it mildly, similarly uncomfortable.

INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION. The roundtable participants expressed different and at times controversial opinions. We can accept some things and some things we categorically do not agree with. But the primary result of the conversation is seen in the fact that both the military professionals and the representatives of power are vitally interested in the formation of the Armed Forces and consider it their duty to join efforts for the good of the common cause. Any suggestion which possibly differs from official precepts may be of use here.

Arzamas-16 Begins Nuclear Weapons Destruction

92UM1191A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
24 Jun 92 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by IMA-press: "Tactical Nuclear Weapons from Ukraine Are to be Eliminated"]

[Text] Arzamas-16 has begun the destruction of tactical nuclear weapons.

The arrival of a group of observers is expected from Ukraine and they are to make certain that the weapons are actually destroyed and not mothballed.

Situation of National Guards on Moldovan Border

92UM1180A Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
25 Jun 92 First edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel V. Kaushanskiy: "In the Special Condition Zone: Ukrainian National Guard Situation"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The white sign post located to the right of the Poltava-Chisinau Highway seemed anachronistic: On both sides it displayed the emblems of the former USSR and the abbreviations for the former Union republics, now sovereign states of Ukraine and Moldova. Not much more than a dozen kilometers further there was a war going on, one which in the dawn once more brought a reminder of the short truce in the Dniester area in the form of a chatter of automatic rifle fire and fiery tails of an Alazan.

"Now you know why the National Guards are needed in these parts," said Nikolay Torzhinsky, spokesman for the president of the Ukraine, as he dropped off a group of journalists from his Volga on their visit to the border troops. "We do not want to see a single drop of blood shed on Ukrainian soil. The Guards are our only hope."

Is there justification for the hope? To answer that question, let us forget the border area for a moment and return to Kiev, to the Main Directorate of the National Guards. Hardly a year has passed since Leonid Kravchuk signed the Supreme Council decree implementing the law creating this structure. Established after the August takeover attempt, the Ukrainian National Guards were brought into being as swiftly as a speeding locomotive, acquiring leaders, command echelons, and personnel. Parliament worked up another legislative package, one designed to set the new structure on a legal basis. Incidentally, the law specifies that the commander of the NG [National Guards], who is appointed by the Supreme Council on the recommendation of the president, occupies the post for a period of five years, but cannot serve longer than two consecutive terms.

"We decided to be selective as far as personnel is concerned," Guards Major General Vladimir Kukharets said to me. "Serving in the National Guards are only professionals of the highest caliber. We chose the commanders, many of whom are "Afghans" and "Chernobylites," on a strictly competitive basis. We started at the very beginning, applying fundamental considerations and discipline."

However, the general—one who commanded one of the best brigades of internal troops of the Union MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the Dnepropetrovsk Brigade, could never imagine that he would in a matter of a few days deploy NG units to a hot spot that showed up so close to the republic; that his officers would be entering onto area maps the symbols for antitank and helicopter reserves not yet deployed but which may be called into action in the event the Dniester area situation gets out of control; that he would find it necessary to train personnel directly in the "special condition zone" (the term employed in the Ukraine president's decree of 17 March assigning the Guards to duty in the border area), which occupies a 50-kilometer strip of land in Vinnitsa, Odessa, and Chernovtsi Oblasts.

Incidentally, if we have a look at the kind of leaders there are in the National Guards, it becomes obvious that

most of the officers have a very good idea of the nature of special condition zones and states of emergency. Take for example Guards Chief of Staff Major General Vladimir Mokhov, who was the first to bring the internal troops operations regiment under his command to Chernobyl. His subordinates extinguished the fires at the nuclear power station and took control of the difficult area of Pripyat. Kiev Division Chief of Staff Guards Colonel Gennadiy Strelnikov, whom we met in the border area, and senior section officer Guards Lieutenant Colonel Valeriy Noviko "went the distance"—as they put it, from Sumgait to Sukhumi. No need to explain what kind of trip that was.

I was introduced to the situation by the chief of the troop operations group in the special condition zone, Guards Colonel Nikolay Melnik, who is also the NG deputy commander for training and education. He stated the following:

The difficulty here is that we may find ourselves in the middle of a conflict triangle: Moldova, the Dniester area, and Russia, something that must be avoided. There are no borders as such, only roads, and these we are watching with operationally mobile groups, since the border troops have no forces to spare. Also, we do not enter their kilometer zone of responsibility. We have our own mission and duties: preventing entry of armed groups and other border violators onto Ukrainian soil, making checks on transport vehicles; covering routes that could be used to carry weapons back and forth. Finally, we are of course to assist MVD agencies in the maintenance of public order.

The NG are provided with their own aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, engineer subunits, and communications troops. NG Chief of Staff General Mokhov explained to me in Kiev that this is the kind of organizational structure that makes it possible for each unit to carry out its mission as independently as possible.

I might add that the variegated nature of the Guards has been further enhanced by the introduction of spotted berets for the special-purpose subunits.

For the present, all Ukrainian National Guardsmen wear the field uniform of the former Soviet Army. However, the design of a new uniform is in the making. During my visit to the NG commander in his office, he showed me a table displaying various shoulderboards, stripes, and insignia. The Guardsmen will wear on their sleeves emblems representing geographic areas of the Ukraine where their units will be stationed. The uniform will not include a peaked cap (the beret is preferred) or an overcoat (which will be replaced by a short coat with liner), while footwear will be of a lighter and dressier style. The NG uniform is to be designed by a Czech-German firm and a local light industry institute. However, it must be realized that serial production will require time and funds.

Also in short supply are military installations and training grounds. There is little the Guards have on

which to build; General Kukharets also pointed out that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has yet to offer the National Guards any assistance. There is another aspect of the problem associated with placing the new structure on a solid footing. The views held relative to the National Guards are not all ones of amicability and respect. Although the NG are still in the planning stage, the fact that the Guards are present in the area is of and by itself interpreted by some citizens as a sign of trouble. For example, while in the NG Press Center, I was handed an issue of the Donets newspaper GOROD. The writer of one of the articles states angrily that the Guards constitute a real danger to the residents; that they are deployed near mines in the Donets area for a not altogether innocent reason; that it is just not by accident that the Guards are recruiting sergeants from Galicia and Volhynia; that the Guards amount to a "strike element of Western Ukraine," serving "post-communist leaders who have joined forces with nationalists." There were further accusations, but they were rejected out of hand by the NG leadership.

It would appear that the "hot spot" close to the Ukrainian-Moldovan border will not last forever. However, the following is a thought told me by one of the NG leaders: "I sometimes ask myself questions: What will happen once the conflict cools down? What will take up our time when there is nothing to do?"

The following is what is associated with the problem. The Ukrainian Parliament on 19 May passed with amendments the National Guards Law and a statute governing the duties and rights of Guards personnel. And so, deleted from the final version was a paragraph requiring the Guards to assist internal affairs agencies in the maintenance of public order, while the amended statute makes no mention of the National Guards' furnishing of an honor guard company as a role relative to welcoming and departure ceremonies for visiting heads of states and governments.

Really, now, what is there for the NG to do?

BALTIC STATES

First Edition of Latvian Military Monthly TEVIJAS SARGS Published

92UM1194A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Jun 92 First edition p 3

[Article by Colonel M. Ziyeminsh: "New Latvian Military Monthly, Printed by NWGF's ZA RODINU"]

[Text] Information on three departments—the Defense Forces, Home Guard, and Security Service of the Latvian Republic—is to be provided by a new publication, which is entitled TEVIJAS SARGS (DEFENDERS OF THE FATHERLAND).

What will we learn by reading the first edition? Primarily the views held by the leaders themselves. For example, Minister of Defense Talavs Junzis recognizes three essential areas of interest: The creation of a communications system—completely computerized—that would include every battalion; weapons and transportation; and the construction of buildings and other structures to constitute an entire infrastructure. Girts Kristovskis, chief of the Home Guard, is of the opinion that the most significant component of assuring the security of the Latvian population is the personnel of his department, that is, the Home Guard members, which presently number 12,000.

The first issue of TEVIJAS SARGS contains a great deal of information on military history. On the other hand, there is virtually a complete absence of basic discussion on Latvia's defense forces; of the signatures of authors of the articles, I did not recognize a single name as being that of a "local." Finally, TEVIJAS SARGS is being printed in the same plant that prints the North-Western Group of Forces newspaper ZA RODINU.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Lack of Action Threatens Defense Sector Disaster

92UM11664 Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN
in Russian No 18, May 92 p 1

[Article by V. Golovachev: "The Collapse of the Defense Complex Could Bring the Nation's Economy to Ruin"]

[Text] The collapse of the Soviet system of administering the defense complex and the extremely slow development of a Russian management system have produced a situation in which, during the first quarter of 1992, defense enterprises received neither orders from the Ministry of Defense nor decisions to halt the production of this or that kind of combat equipment.

This has resulted in a situation in which, with 6.5 billion rubles allocated in the budget for the first quarter of 1992 to pay for weapons and military equipment, defense enterprises produced almost 15 billion rubles worth in January and February. The amount exceeded 20 billion rubles for the first quarter.

Production support enterprises accumulated bank loans totalling around 4 billion rubles to pay wages and more than 16 billion rubles to pay for materials and assembly parts. The already difficult situation is exacerbated by an increase in defaults, which has now reached 700 billion rubles for Russia as a whole.

The profusion of problems in Russia's defense complex is approaching the critical point. Right now the main concern of enterprise directors in the VPK [military-industrial complex] is not one of organizing production but the survival of the enterprises. In the literal sense of the word.

Deprived of state orders and of its sources of financing, the defense industry, the reorientation of which will require enormous outlays, is potentially the most powerful source of social instability in the society. After all, the VPK produces not only (and today not so much) bombs, missiles and tanks. It also turns out 83% of the medical equipment, 92% of the equipment for light industry and 76% of the equipment for the processing branches of the APK [agro-industrial complex].

Vitally needed types of products (see graph [graph rendered as table]) account for an enormous share of the output of enterprises in the defense complex. The capacity built up in the VPK makes it possible to increase output even in the crisis. Those few achievements of Russia's industry during the first quarter—a 1.6-fold growth in the production of video recorders, for example—are linked to the defense industry in one way or another.

Defense Complex Share of Total Production Volume Within Russia	(as percentage of total output)
Diesel engines and diesel generators	88
Computers	95
Rolled aluminum	94
Rolled titanium	71
Long-haul rail cars	33
Gas and oil drilling units	28
Television sets	100
Sewing machines	100
Cameras	100
Video recorders	100
Tape recorders	98
Refrigerators	98
Engine blocks	81
Vacuum cleaners	72
Washing machines	66
Motorcycles	52

Just what awaits the VPK enterprises this year? According to the experts, practically the only way to improve things (given the drastic drop in orders for weapons) is by restructuring. Based on data from Russia's Ministry of Economics a growth of 6.5% is forecast for civilian production at defense industry enterprises. With a drop in the production of weapons and military equipment to 31.1% of the 1991 level, the decrease in the overall output of commercial products will amount to up to 75.1%. If we believe these figures (and we have no others right now), the specific share of civilian products in the total volume for the VPK will increase to 81% in 1992 (compared with 56.4% in 1991).

It is drawing a long bow to call what is presently occurring "conversion." It is more like an operation without anesthesia and without a subsequent recovery period. All hopes are on the enormous inner strength of the VPK, on its ability to survive such an operation. As a result of the reduction in the volume of military products the number of workers laid off in military production will exceed 1 million (compared with 1991). Profits for defense industry enterprises will be reduced 3.2-fold. The number of unprofitable enterprises will increase sharply. A return from the conversion—according to optimistic forecasts—cannot be expected for 2 or 3 years.

One cannot say that Russia's government is viewing the troubles of the VPK with indifference. Based on outlays for the purchase of weapons and military equipment, 80 billion rubles, and orders from industry, the cost of the conversion has been set at roughly 100 billion rubles. A total of 40.6 billion is to be covered out of the budget. VPK enterprises will need an estimated 42 billion rubles in bank loans and will pay 1.6 billion in interest on that amount.

No bank will loan that much money without government guarantees, of course. The Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Finance have therefore prepared a requisition for the Central Bank of the Russian Federation to issue preferential loans in the amount of 42 billion rubles to the defense enterprises. A Decree on Preferential Loans for Implementing Conversion Programs has also been prepared.

In addition to funds out of the budget and preferential loans, extra-budget conversion funds will also be channeled into the financing of conversion measures. It is being formed by decision of the government with a withholding of 3% of the production cost of the products of defense enterprises. The calculated withholdings going into this fund could amount to around 10 billion rubles.

Finally (almost by tradition), an ukase being readied by the President of the Russian Federation On Emergency Measures to Accomplish the Conversion of the Defense Industry in 1992 should be the final touch in bolstering the finances of enterprises undergoing conversion. This draft law calls for allowing the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Finance to centralize up to 20% of the depreciation allowance of subordinate enterprises in a conversion assistance fund and to put into the fund also 10% of the receipts from weapons, military equipment and other special products sold for export, to allow enterprises undergoing conversion to revalue commercial goods at the time they are used in production up to the level of current prices and use the entire amount of the extra assessment for replenishing circulating capital.

In short, judging from its intentions, the present Russian government is attempting to pull the defense industry enterprises out of the crisis. It is greatly troubling, however, that practically everything is still just on paper: "called for," "proposed," being readied".... And the conversion problems did not just befall us from who knows where. The Russians inherited them from the former Union government. When the government of Russia planned its policy for minimizing the budget deficit, it had an obligation to foresee the consequences for the VPK.

Possibly, the long absence of a precisely defined policy with respect to the defense complex is what evoked the wave of articles in the press. Literary scholars and biologists undertook to discuss conversion problems. There is nothing terrible about that. Something else in the publications is upsetting: a distinct predominance of emotionalism and lack of proof. In *IZVESTIYA* (No. 97), for example, A. Yablokov, state adviser to the Russian Federation, directly supported one point of view on the development of the conversion processes and advanced arguments against another without citing a single (!) figure or specific fact.

What is permitted the State Council for Policy in the Area of Ecology and Health Protection, however, is not permitted the government. It must be guided only by the

specific realities. In the case of the conversion, I would hope, it has begun to take them into account, albeit it belatedly.

Well, "better late than never." If, of course, this "late" does not come after the enterprises have gone down the tube. Each day of delay in extending support for the enterprises undergoing conversion brings their complete stoppage nearer.

Past Militarization Retarding Conversion

92UM1166B Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
17 Jun 92 Morning edition p 3

[Article by Yevgeniy Aleksandrov and Vyacheslav Kolbin: "The Nation's Economy Is Buried Beneath Piles of Weapons"]

[Text] Today we are all racking our brains over the question: What has happened to the nation? Why, all of a sudden, within a period of 2 or 3 years, have most of the people ended up at the brink of poverty? And this is in peacetime, with an unprecedented relaxation of tensions in the international situation and significant material assistance from abroad. In the eyes of the society the rapid impoverishment compromises the course toward liberalization of the economy and policy, and is producing the preconditions for a reactionary revolution. One hears calls to "give us back the stagnation" with increasing frequency.

Various reasons are given for the economic collapse: the disintegration of the Union, the breakdown of economic ties, corruption, thievery, sabotage and so forth. All of these are secondary factors, however. The basic cause of the crisis is the chronic economic deficit: a rise in outlays over income which sapped our nation for many years and finally drained it entirely.

This deficit was caused primarily by enormous outlays on armaments. Their scale was carefully concealed by means of false prices, by disguising them as expenditures on other items in the state budget and by covering up the real military production volumes. Until 1989 the society was given a figure for military outlays which was understated by many times: 4.2% of the gross national product (GNP). As a result of the intricate falsifications the leadership of the USSR lost its concept of the real cost of modern military equipment and drew the nation into an egotistical and ruinous arms race. Only because of pressure from the NATO nations did more serious assessments of our military outlays begin to appear, and it was admitted that they amounted to more than 30%.

This is what it cost us to maintain approximate parity with the USA in the arming of the strategic triad and considerably to surpass NATO in chemical weapons, armored equipment, artillery and certain types of missiles. (When intermediate-range missiles were destroyed under the agreement, it turned out that the USA had 826 missiles, the USSR 1,846. The Soviet Union had spent 600 billion rubles on their development and production).

No system, no economy can afford such costs. The bulk of the GNP (at least two thirds) must be returned to industry as investment and to cover depreciation, after all, not to speak of expansion. American experts have proven more than once that their nation's military outlays of 6.1% were too great and approached the maximum possible amount, that they were the cause of the USA's lag behind other developed nations. The expenditure of almost a third of the GNP was clearly suicidal for our spendthrift economy.

For a long time we maintained relative stability by selling large quantities of nonrenewable resources abroad at a cost of destroying our environment and neglecting the people's health, for the protection of which only meager amounts were spent. The nation's wealth gradually melted away, the people became impoverished and their lives were shortened (life expectancy decreased). When the flow of petrodollars ceased, funds so greatly needed by the civilian sectors of the national economy were channeled into a continuation of the insane production of weapons.

It was not military expenditures alone which sapped our economy, of course. There was also the unreasonable financing of "friendly regimes" all over the world. There were also disastrous "projects of the century." There was a generally extremely inefficient economic system. Changes are being made. Many senseless items of expenditure have been eliminated. However, we have been inexcusably slow in plugging the most ruinous hole, weapons production.

By rejecting the ideological priorities in international policy the Soviet Union immediately eliminated the danger of a world war. It seemed that the path to the nation's redeeming demilitarization was clear. The only real achievement, however, was the destruction of part of the weapons already manufactured. Their absurd production continued. By the end of last year only 12 of 5,000 military orders had been halted.

Only now, when a decree on a 70% reduction has been passed, has an apparent start on demilitarization been made. The decree still has to be implemented, however, and this will be very difficult due to stiff resistance at all levels of the profoundly militarized society. A reduction in purchases affects the interests of the army and those of 40-50 million civilians involved in one way or another in military production. The halting of military orders greatly alters not just the lives of the workers. It eliminates the careers of shop chiefs, directors, heads of main committees and ministries, people's deputies, heroes and holders of honors. It affects all the infrastructures of power in the nation, which are closely linked to the military-industrial complex [VPK]. Furthermore, the public mind is indoctrinated in the surviving tradition of taking pride in military power and considering fear instilled in the world to be the measure of national greatness. Public opinion is easily stimulated by demagogic appeals to preserve military superstrength. In the current situation one is asked over and over: Will a

reduction in weapons production not undermine our security? Will the situation of military personnel not worsen? What about the anticipated massive unemployment? Would it not be better to keep producing weapons for export?

Let us try to answer these questions. We do not have and cannot imagine enemies among the developed democratic nations. We shall have an enormous stock of nuclear and conventional weapons (even after all of the planned reductions) and therefore do not have to fear even totalitarian regimes, particularly since a world system of collective security is on the agenda. If we have anything to fear, it is the cramming of an unstable nation with weapons, which are already beginning to kill their masters.

To answer the second question, it costs incomparably less to maintain the military personnel than what we spend on weapons, and this could be improved with even a small portion of the funds freed.

Fears of massive unemployment are based on ignorance of the structure of modern military production. It is a multilevel, pyramid-like structure. The bottom level, involving the most people, consists of those who produce the fuel, raw materials, energy and processed materials. The next is the production of parts, components and assembly parts for military production. The top level involves the assembly and finishing of the final product: tanks, aircraft and missiles. Around 3 million people are employed here.

Nothing will change at the base of the pyramid if military production is reduced. Its output will just go into the civilian economy, immediately increasing the availability of consumer goods. Most of the products made at the second level can also be drawn immediately into the civilian economy. They include many standardized assembly parts which the civilian economy previously received only as individual items rejected by representatives of the military.

The greatest difficulties will occur at the top level of the pyramid. The workers there, who perform more specialized and complex jobs, will have to undergo reclassification or change professions entirely. In our opinion, this category of workers and engineers should receive benefits in the amount of their wages for the long period of adaptation to the new circumstances (1-3 years). We would point out that wages account for 5-10% of all the production costs in the military industry. Its cessation will therefore be extremely profitable for the society even given the payment of benefits.

Finally, to answer the question of whether we should not retain the production of weapons as the most competitive goods in the foreign market. This choice, very attractive to the VPK, is motivated by the high profitability level of these exports, which ostensibly stems from the ratio of domestic to world prices. The extremely low production costs of our products is fiction, however. It is a manifestation of that same policy of

disguising military outlays, a result of artificially low prices for raw materials, metal and energy arbitrarily set for the military branches. Only our labor is cheap, but this is what we have to get rectified (and is it so cheap when we consider the low productivity). Furthermore, by continuing the inflated energy-and metal-intensive production we are exhausting our resources, sapping nature and the health of people and taking the role of a world colony with dirty industry. If we do sell weapons, then only from our enormous stockpiles, as a temporary measure against our great need, because all weapons trade nourishes conflicts.

And the last thing. Militarism is the main support of conservatism. We have expelled it from our policy, but it remains in the public mind and in the economy. A nation two thirds of whose industry is devoted to weapons production is doomed. There is no salvation for us other than putting an end to it.

Ye. Aleksandrov worked for more than 20 years at the State Optics Institute imeni S.I. Vavilov, the last 3 years as deputy director. He is a prominent scientist in the field of physical optics, quantum electronics and nuclear physics. He is a corresponding member of Russian Academy of Sciences and chairman of the Council on Science and Education under the mayor's office of the city of St. Petersburg.

V. Kolbin is a doctor of economic sciences and professor at Petersburg University. He specializes in problems of conversion. He is deputy chairman of the Council on Science and Education under the mayor's office of the city of St. Petersburg.

Sevmashpredpriyatiye, Zvezdochka Plants Halt Work

92UM1190B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Jun 92 p 2

[RIA article: "The Enterprises of Severodvinsk Have Stopped"]

[Text] Work has been halted for three days at the largest defense plants of Severodvinsk Sevmashpredpriyatiye [Severodvinsk Machine Building Enterprise] and Zvezdochka [Sprocket], the Kontakt Agency has announced. Up to then they had been operating on an emergency basis, that is, they were receiving 25 percent of the required electric power. The local thermal power plants are out of fuel and there is no money to buy any.

Sklyarov Considers Problem of Funding Conversion

92UM1189A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 19 Jun 92 p 2

[Interview with Ivan Petrovich Sklyarov, RSFSR People's Deputy and First Deputy Head of the Administration in Nizhegorod Oblast, by Yu. Shtatnov: "Let Us Roll Up Our Sleeves, So We Don't Have to Tighten Our Belts"]

[Text] Our correspondent spoke with the RSFSR People's Deputy and First Deputy Head of the Administration of Nizhegorod Oblast, Ivan Petrovich Sklyarov, on how to reconcile the interests of the local authorities and the military-industrial complex.

[Shtatnov] Nizhegorod Oblast is one of those where enormous economic potential is concentrated with a focus on military needs. Ivan Petrovich, possibly conversion will help in the short run to satisfy the needs of the Nizhegorod residents?

[Sklyarov] You know, the need for conversion has been around for quite a while. Wise heads were wondering about this long ago and they even began to initiate something. Let us take the Arzamas Instrument Building Production Association. If here they had not assessed the situation and had not expanded the production of general industrial use products and consumer goods, then they would have been unable to avoid significant dismissals and could not have converted painlessly to the current market relations. It was the case that some 90 percent of the output was made up of special orders for military aviation. Over the last 4-1/2 years, this has declined to 8-10 percent. The Arzamas workers were helped by the specific features of production, that is, first rate equipment and superaccurate instruments were in essence being used in the already established production methods. Utility services under market conditions require calculating and hence there must be flowmeters which are also produced by the instrument builders. Incidentally, the Arzamas workers have acquired a monopoly on the production of these meters in Russia. The Japanese who plan to reconstruct the Kstovskiy Oil Refinery intend to use the Arzamas flowmeters.

At present the enterprise has organized the production of very complicated instruments for medicine. These are the Mioton [Myotone], a device for the rehabilitation of neurological patients. A UZI [ultrasound imaging] machine is essential both in the hospital and in the maternity home, and a diagnostic center cannot get by without one. Such an instrument costs approximately a half million dollars. The plant will produce it for 300,000 rubles. And of course they will continue to produce the Legenda tape recorders which are not of bad quality and are cheap at the current prices. These recorders are constantly being improved and are reaching the world standards.

[Shtatnov] Ivan Petrovich, you are a person who is certainly not a novice in the defense industry and for a long time you worked at the same instrument building association. The example of "your" enterprise bespeaks a civil awareness and patriotism. Certainly this is inherent to many other collectives in the defense complex. Nevertheless conversion involves much pain and often is perceived as a tragedy...

[Sklyarov] If a person is forced to make pots and pans (although these are extremely essential) instead of an aircraft, then this is a tragedy not only for him but also for our entire republic. Hence more and more enterprises

are trying to acquire a new face and find worthy employment for the forces and abilities of the personnel. As an example take the Scientific Research Institute for Metering Systems, an offspring of the USSR Ministry of Nuclear Energy and Industry. The specialists at the institute are well aware that the 270,000 kilometers of gas pipelines built largely about 20 years ago are beginning to break down. Every year there are about a thousand explosions on the gas mainlines. It is essential to have rigid monitoring of the state of the networks. The institute's specialists are turning out high-grade documentation for the oil and gas industry. It is important to point out that there is a tradition here of not employing imported materials and preassembled parts. This work has aroused great interest at the American Concord Firm. If the institute succeeds in solving the problem of the underground detecting of deep-lying oil and gas, this will mean a revolution in the exploration and operation of the deposits.

[Shtatnov] As is known, the Americans closely scrutinize any steps to restructure the military-industrial complex. Are these plans being worked out with sufficient circumspection in Russia and Nizhegorod Oblast?

[Sklyarov] Conversion, according to our estimates, should provide during the current year an increase in consumer goods production of some 30-35 percent and by the end of 1995, by 2.5 fold in comparison with 1988, the year of the start of conversion. Very marked growth in the production of civilian products is planned at the Arzamas Instrument Building Association, the Plant imeni Ulyanov, the Burevestnik NII [Scientific Research Institute], the Nizhegorod Machine Building Plant, the plants imeni Frunze, Gidromash, the Krasnoye Sormovo Production Association, the Kristall NII, the Elektromash Plant and others.

Seemingly a good start has been made, but serious problems constantly arise. Because of disarmament, the volume of industrial production at the defense enterprises of our oblast has dropped by 330 million rubles in 1991 and is continuing to fall. These are tangible losses for the labor collectives and for the residents of the entire oblast. It is important to keep the achieved level of profitability and wages, the quality of the equipment and the prestige of the new, as they say, civilian products, the social benefits and the skill composition of the personnel. Conversion has had a difficult start, the range of products has been plucked "out of the air," material and technical supply were not guaranteed, and organizational chaos was permitted. Moreover, at individual enterprises, the output of defense products has not ceased completely but merely declined. Naturally, the production indicators slip down, all social security deductions are reduced and wages fall. Such trends lead to the formation of economic disaster zones and to the rise of unemployment and human dramas. Over the 2 years, the defense enterprises in the oblast have dismissed over 18,000 persons, and although they, as a rule, have not become unemployed, this trend causes great concern.

I would like to mention the government confusion on the question of conversion. In the first place, there is no separation of rights, functions and responsibilities between the Ministry of Economics, the Ministry of Finances and the Minprom [Ministry of Industry]. Over the 2 years, we, and the defense enterprises in other regions as well (the enterprises are partially interdependent), have not received a single state conversion program for the priority areas.

Undoubtedly conversion of the defense sectors requires enormous financial resources. As is known, these resources are in short supply in the state. In considering this circumstance, we submitted to the Russian Federal Government a proposal to deposit up to one-half of all the tax payments from the defense enterprises in a special off-budget fund for assisting conversion. This is a lot of money! Our proposal has been approved by a special government decree.

[Shtatnov] Ivan Petrovich, you can remember the opening up of the Ilinogorskii Hog Raising Complex, the development of the unique Volzhanka milking rig at one of the defense enterprises, the erecting of housing agrosettlements on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Yes, the Arzamas enterprises where you worked for a long time have made a significant contribution to the development of agricultural production. Then there was a decline in sponsorship and the market relations have left a negative imprint on the links of city and countryside. Will not conversion bring back the former glory of the Nizhegorod workers in uniting the union of "hammer and sickle"?

[Sklyarov] I could name a good score of other projects put up in the countryside with the active aid of the industrial giants, including the defense ones. But, in the first place, the times were different and we were told what targets we were to fulfill and we did. Secondly, in comparison with the volume of the military orders, the sponsorship aid, frankly speaking, was merely symbolic.

At present the market is beginning to dominate. Yet it is not the fault of the Aircraft Association or the Krasnoye Sormovo Plant but rather the misfortune that they in a short period of time have been unable to switch to the production of consumer goods or equipment for agricultural production.

[Shtatnov] Recently there came into my hands a program of urgent scientific and technical development for national economic purposes and put out by the Burevestnik Central Scientific Research Institute. It contained much that was attractive.

[Sklyarov] We must give due to the leadership and developers at the institute for converting many areas of their work. Just 3 years ago, they in a short period of time proposed for the livestock sector a rather complicated unit for producing grass protein in granules and dry bulk in the form of haylage made from green bulk. The unit was promising but more work had to be done on it in order to make it trouble-free and most importantly, cheaper.

The program which you mentioned has many developments involved in the processing and storage of agricultural products. The sections "Natural Products," "Children's Diet," "Soya," "The Container," "The Potato Chip," "Pure Feeds" and others provide both for the introduction of new technologies as well as the creating of special machines and lines.

[Shtatnov] I happened to hear the Director of the Lindovskoye PO for Producing Chicken Meat, G. Elbert, at one of the seminars give an excellent description for the products produced by the Dzerzhinsk Kristall NPO [Scientific Production Association]. Could you provide more detail?

[Sklyarov] The Kristall Association is a leading chemical enterprise which produces various products, including for defense. But life has forced the collective to give some thought to tomorrow. Thus arose the idea of producing strong antiburn compounds, enterosorbents and ultrafilters. Kristall has collaborated actively not only with the Lindovskoye PO but also with a number of kolkhozes and associations in Borskiy, Knyagininskiy and other rayons. The chemists have developed, tested and put into production the preparation Mebikar for preventing gastrointestinal illnesses in young cattle and poultry. The compound is added to the concentrated feed not only for curing the animals but also for creating conditions for a weight increase. Another preparation is the anticoccidial pharmocicide and which protects young poultry against numerous diseases in the first days of life. The survival rate of the broilers increased up to 80 percent and the daily weight increase by 20 percent.

There are more than enough examples of the restructuring of sectorial science in the defense complex in the interests of the national economy. Thus, the collective headed by Academician F.M. Mitenkov has developed mobile floating electrical and freshening plants operating on nuclear fuel, well pumps for rural areas with a life that surpasses by scores of fold those existing in our country and equipment for the dairy industry; the NII for Radio Engineering (Director V.A. Proskurin) has developed a mobile chassis-mounted runabout, a medical diagnostic center for the rural rayons as well as those remote from the administrative centers. A great contribution to the affairs of agriculture has also been made by the scientific collectives at the Institute for Radio Communications, Metering Systems and a whole series of other collectives.

[Shtatnov] But all this and other work in restructuring the defense production lines and laboratories requires investments and a lot of them. No country in the world has carried out conversion without the corresponding investments and the sources for these can be the profit of the enterprises, individual interested investors (agencies, enterprises, regions and private individuals), including, to a greater degree, the state.

[Sklyarov] Under the current difficult conditions for Russia, of course, it is not an easy thing to seek out free financial resources. Nevertheless, the government in the

person of the Ministry of Economy and Finances has received from the Central Bank a credit of some 42 billion rubles and that amount as a low-interest loan should be channeled into carrying out concrete programs of converting the defense enterprises.

At the end of April, together with the Governor B.Ye. Nemtsov, I took to Moscow more than two score programs from the enterprises, we visited the Ministries of Industry and Economy, and had interesting meetings with A.A. Titkin and I.S. Materov. The process of defining the priorities in the governmental structures is very complicated to carry out, but nevertheless at present it has already been possible to include such collectives as the Krasnoye Sormovo Plant, the Burevestnik NII, the Arzamas Instrument Building Plant, the Impuls Design Bureau, the aviation association and others in the first stage for receiving loans.

The oblast's administration is assisting in every possible way so that the investments by the state are used actively for converting defense production, for the purchase of technologies and equipment, for preparing production for the new developments, in a word, creating jobs in the place of the lost ones.

Exports, Public Funding to Drive 'Economic Conversion'

92UM11874 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Jun 92 p 3

[Article by Yevgeniy Panov: "Has the Word Been Found?"]

[Text] Two things have become clear in recent months. The first is that conversion is impossible without a leading idea. The second is that it is completely impossible without money.

The idea was formulated by the President's counselor on the questions of scientific-technological policy and information, Anatoliy Rakitov. The military-industrial complex of the nation had to be turned into the scientific-industrial complex of Russia with the maintaining of its potential.

A financing method was proposed by the state counselor for conversion questions, Mikhail Maley. To put it simply, this is the covering of costs from earnings. The military-industrial complex exports weapons, the earned foreign exchange goes to reconstruct the enterprises. The "economic conversion," as Mikhail Maley has termed this path, should last 3 or 4 years.

In a trip through Sverdlovsk Oblast, Boris Yeltsin gave the "economic conversion" good marks. "Sell tanks overseas," said the President at Uralvagonzavod [Ural Railway Car Plant], "and we will leave you 80 percent of the foreign exchange." It is hard to believe that the Tagil workers will remain alone. Probably very soon other defense enterprises will gain the right to export military equipment.

But the present output of tanks at Uralvagonzavod is currently just one percent of the former volume. Generally, as was stated at a May conference of Boris Yeltsin with the leaders of the MIC [military-industrial complex] it turns out that only one-fifth of its capacity is involved in producing military products while the remainder is civilian. Consequently the MIC is no longer military-industrial but rather a peacetime national economic complex which does a little work for defense.

How is conversion to be financed in these four-fifths of the MIC? From the budget? That is excluded. The budget has no money for conversion. The traditional and sole investor in industry—the state—can no longer do this. Who will assume its role? "The people," stated Igor Klyuchnikov, the chairman of the Directors' Council of the recently established St. Petersburg Military Industrial Corporation (SP VPK). That is well put. Only the people certainly for now are unaware of this. Nevertheless, in purchasing stock in the corporation (at 1,000 rubles a share), the public will invest its hard-earned money in conversion.

The organizations which have founded the SP VPK do not intend to founder. There are 18 of them in St. Petersburg including the Pozitron NPO [scientific production association], the Impuls NPO, the Plant imeni Kalinin PO [production association] and so on to the State Technical University and the newspaper SANKT-PETERBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI. In Moscow there are two: the Military-Industrial Investment Company (VPIK) AO [joint-stock association] and the Finco Ltd. AO. In the Baltic there are four, for example the Baltic Brokers AO.

These are to spread out the process of investment, they will replace the budget artery with millions of capillaries, they will mobilize the public's money for reviving the industry, and will involve the public in normal market behavior. The stockholders from the public are to vote for them by using their rubles. But will they give them their vote? The founders are hoping for this since in the eyes of the stockholders the corporation should appear rather attractive. It is stable, for it is based on production which exists and will exist. It brings together defense enterprises from a very varied and (what is crucially important) science-intensive area and a competitive technological level; these are capable of improving, capable of becoming highly profitable by producing superproducts and thereby attracting domestic and foreign capital. The stockholders can be attracted by the plan to work directly for the public and not for some mythical "ministries of all the people," and the promises of establishing business contacts with the firms of Sweden, Italy, Germany and the U.S. As well there is a list of projects with which they will start (processing agricultural products, reclaiming abandoned oil wells and the development of communications systems) and the extremely short repayment time on the investments, just 2.8 years, and finally, the cheapness of the stocks, just 1,000 rubles.

From the standpoint of today, the exporting of arms, as a method of financing conversion, can resolve individual, short-term problems, Igor Klyuchnikov feels. However, over the long-run this will retard the reforms, since the policy will be maintained of the development of production for the sake of production. Clearly a different path would be preferable, a path which would be beneficial for the entire MIC and not just the one-fifth of it. Certainly it is essential to destroy the aura of "the elect" which even now surrounds the MIC; the defense enterprises must be brought into the general privatization process which all industry is being exposed to and find the algorithm of collaboration between the state and private entrepreneurship. The way to do this is by the forming of joint-stock companies.

To bring together—to the clear mutual interest—the private capital with the state's technological potential at present is generally one of the main tasks. This is the strategy in the activities of the Military-Industrial Investment Company (VPIK) and about which this newspaper has already written. The ideology of the VPIK is close to the founders of the St. Petersburg corporation.

The state, Igor Klyuchnikov proposes, in the person of the Minprom [Ministry of Industry] or the Conversion Committee under the Minprom is capable of establishing a favorable base for the forming of joint-stock companies in the previous self-contained and closed spheres. In turn the SP VPK together with the VPIK by effective investments not only lays down a financial base for forming stock companies, but also forms the key elements of the new market investment mechanism. Its other elements are the stock exchanges, and for this reason the collaboration of the SP VPK with the St. Petersburg Stock Exchange is in no way accidental. And with the AO Baltic Association of Stock Markets as well. Certainly in this mechanism room must be found for the banks. And the AO St. Petersburg Stock Exchange Bank is represented in it.

With the setting up of the SP VPK, another step has been taken to form a stock market, a national stock system. If this does in fact appear, the question of any special sources for financing conversion will disappear. Nor will there be any necessity to promote any special conversion programs. The real program is the program of building market investment mechanisms in Russia.

"Not conversion itself, but rather the financing of conversion," clarified Sergey Petrov, the chairman of the VPIK Directors' Council. And he immediately added ironically: "There is a great difference, isn't there?" In actuality, if the ideology of conversion—that is, the converting of the MIC into the nation's scientific-technological complex—is accepted, then only one stumbling block remains, and that is the question of funds.

Impending Disaster at Arzamas-16 Nuclear Weapons Plant

92UM1190A Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian
25 Jun 92 p 4

[Article by Igor Mosin: "Arzamas-16 is Concerned..."]

[Text] The developers of nuclear weapons have sent a letter to the Russian President B. Yeltsin, and in which they warn him of the crisis situation developing at Russia's nuclear complex.

"The process of the collapse of our scientific and technological potential," related the First Deputy Chairman of the Central Council of the Union of Nuclear Weapons Developers, V. Moskalenko, "is assuming a threatening character. You must understand the specifics of our job as we are at work developing nuclear arms. Here there are no textbooks. The agents of experience and knowledge are specific people. We pass on our skills from hand to hand. In the entire world you could count the number of such specialists on the fingers of your hands. We voluntarily have devoted our entire lives to the fatherland. Now the people are beginning to doubt the advisability of the work and are seeking to find employment for their abilities elsewhere. Social stress is increasing. And how could it be otherwise as the average wage of a science associate is 1,400 rubles and that of a doctor of science 2,100. The consequences of such an attitude to the developers of nuclear weapons are difficult to predict."

When bus drivers go on strike, that is bad enough, and when physicians do it is even worse, but it would be hard to imagine what would happen with a strike by the nuclear workers. The letter to the president is a very serious symptom of the malaise in the nuclear complex. This means that the universal collapse of the economy is entering a qualitatively new phase. It has reached the holy of holies of any state and which must be supported and protected in every possible way, that is, its nuclear heart. This heart should beat smoothly in any situation, regardless of the change in leaders and the state organization. Breakdowns are fraught with unpredictable consequences.

The nuclear workers have every reason to turn to the President. At the beginning of the year, Yeltsin visited Arzamas-16 and this factory of atomic thought was given the resounding name of the Russian Federal Nuclear Center. Following the established tradition, Boris Nikolayevich promised to settle the urgent problems of the weapons developers. He issued an decree. Alas, as they say, things are still waiting. For two months the people have not received the promised wages. As someone put it jokingly: at present we live in debt and in the autumn they will pay us with potatoes from the garden. Prices in the stores are scarcely less than in Moscow. But even if we receive the promised increase, inflation has already made short work of it.

Housing construction has been frozen, the social and cultural facilities are not being developed, and money is not being allocated for conducting fundamental and preventive work. As a result the most highly skilled personnel are forced to look elsewhere in search for their daily bread. There is no influx of young personnel. These processes are leading to a drop in the intellectual, technological and disciplinary level of the nuclear weapons developers. At the same time the level of safety is dropping in working with the nuclear weapons. The state which possesses the most destructive weapons does not have the right to even think of the rise of such destructive processes in its nuclear complex. Nuclear weapons are too serious a thing to deal negligently with them. Certainly the tragedy of Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Chernobyl are proof of this?

At Arzamas-16 they showed a news film of the testing of a 5-megaton hydrogen bomb. I was interested in what would happen to Moscow if such a device were exploded over it. I was told that everything would disappear from the face of the earth, and St. Petersburg would also be touched. I must admit that this gave me goose-flesh. Seemingly the current generation of politicians has not completely realized and become aware of what responsibility rests on the shoulders of the leaders of the nuclear powers.

In exchange for their destructive force, nuclear weapons require unflagging attention, the highest carefulness, high skills in handling and constant improvement in operation. Such is the dangerous nature of the genie which we have summoned from the depths of matter. He has his own rules of conduct. For this reason it is essential to be involved with the nuclear weapons and they cannot be forgotten for an instant. This is a headache for mankind, but evidently at present it is easier to live with it than without it...

The genetics of modern nuclear weapons is such that they require regular testing and constant control. To put it figuratively, each bomb lives its own life. We have only to stop monitoring this process, out of political, economic, social or other reasons, and disaster awaits us. With nuclear weapons there is no such thing as a little accident.

Chernobyl has shown that there are areas in which society must provide itself with 100-percent security against accident. In terms of nuclear weapons this is trebly pertinent. But if the president does not fulfill his promises, the nuclear workers are concerned over who will give us the guarantees for this security?

Better Utilization of Scrap Metal Needed in Conversion

92UM1196A Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
26 Jun 92 First edition p 2

[Article by M. Rebrov: "Money Down the Drain: Thoughts on Situation Affecting Country and Defense Complex"]

[Text] Let me start by citing some figures. The country's metallurgical enterprises have a requirement for 109 million tonnes of scrap metal. A year, that is. The utilization of this "raw material" would make it possible to reduce by a factor of about 20 the costs associated with conventional steel production, with greater metal output and with significant abatement of harm to the environment.

Asking the question: How to obtain so much metal? is naive in the extreme. Abandoned and rusting (literally) on the shores of Russia's rivers and seas are approximately 30,000 (!) large and small ships weighing from 100 to 2,000 tonnes. Lying around and awaiting useful application are almost 2,500 long-discarded steam locomotives, 3,000 diesel-electric locomotives, and more than 40,000 railroad freight cars. The same metallurgical plants have accumulated a large amount of scrap items each weighing as much as 70 to 100 tonnes (totaling several million tonnes). We can add to that military equipment taken out of service: 10,000 tanks weighing a total of almost 0.5 million tonnes, hundreds of armored personnel carriers, and fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. Statisticians point out that the piles of scrap and waste alone resulting from ferrous metal processing exceed 100 million tonnes.

The above is actually enormously profitable for metallurgy; a good manager would earn quite a bit of money. (In various areas of the world, a tonne of this material would bring from 100 to 200 dollars.) What we are doing is throwing money down the drain. Not only are we unable to make something of that which lies at our very feet, but we would in addition go ahead and employ yesterday's technology: gas cutting. And what would we get?

We would get a poor output (not more than 6 tonnes of scrap per cutter per shift); considerable materials consumption (from 1.5 to 5 oxygen tanks per tonne of metal); unsafe and at times dangerous working conditions; and ecological harm (estimated at 150 to 300 rubles per each tonne of metal scrap.)

The losses are enormous. The defense complex is offering new blasting technologies for application to cutting apart items consisting mostly of metals. These technologies promise smaller costs, significant reduction in work time (by a factor up to 10), and a high assurance of minimal ecological harm. The following examples may be cited. Preliminary disassembly of a 300-tonne barge would require 30 hours in the case of the new blasting technology instead of the 4 weeks associated with gas cutting. The IL-28 aircraft could be taken apart in 1.5 to 2 hours. The ER type steam locomotive (weighing 120 tonnes) could be cut up in 28 hours, while discarded tanks (T-54, T-62) would take 2 to 3 hours. In a word, that which the defense complex offers would make it possible to supply metallurgical plants with raw materials, clean up rivers, lakes, and seas, and remove

rusting machinery and equipment from presently untapped sources of supply. This would generally be to everyone's advantage.

Incidentally, this blasting technique could be employed in other applications: for clearing areas undergoing enterprise reconstruction; dismantling of chemical plants; cleanup operations after the occurrence of accidents; creating of underground galleries and tunnels; and carrying out various construction operations. Highly efficient is the use of configuration blasting charges (zaryady konturnogo vzyraviya) in underground operations. This kind of blasting produces any shape desired, without the need for applying "finishing touches." Configuration blasting compared with conventional methods would make it possible to save an average of 1,500 rubles per running meter, with work time cut by almost half and amount of hauling reduced by a factor as much as five.

The clearing of wooded areas for new plantings, pasture land, garden plots and construction, building of roads; breaking up of ice floes without causing damage to dams and offshore drilling rigs; maintaining navigability in northern latitudes; and control of potential snow avalanches and landslides, are all examples of the jobs explosions can do. But,...

Finding myself in the epicenter of the problem, while conversing with personnel of the Department of Munitions and Special Chemistry - people who come up with many innovations, which, unfortunately, are still unapplied, I wondered sadly why we have no good managers, ones who would be interested in enriching the state treasury. That is why the people's money is going down the drain.

And one final thought. If people who create new technologies are going to work for their own benefit, while everyone else chooses to ignore the rules of economic sense and do nothing but wait for manna to drop from heaven, it will be difficult to expect conversion to be successful. The latter will continue to be nothing more than a kind of game, a mere one-way street.

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

Initiative as Basis for Rebirth of Tactics
92UM1072A Moscow VOYENNYY VESTNIK
in Russian No 8, Aug 91 pp 33-35

[Article by Colonel P. Konoply: "Revive Initiative"]

[Text] Lately the question of a revival of tactics as the art of warfare has been discussed animatedly in the military press. In examining its aspects, the articles' authors rightly note the increased significance under present conditions of stratagem, surprise, nonstandard procedures of battle and so on. At the same time, I would like to note that in my view, the important thing in solving

the problem lies in educating a soldier, NCO, and officer of initiative. The essence of a renewal of tactics consists of a revival of initiative.

The striving of a commander and staff to independently find and apply in practice the most effective method of performing a mission in accordance with the situation and the senior commander's concept can be called the content of initiative. It permits imposing one's will on the enemy, it is a precondition of surprise, and it ensures full use of combat capabilities of personnel and equipment in combined-arms battle.

The correlation among centralized command and control, its rigid scope, and subordinates' independence is not something that is frozen. To the contrary, it is lively and changeable. On the one hand, with a growth of spatial scope and fluidity of combat operations, the senior commander will not always receive exhaustive data on situation changes and simply is forced to give subordinates more independence. This trend has long-established traditions. It was A. V. Suvorov who said: "The local person has better judgement based on proximity and circumstances; I commanded forward, you see and do not go forward."

On the other hand, the appearance and development of automated command and control systems sharply increases the scope and validity of situation data coming to the senior commander. It becomes possible for an operational-level commander to know the situation and status of all subordinate personnel and equipment right down to battalion and company. The time of reaction to situation changes is reduced by an order of magnitude. Therefore centralization of command and control objectively increases with the introduction of automated command and control systems.

Thus one should speak not about initiative in general, but about its **reasonableness**. For example, one would not categorize a subunit's move to the enemy's forward edge before the established time in any way as reasonable actions no matter what good intentions guided its commander, for because of this coordination is disrupted, preconditions are created for destroying attacking subunits in detail and, finally, the threat arises of an air and artillery strike against friendly forces.

Reasonable initiative consists of independently making an original decision, seeking procedures and methods of actions unexpected for the enemy (but not for adjacent units and the senior commander!) and employing advisable combinations in aligning the combat formation, and all this within the framework of the superior commander's concept. Its basis is formed by the ability to correctly understand the goal and concept of upcoming actions, clarify the mission received, and thoroughly analyze the situation.

The moral-psychological aspect also is of no small importance here. It is common knowledge that irresponsibility and the striving to evade resolution of urgent

problems has become widespread in our society. Negative phenomena also did not bypass the Army. A type of officer formed over long years of a suppression of independence who did not dare to assume full responsibility for an assigned job. For the sake of fairness I will note that leaders of the senior level who suppressed subordinates' initiative by excessive coddling contributed to that to no small extent. The sad experience of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War vividly demonstrated what this leads to in a combat situation.


Failures quickly forced giving up excessive centralization. Subsequently a display of reasonable initiative in battle became a mass phenomenon in the Red Army. Special attention in training subunits and units began to be given to mobility, boldness of actions, independence of individual elements of the combat formation, and development of the initiative of fighting men and commanders, and the situation changed rather quickly. Beginning with the second period of the war, Soviet troops often began to defeat the enemy by ability and not numbers.

For example, during an operation to liberate Belorussia in 1944, a tank platoon commanded by Lieutenant V. Pushkarev was attached to a motorized rifle battalion and was advancing in the direction of Mlynny. The mission was to defeat the enemy here and subsequently seize a bridge across the Lesna River, which was southwest of Trostyanitsa (see diagram). By 1300 hours on 20 August the platoon and a motorized rifle company had moved to the north edge of a grove south of Mlynny, where they came under fire by the enemy. Quickly deploying into combat formation, the subunits took the populated point.

Lieutenant Pushkarev was just about to deploy the tanks toward the bridge to the northwest, but then his attention was drawn by a column of enemy vehicles moving a little to the east along a dirt road in the direction of Trostyanitsa. The platoon commander presumed, not without grounds, that the enemy was heading for a second crossing. He decided to attack the column, reported to the battalion commander, and rushed toward the river. Destroying the Germans, the platoon took the bridge without a pause. Subsequently the main body crossed over it, since the second bridge (the initial target of the attack) turned out to have been blown up by the fascists.

Lieutenant Pushkarev's actions serve as a convincing illustration of the importance of timely, reasonable initiative in battle. In displaying it, the officer was sure of the senior commander's support, and this was additional motivation for the nonstandard decision. Had the lieutenant precisely followed only the letter and not the spirit of the order, he would most likely have had to organize a river assault crossing fraught with heavy losses.

The ability to display initiative is not an innate quality. Of course, every normal person has an inherent desire to



do an assigned job in the best way possible, but military specifics are such that it is impossible to permit an individual soldier, officer, or subunit to act only according to his or its own understanding. A high degree of coordination of all measures and consideration of a multitude of factors is required here. This presumes detailed, vast knowledge, correct determination of the line of conduct, and an ability to choose the correct path corresponding to the senior commander's general concept.

Meanwhile it is not often that one encounters a shaping and developing of initiative in various categories of servicemen in the aims of classes and exercises either among the troops or in military educational institutions. In organizing for battle and during battle, commanders often display passiveness and indecisiveness even in simple situations. Some commanders assert that a fear of responsibility influences officers. In agreeing with them, I would like to add that a low degree of professionalism both of commanders and of subordinates also tells. Initiative is born only on the basis of firm knowledge.

The familiar instructions of the USSR minister of defense of two years ago facilitated an improvement in tactical proficiency and a revival of initiative to no small extent. As a result, there were stepped-up searches for

new methods of training officers and subunits, more attention began to be given to independence in decision-making, and room for commanders' creativeness expanded.

Tactical missions are rehearsed and short tactical training problems are solved in a new way in the chair headed by Major General A. Malyshev at the Military Academy of Armored Troops imeni R. Ya. Malinovskiy. For example, in studying a defensive topic, students are given only certain data on the enemy and adjacent units, the combat mission in a general form, and the time for briefing the decision to the senior commander. Other information is omitted in accordance with requirements of the regulation. The officers independently determine the direction for concentration of main efforts, the area on whose holding the stability of the defense depends, the outline of the FEBA, number and outline of trenches and positions, densities of antitank weapons and tanks by axes, readiness of the fire plan and engineer work, and so on. It is even recommended that students substantiate fire engagement of the enemy by the senior commander's weapons and submit it in the form of a request.

The most advisable variant is determined after each person's concept is discussed, and this is approved by the instructor. In playing out the dynamics of battle, trainees often have to act in crisis situations characterized by contradictory situation data. They consider several decision variants for each one, and nonstereotyped actions, activeness and initiative are encouraged.

Experience has shown that this method spurs an interest in tactics, develops officers' sense of their own worth, and prompts them to think creatively and strive to understand the art of warfare. In my view, to instil and develop initiative one should not excessively restrict subordinates' actions or indicate to them specific procedures and methods for performing a mission. A well-trained officer always will be able to execute a combat order, in which it is enough to indicate the goal of an upcoming battle and the subunit's mission and to give information about the higher echelon's mission, about the enemy, and about adjacent units.

In finishing the conversation about instilling initiative, I would like to advise all officers: before complaining about a superior's coddling, try to take a look at your own work method from the side. Are your subordinates capable of displaying initiative? Do not forget that well-known military leaders also began with the platoon, and they always recalled with love those company, battalion and regimental commanders who encouraged initiative and gave the right to err, to seek, and to be independent.

Maskirovka and Simulation

92UM1073A Moscow VOYENNYY VESTNIK
in Russian No 8, Aug 91 pp 42-45

[Article by Major General V. Krivilev, doctor of technical sciences, professor, under rubric "By Way of Discussion": "Stratagem: Maskirovka and Simulation"]

[Text] As a rule stratagem is thought about only some time after a victory, and then the talk is more about superiority of weapons, valor of soldiers and sagacity of military leaders.

But an analysis of the dynamics of the largest engagements shows that success was laid down at the very beginning, when the concept was being worked out, and the result was determined by how fully the concept was fulfilled.

Stratagem is directed toward changing the combat situation and creating the most favorable conditions for defeating the enemy. Its essence lies in the skillfulness, inventiveness and resourcefulness of the concept and effect on the enemy's will and in the ability to destroy him with fewest losses for oneself.

It is common knowledge that one tries to achieve the goals contained in stratagem by carrying out a set of organizational and engineer measures.

Simultaneity in performing both kinds of measures is envisaged inasmuch as they mutually supplement each other, increase authenticity and ensure verisimilitude of objects or the situation.

This means that concepts of stratagem are realized by different procedures and methods, but maskirovka [lit. "camouflage", however, includes "concealment" and "deception"—FBIS] and simulation, which use large masses of troops for implementation, should be regarded as the most widespread.

Man used maskirovka in itself back in the earliest stages of his establishment and development. Even in hunting animals, not to mention in armed struggle, success accompanied the one who fulfilled concealment techniques most skillfully.

Maskirovka gained a certain stability, its most effective techniques were rehearsed and equipment was improved in military conflicts.

In the time of Louis XIV, for example, residents of the small town of Besancon, surrounded by the French, stretched wide panels over the bridge from the city to the fortress and concealed movement over it from the attackers.

Peter I deceived the Swedes and won the Battle of Poltava in 1709 by using numerous stratagems, including dressing the Guards Novgorod Regiment in the uniform of new recruits of the Russian Army.

During the withdrawal of troops after the Battle of Borodino, M. I. Kutuzov ordered bonfires to be lit all night at positions being abandoned and thereby deceived Napoleon, who did not find our Army in the morning.

Prototypes of vertical drapes appeared during 1854-1856 in the form of lengths of ship's ropes with which Russian seamen and gunners covered their gun ports.

Later dummy artillery batteries and other objects appeared during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878.

In these same years many armies began forming engineer maskirovka subunits. Some 150 teams of maskirovka instructors were formed in the Russian 7th Army alone and it was arranged to supply them with special equipment and materials (paints, paint sprayers, smoke pots).

Subsequently the arrangement of flat overhead nets and creation of dummy railroad lines, depots and other installations spread. Smoke screens began to be used more widely.

Maskirovka was further developed in World War I. The improvement of rifled weapons and the increased range at which artillery engaged targets posed tasks involving concealment of installations in the depth of defense as well. For example, the 1916 "Ukazaniya po ukrepleniyu pozitsiy" [Instructions on Fortification of Positions] of the Russian General Headquarters noted: "Everything accessible to the eye of an artillery observer will be demolished. Consequently, it is necessary to use maskirovka." Enemies' capabilities in range of reconnaissance expanded considerably with the appearance of aerial reconnaissance, and troops were forced to use maskirovka not only at forward positions, but also in the operational depth and in disposition areas of reserves and rear installations.

To deceive the enemy regarding the axis of main attack in preparation for the Brusilov breakthrough in May 1916 under the direction of K. I. Velichko, vast engineer maskirovka measures were conducted across a broad front to conceal unit concentration areas, to camouflage actual artillery firing positions and to show dummy ones. The result was the operation's success.

Maskirovka and simulation also were given very careful attention in the first years of Soviet power. One of the first publications about them generalized results of experience of a two-day deception maneuver during 21-22 August 1924 executed by units of the Moscow Military District and military educational institutions in the vicinity of Moscow.

Establishment of a higher school of maskirovka in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army dates back to that time. Its graduates subsequently made a significant contribution to tactics and strategy of combat operations.

World War II advanced the development of maskirovka and simulation to a leading place. The upgrading of

aerial reconnaissance assets permitting objects to be photographed with high resolution served as the main incentive for this.

It would be possible to single out from examples of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War the successful maskirovka of Moscow, thanks to which German air strikes were ineffective.

Successful use of maskirovka permitted predetermining success in many operations to a considerable extent, and its scale grew considerably. For example, over 215,000 m² of flat overhead nets were set up and hundreds of dummy areas were prepared just in the Jassy-Kishinev Operation.

One also should note results of maskirovka and simulation measures performed by the German Army: underground plants, airfields, command posts and other installations functioned essentially until the war's end. Of course, it is also possible to speak here about the high degree of the installations' protection, but in a number of cases their survivability was ensured only because of maskirovka measures and simulation. For example, a great deal of simulation work was done in Ploesti to preserve the oil fields and refineries. Several dummy Ploestis with plants, unloading stations, rolling stock and even street lighting were erected.

The majority of real enemy installations were preserved until the war's end despite the fact that the Allies knew about large-scale simulation measures.

Here it is apropos to direct attention to a purely psychological effect: when a pilot knew where a target was located and what its revealing signs and appearance were, and when he saw something similar on the approach, although not situated quite where it was supposed to be, he delivered a strike against the dummy target and figured intelligence had been inaccurate, especially as the decision was being made under the effect of enemy antiaircraft fire and with essentially no time for reflection.

Great Patriotic War experience and its successful conclusion generally showed that maskirovka and simulation played an important role as components of strategem in defeating the enemy.

In the postwar period, during the 1950's and 1960's, interest in maskirovka abated somewhat in connection with the appearance of nuclear weapons with their high destructive capability. The opinion formed that if coordinates of target locations were known (such as strategic missile silo launchers, command and control facilities and so on), destruction was unavoidable no matter how they were camouflaged.

After the Chernobyl accident and the Challenger catastrophe, international public opinion and the most responsible politicians of the West began to incline toward the thought of the undesirability of using nuclear weapons in combat operations. This in turn led to

intensified development of conventional weapons and precision weapons in particular.

The S&T revolution in military affairs led to an extraordinary saturation of modern armies with various kinds of combat equipment. The nature of how combat operations were conducted also changed. They are distinguished by great dynamism, fluidity, and high mobility. (The Persian Gulf war is a vivid example of this.)

In addition, there was a significant increase in capabilities of reconnaissance equipment using the radar, thermal and optical bands of the electromagnetic wave spectrum in connection with the appearance and continuous upgrading of Earth satellites. Weapons functioning in the "see and kill" mode also are being upgraded. Detection and engagement time was reduced to 15-20 minutes. Precision munitions are fitted with dual-spectrum homing heads and register a target in the radar and thermal electromagnetic wave bands. (For example, the probability of killing a tank exceeds 0.5.)

It must be noted that the effectiveness of aerial reconnaissance and target designation grew when AWACS aircraft became operational in NATO countries.

All these factors dictate heightened demands on techniques and means of maskirovka and simulation, i.e., the need to conceal not only optical revealing signs, but also radar and thermal signs. Thus a target concealed by an ordinary camouflage net will be visible on the radar screen, and its heated part and the purpose and nature of its functioning also will be "visible" for thermal reconnaissance equipment. Consequently, for skillful maskirovka and simulation it is necessary to use equipment operating effectively across the spectrum.

The significance of using the terrain's concealing properties has not decreased under present conditions; to the contrary, it has increased. Placing troops and troop installations in dead ground and behind natural screens (forests, groves, residential and industrial developments) permits increasing their survivability considerably.

The terrain's concealing properties are characterized by its appearance attributes, maskirovka capacity, degree of concealment provided, and presence of dead ground. They should be taken into account in laying out movement routes, connecting passages, trenches and communications lines and in placing equipment on an exposed surface. The conspicuousness of long objects is reduced by placing them on the borders of contrasting patterns along dams, ditches, fences and so on. In placing single objects it is necessary above all to make use of natural screens, preclude the silhouetting of objects, and set them up at a distance from precise reference points with consideration of relief features, desirably in the shadow of local objects. The presence of objects' own revealing shadows also is considered at the same time. In this case they must be so situated that the shadow falls on local objects (bushes, plantings, elements of demolished buildings and so on) and is distorted.

In evaluating the terrain's concealing properties one usually operates with concepts of backgrounds, the most widespread being with vegetative cover (grass, bushes, trees and so on), without vegetative cover (mountain-desert terrain, sandy shore, bare talus, precipices), water surfaces (rivers, lakes, seas) and residential and industrial structures.

Wooded, hilly and mountainous terrain is the most favorable for maskirovka. Various kinds of residential and industrial installations also have high concealing properties.

Landscapes with trees and dense underbrush contribute to rather effective concealment of personnel and equipment, and cleared strips help conceal roads and approach routes to and between objects. In choosing equipment locations, such as in day rest areas, greatest preference should be given to bushes, since they have considerable spottiness caused not only by differing diameters of tops, but also by size and the configuration of shadows from the bushes.

Backgrounds with grassy covers and field and garden crops are less effective from a maskirovka standpoint. Backgrounds devoid of vegetation (bare soils, fills and so on) are favorable because of their sharply contrasting spottiness and diversity of the pattern of spots (with the exception of level sandy terrain).

It is especially important to take advantage of concealing properties of areas being occupied by troops under conditions of implementation of a defensive doctrine, when their fortification will begin immediately before the beginning of or during aggression. This method of protecting troops will be prevalent with respect to other engineer measures included in the overall system.

One of the important maskirovka techniques among many is painting, which was used for the first time during the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). Because British troops were superior in number to the Boer troops by several times, the latter were forced to make maximum use of the terrain's concealing properties and, along with other stratagem techniques, to use camouflage painting of artillery and uniforms. Later it was used widely during the Russo-Japanese War and in World War I, when the khaki color appeared. Since then almost all world armies have given preference to uniforms of protective coloration, which proved to be most successful and is the practice in our time.

This also goes for military equipment, for which two-, three- and four-color painting is used. With multiple-color painting, an effect is seen where individual spots close in color to the predominant background color "disappear in the background".

Local construction materials and painting compounds (soil, clay, lime, cement and so on) can be used for these purposes during combat operations. They show their high effectiveness in all working bands of the electromagnetic wave spectrum.

Techniques for concealing troop fortifications hold a special place. Take just the firing positions of automatic weapons and artillery, which are the basis of a defense. They usually are concealed as local objects, and whether or not they remain undamaged depends on the art of maskirovka.

Work to erect troop fortifications for maskirovka purposes should be done chiefly under conditions of poor visibility (night, snowfall, dust storms and so on).

Experience shows that with engineer preparation of areas, it is advisable to plan 20-25 percent of the time directly for maskirovka, and it must be done in stages, not leaving uncamouflaged objects for hours of daylight.

Special attention should be given to maskirovka of entrances to structures and connecting passages, concealing them or extending them outside the outlines of troop fortifications. If this is not done, the enemy will see dead-ends and will have no difficulty determining the location of objects. Also remember that carelessness in performing maskirovka work (piles of construction waste, trampled areas around structures) nullifies all concealment measures.

No matter how skillfully it may be done, maskirovka alone will not permit ensuring desired survivability. Having lost an object, but knowing that it exists, the enemy will step up reconnaissance and in the final account will discover it. This is why maskirovka must definitely be supplemented by simulation.

Specific requirements are placed on means of simulation, taking into account the multifunctional nature of reconnaissance equipment and guidance systems. While during World War II mockups were fabricated chiefly out of boards, plywood and even soil for showing revealing signs of their appearance in the optical band, this now is not enough. One has to reproduce the corresponding radar cross-section in the radar band of wavelengths and show the most heated elements (for example, the rear armor and exhaust gases for a tank). Only in this case will the mockup have the necessary signs. It is very difficult to practically implement this set of tasks that are technically rather complex, but judging from press reports, such mockups are being successfully adopted (that was the case in the Near Eastern conflict). They can be pneumatic and made of metallized rubber or plastic to increase mobility and transportability and reduce labor inputs for installation. This achieves a high degree of detail and similarity to the real object both in the optical as well as the radar electromagnetic wave bands.

Thus at the present time stratagem not only has not lost its original significance and pertinence, but even has moved to the level of leading factors which determine success in the battle and operation. Commanders at all levels must constantly remember this. It was the very ancient Chinese military leader Sun Wu who said: "The general's art should consist of keeping the enemy totally ignorant regarding the place of battle and concealing

from him the points being supported. If he succeeds in this and is able to conceal the most minute measures, he will not only be a skillful general, but also an uncommon person..."

It remains only to add that such an art is a basic component of a commander's military proficiency and professionalism.

Footnotes

1. VOYENNYY VESTNIK, No 6, 1991.

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**MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN
MILITARY AFFAIRS**

**Report on Draft Completion of CW Treaty in
Geneva**

92UM1193A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Jun 92 First edition p 3

[Article by Major M. Pogorelyy: "Chemical Warfare Disarmament Treaty Readied"]

[Text] According to reports received from Geneva, the disarmament talks in progress there have produced a draft treaty banning the use of chemical weapons. The agreement has won virtually unanimous approval by all delegations participating in the talks. More accurately, not a single dissenting vote was cast.

The draft calls for a total ban on the development, production, selling, transfer, and, especially, the use, of chemical weapons. The document also obligates the states entering into the agreement to destroy all their existing stocks of toxic chemical agents and the enterprises which produce them within a period of 10 years after the treaty takes effect.

Germany's representative Adolph von Wagner, who is also the chairman of the working group that wrote the draft, stated that the system developed for international monitoring of treaty provisions is very effective and reliable. Von Wagner pointed out that the participants are still at work ironing out a few items for the addendum. The latter include precise definitions of chemical weapons, toxic agents, and agent components to be destroyed; cases where the use of mob dispersal gases (such as tear gas) may be used; and certain inspection procedures.

Expectations are that the treaty will be signed in Paris by the end of the year. At least 50 countries, including Russia and the USA, have indicated their intent to be among the first to sign.

SECURITY SERVICES

Interview With Russian MVD Personnel Chief

92UM1202A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Jun 92 First edition p 4

[Interview with Col Internal Service S. Pylev, chief of the Personnel Directorate of Russia's Ministry of Internal Affairs, by Lt Col S. Kalinayev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "Specially for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "Where Is the Militia Hurting?"]

[Text] The Directorate for Personnel was recently established within the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. Col Internal Service S. Pylev, candidate of philosophical sciences and honored cultural worker of Russia, was appointed its chief.

[Kalinayev] Stanislav Semenovich, as a specialist on your level it is perhaps simply embarrassing to mention once again that "ninth wave" of crime which, combined with other factors, has brought our society to the brink of destabilization and anarchy. And now, against this background, a new directorate is established within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. But then the majority of our overwrought people expect law-enforcement agencies to establish firm order and apply substantial, rigid pressure upon the hooligans and particularly the criminal elements.

[Pylev] I understand your question. But let us figure out who is supposed to maintain that law and order desired by everyone. In the broad sense, of course, the entire society, our entire people. But first of all, the man in the police uniform. And his main mark of valor, I am convinced, is not so much his ability accurately to fire organic weapons or to employ buckshot effectively (although this too is essential today), but primarily his ability to remain a human being, rational, fair and, if you like, with a conscience, in which the spiritual elements, morality... predominate over the other professional qualities.

[Kalinayev] That is, the "vengeful sword of the revolution" is a thing of the past?

[Pylev] In that distant interpretation based on the infamous class awareness and revolutionary vigilance, of course it is. Today—and this might sound incongruous—putting the professional, organizational and operational qualities of the workers aside, I would place the emphasis on their culture and spirituality in the broadest sense of the word.

This is the situation today. In a survey we conducted of 5,000 workers not a single one (!) answered "kind" to the question: What kind of person do you want to be in your work in the militia? And this moral quality is up there with courage, strength and bravery. This is why I am convinced that we must develop a "militia guard" for which the spiritual attitude of "I have honor" will be sacred.

[Kalinayev] I would like to interrupt you at this point, Stanislav Semenovich. For years we wrote about our militia and depicted it in exclusively rosy colors, saying things like "soldiers of law and order," "serving day and night" and so forth. Today *glasnost* and a certain degree of openness permit us to say that all of this was exaggerated, to put it mildly. Cases of drunkenness, corruption, actual betrayal... have all come to the surface.

[Pylev] Unfortunately, these things do take place. And not merely because the militia is a part of our society with its many flaws. It is both more simple and more complex than that. I swear that personnel are losing faith in the importance of their labor, sensing that their profession is losing its prestige by the day and ceasing to feel that the society needs them. That is self-evident, but the low level of social protection and of material and technical support for the service, and—what is more alarming—the increasing number of instances in which the militia is "offered up" are turning it into a piece of small change in the game of political ambitions of the various opposing forces. Take just the events of 28 February of this year or the quite recent passions surrounding the television center at Ostankino. This is precisely how the image of an enemy is formed in the eyes of the people out of what one thinks of as yesterday's defenders. It is because some of them, weak in spirit, so to speak, or simply people who do not belong with us, start to engage in commerce, succumb to corruption and set out on a path of crime.

Now let me cite some facts and figures which are painful to us. Last year the number of workers tried as criminals rose by 25% to 1,620. This included increases of 40.3% for theft, 68% for bribery, 18.7% for robbery and 60% for speculation.

Here are several quite recent examples. A certain M., chief of the UVD [directorate of internal affairs] in Orenburg Oblast, helped a cafe manager acquire 100 cases of vodka and arranged for their resale at speculative prices. Workers Zh., M. and S. in the internal affairs department in the city of Rzhev, Tver Oblast, accepted 30 cases of vodka as bribes from the workers of one joint-stock company. Inspector I., an inspector with the UVD's GAI [State Motor-Vehicle Inspectorate] in the city of Cherepovets, Vologda Oblast, accepted a bribe for allowing the removal of metal to Estonia without a license.... I want to make it clear that I am not revealing the names of these individuals only because their cases are currently under investigation.

The educational agencies and our own failures are undoubtedly partly to blame. By not meeting the spiritual needs of the worker, we have created a spiritual void, a niche which is filled sooner or later by other "values"—drunkenness, for example. Drunkenness is involved in every fourth crime committed by our workers and around 30% of the DTP [traffic accidents].

[Kalinayev] It seems to me, however, the very fact that you yourself are openly talking about these things is grounds

for hope that not all is lost, that sooner or later the MVD will rid itself of this corruption.

[Pylev] I believe that. I still want to stress the fact, however, that the incidents cited are more the exception than the rule. In the overall picture, though, the aggressiveness of the criminal elements has grown immeasurably in general and particularly toward the workers of internal affairs agencies. There were 1,160 attacks on them in 1991, an increase of almost 30% over the figure for 1990. Furthermore, 78 people were killed and 556 workers were wounded in these incidents. In all 301 people died in the performance of their duty last year. During the first 5 months of this year alone 35 militia workers have been killed and 225 wounded in run-ins with thugs. In short, the audacity and cruelty of the criminals know no bounds. On 2 May, on a train in the Yessentuki-Kislovodsk sector, two unknowns fired point-blank with a semiautomatic rifle at Sr Sgt Yu. Zuyev and V. Shmatov, LOVD [expansion unknown] workers. At the beginning of the year thugs broke into the apartment of A. Kartashov, senior agent with the Solikamsk GOVD [municipal department of internal affairs] in Perm Oblast, inflicted seven knife wounds upon his mother, resulting in her death, and strangled his four-year old son.

Good people devoted to their work are dying. Sorrow is affecting homes and families. As we pay our final respects to the victims of the criminal outrages, we consider our main task to be that of comforting and helping the family. And, of course, of seeing that the insurance and benefits prescribed by the Law on the Militia are paid. Also to involve charity funds and public organizations in the matter. Each year we hold meetings in the ministry with the families of those who have died, and each case is not just a touching event but also an opportunity once again to feel that we are a single family with common joys and sorrows.

[Kalinayev] Yes, these cases—I refer to the deaths of people—are sad. The losses are irreplaceable. We are, however, talking about members of the militia authorized to use weapons in acute, so to speak, situations. Do you not have some sort of problems here which are hidden from the uninitiated?

[Pylev] With respect to the use of organic weapons, this happens constantly today. In connection with this, however, I would like to turn the conversation to a somewhat different area. We are very concerned about the fact that 196 civilians died in 1991 from the use of organic weapons (an increase of 42% over 1990).

But this is the situation. Far from all of these cases involved shooting with intent to harm. The combat training specialists have some work to do in this area. There is also a psychological element, however. The personnel train in firing the weapons mainly at shooting-ranges with normal lighting and stationary targets. That is, in artificial conditions. Upon finding themselves in

extreme circumstances the personnel are prepared neither technically nor mentally to use the weapons.

All of this is making it necessary extensively to expand the effort to rehabilitate the workers psychologically and to set up offices and sites for providing psychological and emotional support.

There is also another reason for the importance of this work. I am telling the press about this for the first time. Unfortunately, the number of suicides among workers with internal affairs agencies is increasing by the year. Last year we were missing 185 workers in our ranks from this cause. This is 5.7% more than in 1990. More than 40% of the suicides are linked to some kind of domestic problems, every fourth one has to do with conflicts on the job and every fifth occurred during work hours or on agency premises.

[Kalinayev] Stanislav Semenovich, our conversation has developed into a sort of review, so to speak, of problem areas for the internal affairs agencies. We have therefore not gotten around to discussing in detail the tasks of your directorate....

[Pylev] I cannot agree with you. Everything said here has to do with the competence of our structure. We simply do not intend to operate with the old directive-and-pressure methods. We have begun a study of acute problems, placing the emphasis on the human being in the militia shoulder boards, on his service, his life and personal circumstances. We hope to arrive at the necessary solutions in this way. Let me concretely identify the areas of focus in our work. They are the social and legal protection of the personnel, moral and psychological preparation, educational work and culture.

[Kalinayev] If it is no secret, how many do you have on your staff?

[Pylev] Slightly more than 30.

[Kalinayev] Not many....

[Pylev] Perhaps, but we shall operate according to Suvorov: not with numbers but with ability.

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